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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL
ROOM 250 HUTCHINS HALL
FRIDAY, MARCH 22, 2002
INTRODUCTION
WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
DEAN JEFFREY S. LEHMAN: Okay everyone, let's start. I'm Jeff
Lehman, Dean of the Law School and it's a privilege to welcome you
here this morning.
Law is arguably the most important instrument through which a
society determines the consequences that follow from individuals' words
and deeds. And within the law, the law of marriage is arguably one of
the most significant domains in almost every legal system in the world.
Through the law of marriage, individuals' actions or expressions of
commitment can create enduring rights and duties: rights that can be
enforced against one another and against third parties, duties to one
another and sometimes to outsiders as well. Inherent in the idea of law
is some element of consistency over time. In positive terms, the force or
precedent is usually described as stable and predictable. In negative
terms, that same force can be described as rigid and archaic.
Over the past hundred years, social and cultural expectations
surrounding various forms of committed relationships have changed
dramatically, and contemporary legal systems have struggled to adapt.
The result has been an extraordinary opportunity to test fundamental
assumptions about law, about the cultural understandings that are
enforced through state power, and about the mechanisms that drive law's
evolution. The Michigan Journal of Gender & Law has drawn together an
exceptional group of panelists who will discuss these questions
throughout the day. The four panels develop these questions chronologi-
cally, beginning with a more historically grounded conversation about the
way in which marriage law has evolved and ending with a more
speculative conversation about the way in which marriage law is likely to
evolve in the future. The panelists bring deep expertise from a variety of
disciplines. We are all grateful to the editors of the Journal of Gender &
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Law for their work in preparing what promises to be a day of
intellectual stimulation and insight.
And so without further ado, let's have the first panel come forward
and we'll turn things over to the first moderator, Bruce Frier.
PANEL I
MARRIAGE IN HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE:
TRADITION AS EMBODIED AND ENFORCED THROUGH LAWS
BRUCE W. FRIER, MODERATOR: Let me welcome you to this
first panel on Marriage in Historical and Cultural Perspective: Tradition
as Embodied and Enforced Through Laws. This first session of the
symposium on marriage law centers on the weight of history in relation
to the institution of marriage. The historical development of marriage,
the historical forms that marriage has assumed, these things are of
considerable interest in determining the extent to which the familiar
institution of marriage is malleable, either through the direct normative
control of law or through suppler responses to social changes. In order
to decide whether marriage has a future, we must first discuss whether
marriage has a past.
The principal question that historical sources pose may perhaps be
put in the following way. Marriage in some form or another is an all but
ubiquitous feature of human societies in the sense that external observers
will virtually always find within each society an institution that they
broadly recognize as what we call marriage: a regularized and long-term
coupling of a man and a woman, a degree of guaranteed domestic
exclusivity and autonomy associated with that coupling, and a widespread
social understanding that such a coupling is intimately associated with
procreation and the demographic reproduction of society.
Nonetheless, even if we confine ourselves solely to the mainstream
Western cultural tradition, thus ignoring huge masses of evidence on
non-Western societies, the forms that marriage has taken over the past
three millennia have been so diverse as to make it questionable whether
we are correct in referring to one single institution that has undergone
repeated metamorphosis in response to social and legal demands, or
rather to a series of institutions or social formations, more or less
historically independent of one another, that for the sake of convenience
we simply designate with the cover name of marriage. The answer to
this question may in turn influence the extent to which we feel free to
alter the legal institution of marriage in order to make it conform more
perfectly with modern social expectations. Is marriage a natural human
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institution that cannot be drastically reshaped without damage to basic
humanity, or instead, a temporal creation? Are we best advised to work
within its traditional contours, or instead to seek more radical
alternatives? Speakers in this and subsequent panels will have much to
say about such issues.
However, before I turn this over to them, I want to very briefly
sketch a sort of radical default model, one that is based directly on the
classical Roman law of marriage. In this model, the role of law is
deliberately kept to a minimum, so that the social institution of marriage
operates almost without external restriction (legal restriction, at any rate).
In principle, in Roman law both the act of marrying and the act of
divorce are entirely matters of consent between the couple.
Marriage arises when the couple agrees to marry, and it ends
whenever man or wife wishes it to end, subject only to a generalized
requirement that these intentions be objectively manifest. The Roman
government and Roman law, more generally, do not overtly participate
either in marrying or in divorce. There is no process of public
registration, no legally required ceremony of any kind, nor does the
government even require that it be eventually informed when marriage
or divorce occurs.
Although Roman law does establish certain capacity requirements
for legitimate marriage, for instance as to minimum age and degree of
kinship, these requirements come into play largely retrospectively and
tangentially in the process of determining, for instance, whether
offspring of a putative marriage are legitimate.
Roman law encourages legitimate marriage and procreation
through indirect incentives, mainly of a financial character, but beyond
that it does not obtrude. Although couples have considerable freedom to
structure marriage as they see fit, Roman law establishes no shared
regime of marital property. The two parties in principle each retain for
themselves whatever property they brought to the marriage, and they are
actively discouraged from mixing their separate estates during marriage.
Any substantial gifts between spouses, for instance, are voidable.
The husband has almost no legally sanctioned disciplinary
authority over his wife nor vice versa, except as a result of statute in the
area of adultery. The spouses have no legal duty of maintenance or
support toward one another, though they may have one toward other
family members, and with only rare exceptions, neither spouse has any
property claim when the other dies or after a divorce. Each spouse is
solely responsible for its own contracts and its own torts. The husband
is, in the normal case, the head of his household, the paterfamilias, and
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as such, he is vested with considerable power over his descendants in the
male line, but this power does not extend to his wife nor is it shared
with his wife. After divorce, children remain in their father's power and
usually also in his custody.
This marital regime is obviously very different from any that we
know, but despite its minimalist character, it endured for almost five
hundred years throughout the heyday of the Roman Empire, until it
was finally swept away by the rise of Christianity. The Roman model
raises, I would suggest, two related questions. First, can such an
extraordinarily laissez faire model of marriage be regarded as still
compatible with the Western tradition of marriage? For if it can, then
that tradition can safely be regarded as very pliant indeed. Second, even
if Roman marriage is compatible with our later models of marriage, can
we possibly regard such radical unobtrusiveness of public policy and law
as desirable? After all, not for nothing did a law student of mine once
describe Roman marriage as the prenup from hell! The Romans may
well have paid a very heavy social price for their insistence on the
continuing legal independence of spouses.
And so to our speakers. And our first speaker today is Ariela
Dubler, Associate Professor of Law at Columbia University Law School.
ARIELA R. DUBLER: Thank you. And I want to start by
thanking the organizers of this conference for inviting me to participate,
and prior to that for deciding that history is relevant to the question of
the future of marriage, which I think it is. I hope I can convince you of
that in the next fifteen minutes.
This morning I want to offer three specific historical arguments
about marriage in America that I think should be useful in evaluating
the future place of marriage in our socio-legal order. And these
arguments focus primarily on the period between roughly the Founding
and the early twentieth century.
Argument number one is a social claim. Historically, formal legal
marriage does not describe the social reality of how all adults have
ordered their intimate and domestic lives. Argument number two:
although marriage has not been a part of all people's lives, marriage as a
legal regime has exerted tremendous regulatory power over the lives of
people living outside a formal marriage. So even unmarried people, in
other words, and particularly (as I'll explain) unmarried women, have
lived, from a legal perspective, in what I want to call the "shadow of
marriage." And finally, argument number three: the meaning of
marriage proper has been defined in large part through its shadow. In
other words, courts and lawmakers have used non-marital relationships
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to define the legal and social meaning of marriage itself. So let me take
these arguments in order.
My first argument boils down to a relatively straightforward, but
important historical proposition, and one that often gets overlooked
because of the way that legal actors in particular talk about marriage:
Many adults have always organized their intimate and domestic lives
outside of the formal legal boundaries of marriage. Now, clearly there's a
big, messy social reality outside of the formal, legal boundaries of
marriage, and let me just sketch out some of the basic categories
inhabiting that terrain, both historically and today. Some adults never
married, either by design or by chance. Some of these people entered
into romantic relationships with members of the opposite sex, some
entered romantic relationships with members of the same sex, some did
neither. Others entered long-term heterosexual relationships and might
even have thought of them as marriage-like, even though they never
formalized their unions in formal ceremonies. Others would eventually
marry, but at some point lived alone with extended family or with other
non-relatives. Still others were formally married, but either their spouses
died or (and this was less common historically) they got divorced.
Now, this list is obviously not exhaustive. Historically, like today,
people ordered their domestic and intimate lives in countless ways, and I
make this list really only to get us thinking concretely about some of the
ways in which people structured their domestic and intimate lives
outside of marriage, and to stress that life outside marriage is not a
peculiarly modern phenomenon. And just a quick, historical tidbit for a
little perspective on this claim. In 1833, in deciding whether to
recognize the doctrine of common-law marriage (which is something I'll
talk about more in a few minutes), Pennsylvania's highest court
observed that if it considered all of the couples who had not conformed
to the particulars of its state's marriage laws, if it considered them
unmarried (and I'll quote), "It would bastardize the vast majority of
children who have been born within the state for half a century." In
other words, life outside marriage was pervasive.
Let me also stress that I don't mean to equate the decision to live
outside marriage with any principled opposition to the institution of
marriage. To be sure, contemporary critiques of marriage have rich
historical antecedents and some of the people who lived outside
marriage historically did so out of principled opposition to the
institution. But others did not, and I think it's important to remember
both of these groups in thinking about the social norms and the legal
rules that define both marriage and non-marriage. I will use the term
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"nonmarriage" to refer to forms of ordering other than formal, legal
marriage.
So with that, let me move to my second claim, which is that
marriage law exerted its regulatory power over unmarried women. I'm
focusing on women because historically (although clearly both men and
women lived outside of marriage) lawmakers were much more
concerned about the marital status of women. I think that an
attentiveness to this gendered dimension of the social and legal discourse
surrounding life outside marriage is critical to observing the ways in
which marriage's shadow developed and functioned, as well as the ways
in which it regulated the legal rights and responsibilities of unmarried
people.
Now let me make explicit my underlying assumption that marriage
law clearly regulated the lives of married women. So before we move to
unmarried women, let me just state that as uncontroversial. And what I
mean is that marriage constituted the dominant regime through which
legislators and courts defined married women's private and public legal
identities. Marriage regulated married women's lives at two levels. First,
the system of coverture explicitly defined women's private legal rights
within and outside of the family. So, for example, married women could
not enter contracts, they could not sue their husbands. Their identities
were legally covered (that's the coverture language) by their husbands'
identities. A wife was a femme covert. Second, marriage functioned more
broadly as a public institution that defined women's citizenship rights
vis- -vis the state. Thus, to name a couple of examples, women couldn't
vote because they were considered virtually represented by their
husbands. And women who married foreign men, for long periods in
our history, lost their American citizenship.
Now given the governance work that marriage was doing legally as
well as socially and culturally, you can see why women living outside of
marriage posed a formidable threat to lawmakers. They seemingly lived
outside of a tremendously powerful regulatory regime. And this created
not only a cultural threat, but also-in the eyes of nineteenth and early
twentieth century judges, lawmakers, politicians-it created an economic
threat. Marriage, at least in theory, functioned to privatize female
dependency by tethering women to particular men, who were then
responsible for their financial well being. Single women thus posed a
potential threat to the public fisc as well as to some kind of collective
imagination of an ordered polity.
But unmarried women existed and they weren't going away. So the
question was how could the law regulate this population. And my
contention, the core of my second argument, is that the law found ways
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to regulate unmarried women by placing them into direct relationships
to the institution of marriage, the very core institution of which they
were not a part. So even women who were not directly covered by
marriage in a coverture sense were nonetheless covered by marriage's
extended shadow.
At one level this extension of marriage's shadow occurred through
an act of erasure. Lawmakers often implicitly denied that women lived
outside marriage at all. The most vivid example of this is the virtual
representation argument that constituted probably the leading argument
against women's suffrage in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.
Women, the argument ran, did not need the vote because they were
already represented by their husbands. Now query where single women
fit into this scheme of the polity. Another quick example is the structure
of the wage labor market, which largely assumed that a woman's wages
would be supplemented by her husband's wages.
Beyond this type of willful blindness, though, marriage as a
normative model exerted a more direct gravitational pull and actually
defined how the law regulated relationships outside of marriage's formal
borders. And let me briefly offer two concrete examples of this
phenomenon. The first is common-law marriage and the second comes
from inheritance law.
Common law marriage was a doctrine that allowed courts to
recognize as marriages relationships between couples who had never
formally married. Almost all common law marriage cases were brought
by female plaintiffs who were in search of economic support from a
long-term male partner who had either died or left. And the doctrine
functioned by explicitly relying on a set of social norms. Essentially, if
you acted married in a social sense then you were married in a legal
sense. Remember, though, that these cases involved couples who had
not formally married. For a woman to get support, however, she had to
claim that although she had never formally married for whatever reason
(and the cases are almost always opaque on what reason that was), she
and her partner were actually married. That was the only way to get
support.
So here is a case where the law imported marriage as a legal
framework within which to understand formally non-marital relation-
ships. And in so doing, legal actors reinforced the idea that marriage was
the only game in town. It was the only normative model of relationships
out there and so any relationship worthy of legal recognition and giving
rise to legal rights had to fit into its borders. Common-law marriage, in
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other words, extended the reach of marriage's regulatory shadow to the
lives of women who had never formally married.
The second example focuses on a different group of women:
widows. I think that we tend to accept more uncritically the role that
marriage played in defining a woman's rights after her husband died.
But let me be explicit about something that I think we often overlook.
Dower, which was a widow's common-law right of inheritance,
continued to define a woman's rights and status in relationship to a
marriage that was most definitively over. One member of the marriage
was dead. Widows, therefore, lived outside of marriage, but very much
in its shadow.
Dower granted widows a rather meager amount of support: a life
estate in one-third of her husband's real property. And in so doing, it
sought to keep women in their wifely roles, i.e., as economic dependents
within a marriage framework. And it's worth noting that the system
worked pretty poorly and it often failed to provide for widows'
economic needs. Gradually over the course of the nineteenth century
and the early twentieth century, states began to look to other systems to
regulate widows' support.
Both common-law marriage and this form of inheritance law
illustrate how marriage as a normative model of domestic and intimate
relations has historically bounded the imaginative universe of the law.
Unmarried women lived under the shadow of marriage because judges
and lawmakers found ways to fit them into that dominant, normative
model.
Now this brings me to my final argument, which is that the
shadow of marriage ultimately played a constitutive role in defining
marriage itself. Let me illustrate this dynamic very quickly with the same
two doctrinal examples that I used a minute ago. First, common-law
marriage: Common-law marriage pointed to formally unmarried
couples in order to define what it meant to act married, and thus what it
meant legally to be married. So the law used the behavior of unmarried
couples, or certainly couples who for one reason or another had chosen
not to formally marry, to define the legal meaning of marriage proper.
Similarly, in the inheritance context, courts used dower to cement the
dependent-provider relationship between a widow and her deceased
husband, and in so doing, courts defined what marriage should mean
socio-culturally, and thus what it did mean legally. It meant that a
husband supported his dependent wife. So again, I think we see how
lawmakers defined marriages by talking about relationships that were
not marriages. In the case of dower they were talking about relationships
between live women and dead men.
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And I should note that when states abolished common-law
marriage and dower (which most of them did by the middle of the
twentieth century), lawmakers reflected quite self-consciously on what
marriage proper meant and what it should mean and how these
doctrines could be revised in order to define marriage to reflect
changing social and legal norms. In other words, they very much saw
common-law marriage and dower as constitutive of marriage itself.
Let me conclude with the suggestion that as we evaluate marriage
today and as we think about what role marriage should or might play in
organizing our future social and legal order, we should stay attuned to
the ways in which marriage functions as a gnomon. It's like the pillar at
the center of a sundial that casts a shadow on the things around it. And
today, as in the past, we should be attentive, not only to marriage, but
to marriage's shadow. We should be attuned to the ways in which
marriage proper has created a set of both legal rules and social norms
that have both drawn upon nonmarriage in unacknowledged ways and,
in turn, have regulated the lives and legal rights of people living outside
marriage in many unacknowledged ways. Thank you.
BRUCE W. FRIER, MODERATOR: Our next speaker is
Marilyn Yalom, Senior Scholar at the Institute for Research on Women
and Gender at Stanford University.
MARILYN YALOM: Hello! I'm also very glad to be here today,
despite the cold, and I want to take a position somewhat different from
Bruce Frier, when he said that Roman law was swept away by
Christianity. In fact, I'm going to argue today that Roman law, Greco-
Roman civilization, and the Judeo-Christian tradition have provided the
template for marriage in the Western world and continue to impact our
present problematic moment. And I'm going to explore with you today
in somewhat greater detail than previous speakers, the history of
Western marriage.
In ancient Greece, a young woman was her father's possession until
she was married, then she was literally given by her father to her
husband. A father would betroth his daughter to a bridegroom with
these words, "I pledge," and he would use his daughter's name, Naomi,
or something like that, "for the purpose of producing legitimate
children." The groom would reply, "I accept." The bride was
traditionally not present at the betrothal ceremony. From the wedding
day on, the husband replaced the father as the bride's kyrios, her
guardian and master. A marriageable woman was treated like a human
commodity to be transferred from her father's home to her husband's,
where she assumed the latter's name and was subject to his control.
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Probably a remnant of that still exists in the marriage ceremony when
the minister or priest asks, "Who gives this daughter?" And the father of
the bride announces that he gives the daughter in marriage.
But in the thousand years that extended from Homer to Nero, the
status of the wife changed from that of subjugation to limited
partnership. Under the early Roman republic from the fifth to the
second century, B.C., marriage resembled the Greek model, the
ownership of women continued to pass from fathers to husbands and
married women's chief responsibility was to perpetuate the husband's
family name through the production of offspring. Yet by the time of the
Empire, a more egalitarian ideal had taken root, one that emphasized
the partnership of husband and wife. These two different ideals were
spelled out in Roman law, marriage with hand and without hand are the
official terms. The gradual shift from one to the other meant that a
woman, even after her marriage, remained under the nominal tutelage
of her father instead of becoming the ward of her husband.
Roman marriage laws continued to require the father's and the
groom's consent but now added that of the bride as well. Provided they
were above the official age of puberty (twelve for a girl, fourteen for a
boy), a male and a female would enter into a marriage by a declaration of
marital affection and by bringing the bride to the bridegroom's house.
Such marriage was legally binding, even without further ceremony.
Emphasizing the couple's consent as the primary determinant of a valid
union, Roman authorities spread this notion throughout the Empire and
eventually throughout the Western world.
It was the requirement of mutual consent that during the course of
many centuries helped change the wife's position in the past, lifting her
from the status of chattel to that of partner, if only a junior partner.
While Roman law provided the legal essence of marriage, the
Judeo-Christian religious tradition provided its substance. As early as
the ancient Hebrews, some limited benefits for the bride were
established, for example, in Exodus, a husband was obliged to provide a
wife with food, clothing, and surprisingly, sexual rights. The marriage
contract, or ketubah specified the sum of money that would revert to the
wife in the event of divorce or widowhood. Still, we must not forget
that biblical Hebrews were polygamists. A husband was allowed more
than one wife if he could afford them, and he also had the right to
initiate divorce. Moreover, he was allowed sexual relations with
unattached women, such as widows, concubines, and servants, whereas
wives were required to limit their sexual activity to only one man. A
convicted adulteress could be put to death by stoning. I'm tempted, of
course, to think about countries and societies where women convicted
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of adultery are still put to death by stoning. But I'll try to limit myself to
the West.
In biblical times, adultery was but one of several abominations that
carried a death penalty. Another was homosexuality. Why homosexuality
was so reviled by the biblical Hebrews has been the subject of endless
debate. One answer has to do with the ancient focus on procreation. Any
sexual act that did not contribute to progeny was vehemently condemned.
Whereas other inhabitants of the ancient Mediterranean world, most
notably the Greeks but also the Romans, tolerated same-sex couples.
Judaism was consistently anti-homosexual. As for Christianity, St. Paul
explicitly condemned both male and female homosexuality. His
negative view of same-sex eroticism was rooted in a widespread system
of thought that took heterosexual relations as natural and all other forms
of sexuality as unnatural.
In other respects, early Christianity deviated significantly from
Judaism. For one thing, Jesus, in opposition to Hebrew practice,
equated the male prerogatives of divorce and remarriage with adultery.
Whoever wanted to be a Christian and married, male or female, would
have to be permanently monogamous. He also challenged the excessive
punishment meted out to the adulteress. In a by now famous incident,
he was asked whether a woman taken in adultery, in the very act should
be stoned, according to Mosaic law. His response has become
proverbial: he that is without sin among you, let him first cast the stone
at her. The emphasis on compassion rather than revenge and upon the
equality of all men and women in sin struck a new chord in religious
and marital history.
During the early Middle Ages, the Catholic Church gradually took
over the jurisdiction of marriage. Previously, much of Europe had
followed the Roman model that required the consent of the bridegroom
and their fathers. But from the mid twelfth century onward, Church
law, Canon law, made two changes that were to have long-term effects.
First, the Church pressured individuals to marry in the presence not
only of witnesses, but also of a priest, and to perform the ceremony at
church. Second, it downplayed the need for parental consent and fore-
grounded the mutual will of the spouses as the major criteria in the
making of a valid marriage. In addition, once marriage was declared a
sacrament (a ceremony through which one obtained God's grace), it
could not be undone. Medieval men and women entered marriage with
the knowledge that there was no way out of it, even if it proved to be
disastrous for one or both parties.
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Throughout Christendom the wife was mandated to be subservient
to her husband. The thirteenth century English jurist, Henry de
Bracton, framed the relationship between spouses by saying that a
woman was obliged to obey her husband in everything, as long as he did
not order her to do something in violation of divine law. He related a
case in which a wife and husband forged a royal writ, and though the
husband was hanged, the wife was acquitted on the grounds that she
had been ruled by her husband.
In the German-speaking world, the rights of a husband over his
wife were clearly outlined in the Sachsenspiegel and Schwabenspiegel,
two books that provided the basis for the laws in many German towns.
These rights extended to a wife's assets as well as to her person. A
husband could dispose of his wife's property, her clothes, her jewelry,
even her bed linens. And he had the legal right to beat her if she did not
accede to his wishes. In most countries, husbands could punish their
wives however they saw fit, short of murder. Wife battering was an
accepted practice, sanctioned by law and custom. It was a staple of folk
wisdom and provided comic caricature in the popular reverse images of
wives beating husbands. But the reality was far from comic, as shown
from court records, that often condoned the behavior or brutal
husbands as a matter of course. Legal wife-beating did not disappear
with the Middle Ages, as we know, and this was long after wife-beating
had been declared illegal.
From the Middle Ages onward, when priests began to participate
more regularly in wedding ceremonies, the Church gained greater
presence in all aspects of marriage, beginning with the conjugal bed,
where consummation was mandatory if the union was to be considered
binding. Sexual relations were considered a solemn duty that each
spouse owed to the other, but not an approved pleasure as we hold
today. Theoretically married couples were supposed to copulate only for
the benefit of procreation. Christian theologians viewed married life as a
lesser state than either virginity or widowhood, since virgins and chaste
widows abstained from sex. St. Jerome had stated explicidy, "Let
married women take their pride in coming next after virgins."
It's hard for us today to imagine the extent to which the ideal of
chastity was glorified and spread among the faithful. Just as we are
bombarded by commercial images proclaiming the value of sexual
activity, so too Medieval Christians were surrounded by model images
of famous aesthetics. A medieval girl and boy were constantly being
reminded that sex, even in marriage, was tainted by original sin. If they
wanted to be more certain of salvation, it was better to enter a convent
or a monastery.
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Now let me say a few words about the Reformation, because few
people have influenced the institution of marriage more than Martin
Luther. By questioning whether priests needed to be celibate, and then
by marrying a former nun, Luther established the model of the pastoral
couple that became so influential throughout the Protestant world. The
result of the Reformation in Germany, Switzerland, etc., and then in the
American colonies, was to elevate the value of marriage at least to the
level of celibacy.
During the second half of the sixteenth century, the primacy of
love in marriage arrangements began its ascendance, at least among the
English. Historian Eric Carlson, who has studied marital practices
among Tudor country folk, states unambiguously that the most
important consideration was love. While it's true that monetary and
social matters weighed in heavily among the nobility and gentry, this
high-status group accounted for only about ten percent of the
population and even here during the Elizabethan period, love marriages
were on the rise. The English on the whole seem to have allowed for
love matches to a greater extent than Continental Europeans.
By the turn of the seventeenth century, English conduct books
assumed that a man would choose a wife according to his heart, and that
a woman, though not so free as a man, had the right to express her
preference, first to her parents, and then if they approved, to her suitor.
Most social historians agree that modern American marriage
emerged in the period between the Revolution and around 1830.
During those fifty years, love became the most celebrated criterion for
choosing a spouse, even if property, family and social status continued
to weigh heavily in the decision. One young American woman, Eliza
Chaplin, expressed the credo of her generation when she wrote to a
friend in 1820, "Never could I give my hand unaccompanied by my
heart." In many homes parents accepted the fact that their children
would select a husband or wife on the basis of inclination, even if the
parents disagreed with the choice.
Since the early nineteenth century, romantic love has been the
primary criterion in the choice of a spouse. With the introduction of birth
control and a corresponding decline in the birthrate from an average of
seven children in 1800 to 3.5 children in 1900 (now I'm speaking
specifically about the United States), pleasure began to replace
procreation as the major meaning of sex. Marriage, once a religious and
social duty, became a venue for personal fulfillment.
By the late twentieth century, Americans were finding that
marriage was no longer necessary for many of the things traditionally
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associated with it: sex, for one thing, cohabitation, or children, not to
mention economic support of the wife. Today cohabitation before or in
lieu of marriage has become the norm and forty percent of first babies
are being born out of wedlock.
If marriage is no longer the sole gateway to sex, cohabitation, and
children, why marry? How can marriage still have meaning in a society
where the alternatives to marriage are as attractive to many as marriage
itself? Marriage today is clearly not for the fainthearted. The fifty percent
divorce rate gives even the most optimistic couples reason to pause before
vowing to live together for better or worse. Women able to support
themselves (and that is most women) think more than twice about
endangering their careers by assuming the domestic responsibilities of
wifehood and especially motherhood.
It is becoming apparent that the real difference in economic
earnings is not so much between women and men, but between mothers
and everyone else. Even with the decline of the birthrate to roughly two
children per adult woman, the amount of time, energy, and money
involved in raising those two children can sink a woman's career or a
marriage. Given the new demographics (a life expectancy of seventy-
three years and more for men and eighty for women), lifelong marriage
as opposed to serial marriage has become an endangered species.
And yet, people still marry. Nine out of ten Americans marry once
in their lives. And eighty-seven percent of newlyweds, according to a
New York Times survey, believe their marriage will last for life. They
marry to provide a framework for love and sex, companionship and
mutual support, and in many cases, children. But since we are no longer
living in ancient Greece or in the world of the Hebrew Bible, the
production of legitimate offspring is no longer the primary reason that
two people choose holy matrimony. I say two people rather than man
and woman, for I do believe that full-fledged legal marriage with
benefits ranging from tax rights to adoption will be an option for same-
sex partners before the end of the twenty-first century.
Ironically (and I'm closing now) we may come to think of marriage
as a vocation, requiring the kind of devotion that was once expected
only of celibate monks and nuns. The state has an interest in shoring up
that vocation, not by excluding those who wish to enter marital unions,
but by including all who are brave enough to make the commitment
and by helping provide support for those couples who take on the added
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BRUCE W. FRIER, MODERATOR: Let me thank all of the
speakers. I'm the most moderate of moderators, and I was very happy
that they kept so closely to the time limits! We now want to give all of
you the opportunity to ask questions. I'm afraid I'm going to have to
repeat the questions because this is being recorded, so if I fail to repeat
your question as you ask it, please let me know and I'll correct myself.
I'll also correct the record.
QUESTION: I'm going to make an effort to try to summarize
that. Your particular interest is in the relationship between Ariela's
general thesis and the problems that arose out of the definition of
attempting to impose marriage in the post-Civil War era on newly-freed
slaves who had relationships that antedated the Emancipation. Is that
roughly correct? That they had previously not had legal access and
suddenly were in a position of having such legal access.
ARIELA R. DUBLER: I think that's a great question. And I think
it is a really interesting example of how to think about marriage's
shadow and marriage's core. And I should say at the outset that if you
don't know Catherine Franke's work on this very subject, you should
definitely look at it because it's a great attempt to look at exactly the
question you're talking about. To answer as briefly as I can, I think that
the dynamic that I'm trying to describe in the examples I gave played
out in really interesting historical ways in exactly the case study you're
giving. And I should say that you shouldn't take from my talk that I
thought that everyone had access to marriage. Certainly same-sex
couples did not in the nineteenth century, as they do today. Interracial
couples did not, although they do today. And slaves certainly didn't.
And I think that in the post-Emancipation moment, one of the things
you see going on is a variation of what I think was going on with
common-law marriage generally. It was perceived to be in the interest of
the state, by some people, to look at relationships that were. not
marriages and say, you acted married by our standards, so presto
chango, now you're married. It's worth noting that not everyone saw it
this way and that some people actually thought that it was a huge threat
to the institution of marriage, which was a white institution, to give
former slaves the privilege of entering it. And I think that there was a lot
of debate within the freed people's community about whether they
wanted their relationships to be viewed as marriages or not. And so I
think that this was an instance where a set of norms that existed in a
different population were largely imposed by statutes. So states actually
passed laws that transformed slave marriages, which were not legal
marriages, into legal marriages. I should say that this dynamic actually
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occurred during slavery as well, because some plantations had systems in
which slave relationships were recognized as long-term unions if not as
legal marriages. There, too, I think you see the same kind of legal
rule/social norm loop in action, where what people understand to be
marriage then gets read into people's behavior who can not formally
marry. And I think always the important thing for me to remember is
that some of those relationships were probably between people who
wanted their relationships to be thought of as marriages. And I think
that's true for slaves and for freed people. But some of them were
probably between people who did not. And so that's where I think the
social norm/legal rule loop gets the most interesting, but I thank you for
pointing that out. I think that is an important historical example.
QUESTION: So the question concerns the general situation of
women who never married in the period before the nineteenth century
in particular, and what we can say about their social circumstances and
what it is that might have led them not to marry, how society treated
them and so on.
MARILYN YALOM: Well certainly in Europe the question of
having a dowry was essential in most societies. If one didn't have a
dowry, if one's parents could not give you a dowry or if you were a
working-class person and you could not amass a sufficient dowry (even
to the extent of bringing a cow or some minor property into the
marriage), you didn't get married. Marriage was primarily in pre-
modern times an economic arrangement. Many women who entered
monasteries or convents at an early age were placed there because they
didn't have sufficient dowry for a marriage. They had sometimes a
smaller portion that they brought to the convent. That was the case of
Luther's wife, as a matter of fact, Katarina von Bora, who was from a
minor noble family and they didn't have enough money to place here in
an appropriate noble marriage. And so she was put into the convent at
the age of eleven. But even in the colonies and in the United States, very
often the last daughter, it was understood that she would stay at home
and take care of the parents. So there are many instances of women who
were designated primarily for economic reasons not to marry.
Well, in some ways their legal status was better than that of married
women because they weren't subsumed by the husband! But very often
economically they were at the bottom of the hierarchy, and certainly
socially they were. They were considered old maids, stale maids,
spinsters, which came, by the way, from the fact that many women in
early modern times made their living by spinning. So they were spinners
as well as spinsters.
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QUESTION: So your question is what larger public interest
involved the state in regulating marriage apart from the settling of
private disputes at the margins of marriage, what interest has the state
historically proclaimed in marriage itself. Not just entry into marriage,
but what happens during marriage and the ease with which marriage
can be terminated.
MARILYN YALOM: I think Nancy Cott's book, Public Vows, is
probably the best study of why the state got involved in regulating
marriage in the colonies and in the United States. Essentially she takes
the position that the underlying assumption is that a man will support
and protect his wife, and the state's interest was primarily that that be
enforced. And she shows quite brilliantly how that idea continued right
into the twentieth century. Of course the quid pro quo was that the wife
would provide sexual and domestic services for the husband. And that's
a quid pro quo that continued right into the second half of the
twentieth century and probably the malaise that marriage is
experiencing now is because that quid pro quo has broken down, in that
that husband is no longer the sole support for the wife, in that women
have taken on the role of provider in the family and from a feminist
perspective are carrying an uneven burden with their husbands who are
still fledgling homemakers. I'm answering your question, I'm sure, far
beyond its original intent, but it does allow me to say something about
the present moment!
ARIELA R. DUBLER: Can I add one thing to that? I second that
Nancy Cott's book on this is a terrific argument. In addition to the
economic role marriage played, it played a real public ordering role that
went beyond only economics, but it wasn't unique in this respect. If you
look at old treatises on marriage, they cover the law of baron and
femme, of master and servant, and of parent and child. So there were
these status relationships that mediated the relationship between
subordinate individuals and the state, and marriage was not the only one
that did that. I think that today we lose sight of the way in which
marriage was often paired with these other status relationships that
performed very similar functions, that were economic at their core but
that were, I think, really about the ordering of the relationship between
private individuals and the state.
QUESTION: So your question concerns the broad metaphors, the
guide changes in the law in particular are you interested in? Does the
metaphor precede change as opposed to simply, if you will, reflecting
the change that has already occurred.
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MARILYN YALOM: Well, I can just think of one that comes
immediately to mind. During the reformation period in England, the
expression "yoke fellows" came into being, and that was a reflection, I
think, of the new idea of the couple as being bound together in some
kind of partnership. Sometimes that partnership was seen as
burdensome. I mean think of a yoke, think of being bound together by
a yoke, and people played on that term. It reflected on the one hand the
new spiritual partnership of husband and wife that was much
emphasized in the English tradition from the Reformation on. But at
the same time, marriage was thought of as a duty. And I should also add
that the notion of the wife's subservience to the husband was still there.
Those two notions were seen as opposite to one another, that is, the
notion of partnership and the notion of subservience, and they get
expressed over and over again in various metaphors. But that's just one
example. A certain section of my book (The History of the Wife) I called
"From Ownership to Partnership." And I think that that is the history,
not only of what happened from Homer to Nero, in that thousand
years, but the gradual history of the relationship of the wife in marriage
in Western tradition.
ARIELA R. DUBLER: I'll offer one more example, which I think
is also related to the question of change of metaphors. Women's rights
activists in mid-nineteenth century America were very explicit about
comparing marriage to slavery. And going back to the question asked
earlier, we can bracket whether mainly well-off white women's rights
activists should have made this analogy and the politics of that. But it
was an analogy that was definitely out there, and it was one that was
explicit and widespread enough so that in the debates over the
Reconstruction Amendments, there were actually congress people
(congressmen) who thought about whether the Fifteenth Amendment
might undo coverture. Now nobody, I think, really took that seriously. I
don't think anyone really thought the Fifteenth Amendment was going
to undo coverture, but that language was out there enough that it
seeped into real debates about changing fundamentally how our society
was ordered. So I think that that's another metaphor that actually was
important to rethinking what marriage meant.
BRUCE W. FRIER, MODERATOR: We're going to have to call
it a halt at this point and have a break, fifteen minutes. Could you
reconvene here at 10:45 for the second panel. I hope you'll join me in
thanking all of our panelists.
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PANEL II
THE PROCESS OF RECOGNIZING NON-MARITAL
FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS
LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER, MODERATOR: One of our
panel members is Paula Ettelbrick to my right, and Paula is, I think,
pretty familiar to the Law School Community here. I think her primary
position is Adjunct Professor at University of Michigan Law School,
and secondarily, she does something in New York, I'm not sure exactly
what it is! [Laughter] No, she's Family Policy Director for the Policy
Institute for National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, and she has done a
lot of good deeds that she'll be talking about. Steven Nock is the other
panel member and is from the University of Virginia. I was reminded
again that I used to be on the faculty at the University of Virginia Law
School and I regret coming up here every February! Steven reminded
me that the crocuses are already up in Charlottesville! You have the bios
of both of the panel members in your packet of materials, so I'm not
going to go into everything, but Steve has been a very prolific author
and has received book awards. His current research is on covenant
marriage, and that's actually what he's going to talk about today. So I
think what we'll do is we'll start with Steven, since he's going to use the
PowerPoint, and then I'll go second because I'm also going to make a
presentation, and then Paula will come third, and then we'll have
questions and answers after that. Steve.
STEVEN L. NOCK: Thanks. I just have a couple of apologies to
make. First, I am using a PowerPoint presentation, and I know that may
not be terribly customary in this room. The second is that I'm not going
to be talking about alternatives to legal family relations, but the
opposite. Covenant marriage is probably about as close as we can get to
a traditional, legal, marital arrangement. But I think there are a lot of
lessons to be learned in this experiment that's taken place in three states
so far. Eighteen other states are considering it. As some of you know,
the federal government has committed a half a billion dollars to
experimenting on various programs to promote marriage of varying
types. I am now in the third year of a comprehensive evaluation of one
such type program, the implementation of covenant marriage in
Louisiana. So today I will quickly review what we've done in hopes that
if questions arise, I can address them in the question-and-answer session.
Covenant marriage is the result of a law passed in Louisiana in
1997, which basically creates two optional forms of marriage. When a
couple applies for a marriage license in Louisiana, Arkansas, or Arizona,
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they must now declare which type of marriage they will enter. To
simplify matters (I'll explain in just a moment the primary distinction
between covenant marriage and standard marriage), standard marriage is
governed by no-fault divorce proceedings and covenant marriage is
governed by fault-based divorce proceedings or extended waiting
periods and a requirement for premarital counseling. So a covenant
marriage is more difficult to get into, and more difficult to get out of.
The reason I studied covenant marriage was to answer some basic
science questions. First, I wanted to know who in America wants a more
restrictive marriage regime, and why? Men, women, rich, poor, black,
white, or what. And second, I wanted to know to what extent the state,
through its actions in domestic relations law, could predictably alter
demographic trends such as divorce rates, marriage rates, or
abandonment.
With respect to the topic of this session, which is recognizing non-
marital family relations, I can offer a few observations based on our
extensive research in Louisiana. First, cultural beliefs resisting change
with respect to marriage are enormously strong. Even while Americans
are quite open and tolerant of alternative lifestyles, they are less tolerant
of alternative marital regimes. Second, marriage is experienced and
understood by most Americans as a sacred relationship, and when we
start talking about changing the legal terms of it, we venture very
quickly into the sacred lives of Americans. Third, social norms and
cultural beliefs will be the primary obstacles to any attempt to change
the definition of marriage. Neither legislation nor judicial actions are
likely to be as significant. As we have learned, passing legislation is a
relatively simple thing compared to changing the popular culture. And
finally, the social classes (and different races) understand marriage and
its meaning in very different ways. Marriage serves different purposes,
and is a different institution depending on one's social class. In the
current social environment, it may be impossible to expect a single
marital regime that will confer the same benefits to spouses in middle,
working class, and poor families.
Here are the broad outlines of covenant marriage. In order to enter
a covenant marriage, a couple must receive premarital counseling from
any person licensed by the state to perform it. The terms of the
premarital counseling are simple. Counseling must include a discussion
about the seriousness of marriage, and the lifelong commitment being
made. Counseling must also address the commitment to make a good
faith effort to work through problems if they arise. Counseling may also
include a discussion of the exclusive grounds for divorce in a covenant
marriage.
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The couple must file a notarized affidavit asserting that they have
received this marital counseling. They must also file a legally binding
declaration of intent. This declaration acknowledges the intention that
this marriage is a lifetime commitment, and that the couple consents to
the restricted grounds for divorce available in covenant marriages. We
don't really know whether courts in other states will recognize this
declaration of intent. There's a conflict-of-laws issue which I'll talk
about in just a moment.
The exit requirements from covenant marriage are equally different
and more strenuous. A divorce from a covenant marriage requires proof
of a good faith effort to rectify the problems. This could be in the form
of repeated visits to a counselor, attempts to go to a psychologist,
requests for help from friends, or whatever, but there must be evidence
of good faith effort to resolve the problems. Then there are two routes
to divorce in covenant marriages. First are the traditional fault-based
grounds, including felony life-or-death convictions, physical or sexual
abuse of a child or of the spouse, adultery, and abandonment. The
alternative route is by no-fault divorce. This requires living separate and
apart for two years (versus six months in a standard marriage). In either
case, the court will expect evidence of good faith efforts to resolve the
problems in the marriage. So it is relatively difficult to get out of a
covenant marriage. It's somewhat more difficult to get into. And so you
can see why I was interested to understand who would want to enter
into such a marriage.
The proponents of covenant marriage come in all stripes and
shapes, but they basically endorse the same principles. First, they see
covenant marriage as turning the tide. The author of the bill says it's the
first piece of divorce legislation in almost two hundred years to make it
more difficult to get divorced. So far as I can see, that is true. It
emphasizes the seriousness of marriage and tests the initial commitment
of the two partners. Confronted with a required choice between a
simple marriage with very easy entry and exit rules, and a more rigorous
form of marriage with more difficult entry and exit rules, how do
couples make such choices, and how do they reconcile differing
preferences?
Advocates of covenant marriage believe it enhances investments in
marriage and reduces the risks of divorce. We have found that it
demonstrably does the former, and probably does the latter, largely
through the economic signaling function associated with it. For various
reasons, including the requirements for entry and exit, couples in
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covenant marriages have different incentives (to be and remain married)
and preferences (of what each expects from marriage).
I want to note that this law was drafted by a woman, and
championed by many women in Louisiana. Our research has confirmed
that covenant marriage appeals more to women than men. Among those
who are currently in standard marriages, one in five state that they now
wish they were in covenant marriages. But this desire is driven largely by
wives. Both husbands and wives report that wives were the ones who
most desired a covenant marriage, regardless of the type eventually
entered.
There are two legal issues that should be mentioned. First, never
before to our knowledge have two coexisting marital regimes existed in
the West. To some extent this represents a novel arrangement where
couples actually have some ability, you might even want to call it
contractual ability, when entering into a marriage to decide which
system of rules and laws will govern their marriage. People on both
sides, the right and the left, fear that this may lead to marital pluralism
(gay marriages, or polygamy for example.) Once you have two forms of
marriage, why not three, four, five, whatever? Knowing the political
climate of Louisiana (as I do), Arkansas and Arizona (the other states
with the covenant marriage), I see no great sentiment in any of these
states to allow polygamy or gay marriages.
Second, the conflict of laws issue has yet to be resolved. If a couple
gets a covenant marriage in Louisiana, they agree to be bound by a
different set of divorce rules (as part of the Declaration of Intent). The
question is whether or not that document will be recognized as legal in
other states. We just don't know yet. And the legal community is-
divided on this conflict of laws issues.
It is important to consider why states are becoming involved in
marriage and divorce issues as they now are. We should ask whether the
state can intentionally and predictably, reduce the divorce rate? That's
essentially what many are trying to do. States are trying to reduce
divorce rate because of the role it (and unmarried births) plays in
poverty. Another reason is the consequence of federal welfare reform
that exposes states to responsibility for welfare after a recipient has
exhausted his or her five-year lifetime limit. In short, many state
legislators see marriage promotion and/or divorce reform as part of a
coordinated effort to reduce state responsibility for welfare (and
Medicaid) support. It's as simple as that, and it's as complicated as that.
To provide a bit of background on how we have conducted our
research, I will quickly review our major efforts. First we began with
focus groups with diverse individuals: covenant married couples from
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the right, feminists (these were members of the National Organization
for Women), women who lived in public housing projects, working-
class groups, and members of both gay and lesbian organizations.
Second, we commissioned with Gallup to conduct a statewide poll of
Louisiana (similar efforts were conducted in Arizona, and Minnesota)-
two states that had passed covenant marriage and one that had not. We
will replicate these in another two years to see how general public
opinion may have changed. Third, we studied the implementation of
the law. We did that by sending unmarried graduate students (male-
female graduate student pairs) into seventeen parishes in Louisiana to
apply for a marriage license. They recorded how they were treated, what
they were shown, what they were told, and all relevant information
provided about covenant marriage. We also conducted a panel study of
one hundred engaged couples for a period of a little less than a year
from the time they announced their engagement until they either got
married or until they didn't, just to see whether covenant marriage
played any role in their decision about whether to continue with the
marriage plans. We interviewed clerks of court who had issued licenses
for a covenant marriage because there is an increment of work that's
added with all these additional documents. We also wanted to
determine the attitudes and perspectives of court clerks in regards
covenant marriage. We also interviewed clergy in the state who had
performed covenant marriages to find out what they know about the
option, and what type of counseling they provide to couples seeking
such a marriage.
Finally, the biggest effort is a five-year, longitudinal study of about
thirteen hundred individuals, half in each type of marriage. We contact
these people by phone regularly, and we interview them with lengthy
questionnaires every eighteen months. What we're trying to do is see
how they change over the course of five years. Our first round of surveys
was completed within six months of marriage. The second round was
completed at about two years of marriage. We're currently fielding the
third and final round of surveys.
Selected findings. First, who selects which type of marriage?
Covenant couples are more educated, are more conservative on a wide
range of political issues, and are more religious. We characterize them as
"sanctifying" or "institutionalizing" marriage, which is to say they do
not operate strictly on a quid pro quo basis when it comes to assessing
equity in marriage. A naive model of equity is equality: two people are
the same. People in covenant marriage do not use such a model of
equity; to them equity is a much more complex issue than both people
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doing exactly the same thing. This "third party" to the marriage, we
have found, provides a template for solving the mundane and
challenging problems so often associated with early marriages. Covenant
couples are also more likely to seek counseling. They have more family
and friend support. They are less likely to have cohabited (dramatically
less likely to have cohabited), or have been previously married. But on a
whole range of other issues, such as issues about gender, issues about
men and women and so forth, they do not differ.
Secondly, how has the law been implemented? The simple answer
is badly. Some clerks of court have intentionally subverted the law.
Many do not tell people about it. They fill out the marriage licenses by
checking a standard marriage as opposed to covenant marriage and so
on. The state did not provide sufficient resources to implement this law.
The pioneers who are going into covenant marriage are more
traditional. They're much less likely to have cohabited or to bring
children from a prior marriage with them. They're more traditional in
their attitudes about gender and social duty to bear children. Their
attitudes about children are really quite strong. They see marriage as a
venue for having and rearing children. And there's a lot less violence in
covenant marriages than there is in standard marriage. That's emotional
violence, physical violence, however you measure violence, we have forty
questions about violence. By any measure, there's less violence against
women or against men or against children in covenant marriages than in
standard marriages.
So what do we have to learn about implementing pro-marriage
policies, if that's what we're trying to do? First, I would say, that
legislative action without corresponding efforts on the grassroots is of
little importance. Passing a law, by itself, does very little. Even though
our research suggests that covenant couples have lower chances of
divorce, and that the choice of covenant marriage may be a part of that
story, there are very few couples seeking covenant marriages. Without
dramatically higher rates of covenant marriage, this type of optional
arrangement is unlikely to alter basic demographic trends in divorce or
marriage.
On the other hand, covenant marriage has provoked what Etzioni
calls a megalog, a large, public discussion among all parties with vested
interest in some issue. Following the passage of covenant marriage
legislation, and continuing today, the popular media, scholars, clergy,
and pundits gave great attention to the question of the role of
government in domestic relations, the importance of marriage, the
trends in living arrangements, and related issues. This may be the most
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enduring consequence of covenant marriage and similar efforts in
America.
Thank you.
LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER: Steve, thank you. We're going
to take a slight pause while they dismantle PowerPoint. Paula and I then
will make our presentations, then we'll take questions at the end for all
three panelists.
Okay, these handouts ought to be distributed by now, I think. I'm
going to report on what the two major law reform organizations in the
United States have done by way of recognizing non-marital
relationships. Those are the American Law Institute and the Uniform
Law Conference.
I want to begin with a few fundamental distinctions. What I'm
about to talk about is how the law is perhaps moving in the direction of
recognizing non-marital relationships in private law. And when we're
talking about that, we're talking about whether or not unmarried
partners have monetary legal rights against one another, or to say it the
other way, whether one partner has monetary duties to the other one.
That's to be distinguished from what you read about more often in the
newspapers and magazines, which is the recognition of domestic
partnerships by universities, municipalities and corporations. The big
difference is that there we're talking about other people's money. We're
talking about domestic partners being able to register and the result of
the registration typically is that the corporation or municipality or
university will grant benefits to the partners, such as health benefits, one
of the biggest ones. What I'm talking about is coming out of the pocket
of one partner and going to the other partner, and whether the law is
moving toward recognizing that. And I say it with particular emphasis
on what the American Law Institute has done so far and what the
Uniform Law Conference has done so far.
In this area it matters principally in two places. One is when one of
them dies survived by the other, and the other one is when they break
up during life. When one of them dies survived by the other, there really
are two regimes that I want to mention. One is intestacy and the other
is disinheritance by will.
In the area of intestacy, a surviving spouse who is legally married to
the decedent gets a rather sizeable intestate share of the estate if the
decedent dies without a valid will. The share varies, but in the Uniform
Probate Code states, it's really quite large and in many cases can be one
hundred percent of the estate that goes to the surviving spouse
automatically. The other area, in the probate area, is what happens
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when a married person dies survived by the other spouse and tries to
disinherit that surviving spouse by will. Now those of you who have had
trusts and estates will know this hopefully, but it's called elective share
law or forced share law, and the surviving spouse is the only relative,
only person, who in the United States gets what's called a non-barrable
share (you cannot totally disinherit your surviving spouse). Everything is
qualified a little bit. Georgia doesn't have an elective share. The
community property states do not have an elective share because the
community property states have a (fifty-fifty) split anyway. They already
own fifty percent each as tenants in common. But in the common law
states, all states have an elective share regime except for Georgia.
Now those two areas of law, the elective share law and the intestacy
law, proceed on quite different premises, because intestacy law tries to
be intent-effecting. That is to say, the reason that we give the surviving
spouse a large intestate share is because we assume that the decedent in
this marriage relationship would have wanted to give a large share to the
surviving spouse, but just never got around to making a will. So it's not
thought to be intent-defeating, rather it's intent-effecting. The elective
share law, on the other hand, is intent-defeating, that is, forcing the one
spouse to hand over (typically by way of property settlement) a share of
that person's property. That's forcing an involuntary transfer. The
analogy to the elective share law in family law is divorce. In divorce,
also, the law is forcing one spouse to transfer, involuntarily, a share of
that spouse's property over to the other spouse as part of the settlement.
So in the area of recognizing non-marital relationships, it has
always seemed to me that the first step would be intestacy because that's
the area where you're not forcing an involuntary transfer, you're simply
carrying out what presumably is the intent of the parties. And also in
intestacy, of course, we're also talking about a couple who either could
not marry or did not marry, but who stayed together until one of them
died as opposed to breaking up during life, and that shows a greater
commitment, it seems to me, in a majority of the cases. But the
distinction I want to draw is between involuntary transfers and
voluntary transfers, or at least attributed voluntary transfers.
Take a look at the handout. I'm not going to go into every one of
these in detail, but I did want you to have a copy of this so that you
could take a look at it afterwards. The first portion of the handout is
what the American Law Institute has done and then in the second
portion, beginning on page five, are a couple of uniform acts where the
Uniform Law Conference has recognized non-marital relationships also.
The American Law Institute has gone quite a bit farther in the
direction of recognizing non-marital partners as the equivalent of
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marriage. The Restatement (3d) of Property, which is on page one, has
done a couple of things. First of all, it has piggybacked on a project
which is mentioned on page two called the Princ'iples of the Law of
Family Dissolution, which was just approved in 2000. The Principles of
the Law of Family Dissolution's main focus was on how married
couples ought to be forced to divide their property upon divorce, but
they also have a chapter on unmarried partners. In the chapter on
unmarried partners, which is chapter six (and I just gave you section
6.03 here, which is the section that identifies who qualifies for these
rights), they basically treat unmarried partners, if they qualify under
6.03, as if they were married, for purposes of divorce law. The
Restatement (3d) of Property, which is the one that deals with the
probate rights, is on page one. I should make a disclosure here! I'm the
reporter for the Restatement (3d) of Property. So when you read this, I
wrote this! I'm not the reporter for the Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution. Ira Ellman is the reporter for that. But I am involved in the
Family Dissolutions Project and I'm also involved in the Uniform Law
Conference in other different ways.
When we did section 2.2 (the first section I'm giving you here in
comment g), the Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution had not
yet been approved but we were pretty sure it was going to be approved.
So we said that if it is approved, then anybody who qualifies under that
project or those rules ought to be treated as a surviving spouse for the
purposes of intestacy. In section 8.1, Requirement of Mental Capacity,
and also in section 8.3 on Undue Influence, we've put in a comment
that does a very important thing. It identifies an unmarried domestic
partner (of the same or opposite sex, it doesn't matter) as being a natural
object of the decedent's bounty. That's extremely important because
almost never will a court set aside a person's will on the ground of
undue influence when it grants a large share to the surviving spouse.
And what we are trying to do, particularly in 8.3 in this comment on
page two at the top, is to identify the unmarried partner as being the
equivalent of the surviving spouse and therefore a natural object of the
decedent's bounty. That goes against some earlier case law. There's one
case in Colorado back in the 1930s where the court said that if you
make a will in favor of your unmarried partner, we presume it was the
result of undue influence. The new Restatement will go a long way,
hopefully, to defeat that notion.
This is kind of quasi-lawmaking because neither what the ALI nor
what the Uniform Law Conference does has the force of law. With the
ALI, we put Restatements out in the hopes that the courts will adopt the
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principles in them. With the Uniform Law Conference, they
promulgate statutes that will hopefully be enacted by the state
legislatures, but they are not law until actually enacted, and they're only
law in the states that do enact them. And so it's kind of a quasi-
lawmaking body, but it certainly doesn't come out with the force of law.
But one of the major problems in any lawmaking is how to identify
who would qualify as a domestic partner, say for purposes of intestacy
rights, for purposes of elective share, for purposes of getting divorce-type
settlements? And with married couples it's easy; they are self-identified.
You are either married or you're not married, and certainly in the
probate area we almost never look behind the marriage. We almost
never look to see what the quality of the marriage was. You're either
married or you're not, and if you are, you get these rights, and if you're
not, you don't get these rights. Even though we have no-fault divorce,
in the family law area there is nevertheless fault that comes up in some
states in the distribution of the property as part of the equitable
distribution process. But for married couples it's mainly self-selected
and there's a bright line rule. You're either married or you're not
married. With unmarried partners, unless you have the benefit of some
of the new statutes like the Vermont Civil Union Statute, which if you
enter into that state then you basically have the same rights as if you
were married. And in Hawaii there is legislation where an unmarried
couple of the same sex can register a Reciprocal Beneficiary Designation
Form, which is a state-sponsored form. Unless you have that kind of
law, the only way of identifying them is to look at a multifactor
approach. And if you look at the Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution (look on page two just for a second at section 6.03), this is
the listing of factors to be considered that was adopted by the American
Law Institute. I'm not going to go through all of them, but I might
highlight a couple of features. In paragraph three, there's a presumption
that you are a domestic partner if you've lived for a certain continuous
period that equals the cohabitation period, and if you don't qualify
under that rule, then the presumption is against you. You'd have to
prove that you qualify.
On the top of page three, there's a multifactor approach also where
there's a whole listing of factors, and I would say that my experience is
that factors that are listed here have a claim to be right on the merits.
But if you were translating that to a uniform law, I think you'd have
difficulty with some of it because the one thing that legislatures want is
some degree of certainty. And so the kinds of factors that I think would
be more saleable in the Uniform Law Conference and then secondarily
in the state legislatures would be to try to restrict these to factors that
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can be established by objective evidence as opposed to evidence of how
you felt toward one another. Did you name your partner as the
beneficiary of your life insurance? Well you either did or didn't. There's
a document that says you either did or didn't. So it's easily proved
whether you did or didn't. Did you go through a commitment
ceremony? You either did or didn't. When you start talking about how
they treated each other and so on and so forth, then that's subject to a
lot of testimony that I can tell you the probate lawyers would not want
to get into! Especially after one of them has died and so the only party
to the arrangement who can testify is the survivor. That's similar to
some of the case law that I think a lot of you are familiar with, where
they break up during life and the claim is that they had an oral contract.
It's a rare case where the party who is claiming that there was an oral
contract can actually prove that there was an oral contract. The
complaint may state a cause of action but the claim is very difficult to
prove. In the Restatement of Property, because the Principles of Family
Dissolution is another ALI project, we piggybacked on that same set of
factors.
I want to say something about the premarital agreement. I gave you
that section also from the Principles at section 7.04 on page three. The
main thing I wanted to point out about that is subsection six (there's
another part of this that says the same thing), which deals with domestic
partners. The section really is concerned with premaritals, where a
couple who is going to get married enter into an agreement as to how
their property would be divided if they get divorced or if one of them
dies. But the section also applies to domestic partnerships, and it does
require a written agreement. That is problematical in this sense.
Premarital agreements do have to be in writing. That's the law. There
are no oral premarital agreements that are recognized. But with a
premarital, the parties are negotiating against the backdrop of the law
that grants them rights. In the non-marital situation, you're negotiating
in the background of a law that doesn't grant any rights, and so it would
be the contract that would grant the rights. And so to require a written
agreement is problematic. However (and I wish I'd included this in the
materials that I handed out to you, but I do want you to jot this down if
you're interested in this), in section 7.01 comment b, the principles say
that their insistence on a written agreement, even for unmarried
couples, is dependent upon the jurisdiction also accepting the idea that
unmarried partners have marriage-type rights in the case of divorce. And
if you're in a jurisdiction that doesn't recognize those rights, then it
doesn't have to be in writing. So really it came out the right way.
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Now let me turn briefly to the Uniform Law Conference on page
five and through the rest. If you just glance down there, I boldfaced the
subsections that applied in the Healthcare Decisions Act, here we're
talking about an extremely important matter. I do want to make it clear
that under the Healthcare Decisions Act you can execute a healthcare
power of attorney naming your unmarried partner as your
representative. The section that I gave you just applies in case you didn't
execute that, and then who can be named your surrogate. You'll see that
under subsection (c), which is not worded as directly as it might be (but
of course it's worded that way purposely), a person who would qualify
as a domestic partner would come in but has a low priority. Other
family members have a higher priority. Then on page six and seven, I
gave you the two sections out of the Guardianship and Protective
Proceedings Act. Those can also be a very significant matter when one
of the partners becomes incapacitated and needs a guardian of the
person who takes care of you or a conservator who takes care of your
property. Again in subsection (c), in both of those, those are companion
sections. It does recognize the unmarried partner by identifying an adult
with whom the respondent had resided more than six months. But it's a
very low priority. It comes in as seventh in priority.
Now, let me switch back briefly and then I want to end this and let
Paula have the floor. When you look at what the Uniform Law
Conference has done, you see that it has not granted intestacy rights to
surviving domestic partners. It has not granted elective share rights to
surviving domestic partners. It hasn't done any of those things, whereas
the American Law Institute in a couple Restatements I gave you has
done that.
There's a difference between the American Law Institute and the
Uniform Law Conference. Basically, the American Law Institute is freer,
I think, to produce products based purely on the merits. That's not to
say that these things can't be controversial. In fact, the Principles of
Family Dissolution was very controversial when it was on the floor of
the American Law Institute, and there were many, many amendments
proposed and all beaten back. So it was controversial. When it got to
our project, it was not controversial at all because the ALl had already
acted. But the Uniform Law Conference can't operate solely on the
merits. Politics are involved also. The Uniform Law Conference is in the
business of producing legislation that can be passed and that makes
them hold back sometimes on controversial matters. I think that's
probably the major explanation of why the Uniform Law Conference
has not acted in this area. I don't think that the Vermont Civil Union
legislation would have been enacted in Vermont had it not been for the
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Supreme Court of Vermont's decision. And I don't think Hawaii would
have enacted its reciprocal beneficiary legislation had it not been for the
Supreme Court of Hawaii's decision that basically forced it to do that.
So I think that's the explanation for why one has gone a little bit farther
than the other one. We'll just have to see where it goes.
With that, I think we can turn to Paula, who's going to talk about
her work in the Institute. Paula.
PAULA ETTELBRICK: Thank you. Well, first I am always
greatly indebted to the perspective of historians and I only wish that
from this morning's panel I had about half a day to rephrase and
reframe some of my comments. It was very enriching in terms of my
own thinking. And also, to you, Larry, I remember when you talked to
me about eight or ten years ago about this project and I walked out of
your office thinking, "Oh yeah, right!" Clearly, your persistence and
your work over time has paid off with the ALl. Those are significant
efforts that help us understand the intricacy of legal and policy change
with regard to family. That it is pervasive. That the laws, structures and
policies affecting family exist in all facets of our system. There are very
few areas of the law in which somewhere, someway, somehow the issue
of family and family definition doesn't come up. And so the idea of this
issue being stuck in a family law curriculum alone obviously is
something that isn't realistic in the way that we look at it as family
advocates.
I'm going to talk on this panel fairly exclusively from the
perspective of having advocated on behalf of the family recognition
interests of the lesbian and gay community. I say at the outset, though,
that it is my own personal view that broader family recognition for all
unmarried couples or people functioning in family units is very
important and is one that needs to be analyzed and promoted. I will
probably spend more time on that in the panel later this afternoon. I'll
start by sort of bringing the historical context outlined earlier a little
more up to date. Then I will go back a little bit to present my own
personal view as someone who's been fairly intricately involved over the
last fifteen to eighteen years in the process of changing definitions of
family, and to talk about what led to some of the decision-making and
strategies that were adopted.
Last September, as we all well know, thousands of people were
killed when four jet hijackings took place. It will forever be an historical
marker for our country and probably the world. Within hours, it
seemed to me, donations from around the world started flowing in,
particularly to New York, out of compassion, out of a sense of despair,
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out of a desire to do something to help. The donations were meant
mostly to assist those impacted by this tragedy, most notably the
surviving family members. Triage centers were set up in lower
Manhattan, the site of most of the damage on that day. The goal was to
help people locate loved ones who had been in the Trade Center or near
the Trade Center or feared near the Trade Center at that particular
time, to help families cut through the bureaucratic red tape, to provide
emergency financial and other assistance, to expeditiously obtain death
certificates for those who had been or could be declared dead (that was
sort of a bit of a difficulty, as we all know throughout the subsequent
weeks), or just simply to get counseling.
The question emerged immediately as to who are these surviving
family members. The fact that New York City is one of the most diverse
cities, certainly in the country and probably in the world, lent an extra
special flair to the question of who was a family. But what was notable
to me in the immediate aftermath of the World Trade Center incident
was the immediate reaction of those administering aid that "well of
course gay and lesbian partners are considered family." The Red Cross,
what I would consider a very mainstream institution. The mayor of
New York (who had, of course, been very prominent in supporting the
domestic partnership law that many of us were very involved in getting
passed in New York City that expanded the definition of domestic
partner beyond just those who worked for the City or lived in the City,
but to all those who might want to register). And even what I think of
as a rather gay-averse governor, also chimed in, in the moment at least,
to recognize that in a tragedy such as this, couples should be recognized.
Now we know that the intricacies and the difficulties and the
complexities of those emotional responses have met a more rational
ground. The federal government in particular seems to have clearly
decided, through the special master charged with administering the
claims of family survivors, to make it nearly impossible for surviving gay
partners to participate in the dissemination of federal benefits. The
governor did declare that a surviving partner who had been a registered
domestic partner in the city of New York could obtain a death
certificate-an unprecedented decision.
But what struck me, nonetheless, was the fact that at least in New
York City, at that moment, New York state, even at that moment, gay
and lesbian couples predominantly were assumed to be within the circle
of family, a fact that was deeply gratifying to those of us who have
approached the issue of gay and lesbian couples' recognition from the
standpoint of family recognition rather than simply marital recognition.
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I'd like to take that point and go back about twenty years to some
critical decisions that have been made across the years as we developed
strategies to achieve the goal of recognition of lesbian and gay couples as
family members. What that incident signified to me, and what I've
always felt as a public interest advocate, is that there are three major
elements to social change, at least from a legal perspective. This is
nothing scientific, mind you. Just my observation.
First, it is critical to incorporate the ideas and work that precedes
any particular advocacy effort. That is, we must try to understand our
work within a historical context. In its very brief and quick leap through
history on the issue of marriage, the panel this morning showed how
different forces came into play to reshape and force us to rethink (and in
fact redo) the way we've always done things. For the gay and lesbian
community over the last twenty years, those forces have included such
things as feminist thought, writing and activism, a sense of progressive
social values that I think predominated in the late 1970s and early
1980s in the thinking of gay rights advocates, liberationist goals which
aren't popular to talk about much anymore but were very much a part
of how we thought about our work in changing some of the social
structures that were obstacles to us.
Second, obviously strategy. Strategy, vision, foresight and goal
setting are obviously very important. Although life presents us
constantly with events that could not have been anticipated, it is
important to have a plan and set of goals that allow us to take advantage
of the opportunities presented. The fact that the effort to gain
recognition for lesbian and gay couples had been on-going allowed us to
respond to the needs of those affected most dramatically by the World
Trade Center incident.
Which goes to my third point which is that unexpected events-
often tragic events-serve to illuminate and help us understand the
importance of ideas that might have seemed theoretical or mundane up
until that point. For instance, the idea of lesbian and gay couples as
being family or spouse-like seemed either threatening or theoretical to
the culture at large. But, September 11 helped illuminate the human
aspects of our lives.
There is a distinct feminist frame to early lesbian and gay family
advocacy. The challenges to marriage as an institution, the workings of
marriage, and the gendered relationships within marriage were part of
the feminist critique that gay and lesbian activists assumed in their own
work. In fact, many of us came out of the feminist community whose
principles informed most of our early work. We, too, questioned gender
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roles within the family and our advocacy efforts were dedicated to
reshaping them. Progressive social change values were much more
prominent then they are now. The idea of critiquing institutions
directly and seeking alternatives rather than seeking simple access to the
institution seemed to be very much a part of the political and strategic
thinking of the 1970s and even early 1980s. And, of course, we
expanded on feminist thought by developing liberationist ideals with
regard to sexuality. Sexuality should not be controlled by the state or
through institutions like marriage. Sexuality and sexual behavior are a
matter of personal choice a view simultaneously under doctrinal
development in the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, and its
progeny. The Court, too, was examining for the first time the role
between government and its citizens' sex lives. The civil rights
movement's shaping of equality principles set us on a course of
significant cultural change-principles of nondiscrimination, equality
and equal rights became not just the law but a part of our cultural
vision. So much so that even though lesbians and gay men are not
generally protected from discrimination, most people believe or assume
it is illegal to discriminate against lesbians and gay men. Many even
believe that lesbian and gay couples can marry and form families as
readily as anyone else. I personally have been asked many times, "Why
don't you two just marry?," a question the person is probably very sorry
they asked after my "deconstructing marriage" response. Nonetheless,
the assumption and the cultural idea that has taken hold that people are
treated fairly in our system. Unwinding those assumptions a little bit has
allowed for some interesting discussions and perspectives.
And of course we know from what John D'Emilio, Nancy Cott,
and other historians have written that the economy and economic
change influences family structure more than any other single element.
The economic needs of families and the exploitation of the family as a
unit shapes the roles performed by family members. Cott discusses the
irony of the Religious Right's Advocacy. On the one hand they argue
for traditional family values. At the same time, they support free market
principles that essentially force women back into the workforce because
of the family's financial needs. Americans' forced identities as consumers
first ensures that no family can live on a single income AND be
expected to fulfill our roles as consumers: buying the newer, bigger car,
the fastest, newest computer, and family cell phones for all. These forces
very much help change or help define some of the choices that we made
early in terms of some of our strategies.
In addition to understanding the current and historic forces that
shape our current lives, social change movements need a strategy.
[Vol. 10:21
MARRIAGE LAW: OBSOLETE OR CUTTING EDGE?
Lesbian and gay relationships, as I'm sure most in this room know, are
faced with an unending structure of rules that completely exclude our
families as well as any one else who has made the conscious choice not
to marry. But in this context, I'll just talk about lesbian and gay
relationships. The rules related to privileging marriage are exclusive:
thousands and thousands of benefits, rights, privileges, legal access that
exists at all levels, not only within law and public policy, but even in the
private practices and customs of those not necessarily required to treat
people who are married or unmarried, differently. Take employers, for
example. There is no mandate that requires employers to provide health
insurance to their workforce. In addition, if they do provide it there is
no mandate that they provide health benefits only to married employers.
Neither the state nor the insurance industry required married-only
benefits, though the law implicitly assumed that only married employees
got such benefits. In fact, the rules and laws governing the workplace
did mandate equality-equal pay for equal work. The idea that all
employees should be paid equally-in wages and benefits-for similar
work. So our early family rights strategy was to draw attention not to
the exclusion of lesbian and gay couples from the state's marriage laws.
Rather our strategy was to focus on the unequal treatment of gay
employees with partners and children who were paid less than their
married counterparts.
We made choices-very deliberate choices-about working to
challenge marriage as the sole core of family definition rather than to
challenge the exclusivity of marriage that keeps lesbian and gay couples
as outsiders. Both our political desire and perhaps political philosophy
at the time led to very strategic decisions to challenge the exclusive role
of marriage in defining the family. To develop the idea that family
function was at least equal to family form in contexts, in particular, like
the workplace. Was it legitimate for employers to decide whether our
relationships were worthy of receiving the equal compensation? If
employee A is married and gets her salary in addition to health benefits
for her husband and her children, what was the justification for denying
the same benefits (i.e., full salary) to employee B for her partner and
children? Part of the idea was that instead of using challenges to the
marriage law to deal with this problem, it was very much part of the
political culture at the time to say that what we really need to do is
expand the idea of who is a family.
So in the context of the workplace and other commercial settings
we began the process of challenging the idea that marriage should be the
only way in which we define family for the purposes of distributing
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family benefits, privileges and rights. The workplace rules seemed to be
the most vulnerable, but this was quickly expanded into many other
areas as well. Airline frequent flyer programs that allowed free flight
benefits only for blood or legal families. Amtrak "family excursion" fares
that did not extend to non-marital couples. Museum, health clubs and
property insurance rates that were cheaper for married couples and their
children. In a very short time, the definition of family has indeed
changed in these commercial contexts.
The 1989 New York Court of Appeals decision in Braschi v. Stahl
Associates is emblematic of the struggle over a course of time. It goes to
my final point about situations, circumstances historically beyond our
control that help us frame the issues for the courts and for policymakers
in general. In that case, a gay man was faced with eviction from his rent-
controlled apartment after the death of his partner from HIV. The law
provided that a family member who had lived with the named tenant
for a minimum of two years had a right to remain as a tenant in the
rent-controlled apartment. A series of these cases had actually found
their way into the courts in the early- and mid-1980s. It was both a
huge problem and a huge revelation about many of the family structures
that existed in New York City. Courts were grappling with the idea of
what to do with remaining tenants who clearly functioned as family
members but had no formal tie to the deceased tenant. Some courts
were coming up with the idea of constructive adoption in the incidence
of adults who had come to live with people as children and remained
beyond adulthood. The "parent" dies, but there was never a formal
adoption. There were also cases involving gay couples in particular who
had been together for years (as Braschi had been with his partner) and
who had a vested claim to the apartment in which they lived.
Now everyone who knows New York understands that rent-
controlled apartments are like finding gold on Fifth Avenue. You don't
give it up easily, and there's always a huge battle over who has the right
to the apartment. And in this case, he decided that he had a right after
ten years of living in the apartment with his partner, even if he was not a
named tenant, to stay in the apartment. It was his home.
That case really brought forward some of the issues that you raised,
Larry, regarding the proof process of how we define and look at what a
domestic partnership is. How we look functionally at those relationships
as well as the potential for a double bind in imposing a formal family
structure where, perhaps, it was never sought. Are we simply reinforcing
what marriage looks like in trying to fit into that, or are we in some way
redefining something new and different? We certainly thought at the
time we were defining something new and different. These days I'm not
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so sure that we've really done that. Nonetheless, Braschi won his case in
the Court of Appeals, New York's highest state court. A very, very
narrowly split court ruled that he had the right to remain in the
apartment. It was the first time in American jurisprudence that a court
had found that the term "family" should be applied to a gay surviving
partner.
Third, again, the events beyond our control. Some of the things in
the 1980s that really helped define and illustrate the need for some
structural change involved two primary events. One was the increased
numbers of out lesbians who were having children. Parents felt very
strongly about the need to secure the financial and economic means of
their families. And so there were repeated requests to employers to cover
the children, to cover their partners, to make sure that if something
happened to a main wage-earner (or at least the co-wage-earner), that
the insurance (health insurance in particular), and other kinds of
benefits were extended to their family members in the way it was to
other co-workers. So began more public demands for recognition of our
family structures.
The second event was the incidence of HIV and AIDS, particularly
in large cities like New York and San Francisco where, in the mid-1980s
especially, many of us felt like we were losing friends on a daily basis
through this disease. The lives of gay men, over time, were revealed to
the American public, courts, health care and social service settings in
very different ways. Cases like Braschi highlighted the unfairness of
many legal structures. Feature articles in the New York Times and other
mainstream papers across the country began to present gay couples more
compassionately. At the time, it seemed to be the first time that the
American public was allowed to view gay male relationships as being
human, not just stereotyped. Being gay was not just about sex. That
coverage-and this awful disease-presented an opportunity for
breaking down some of the stereotypes that people had about gay male
relationships, just as growing numbers of lesbians having children have
moved people to see lesbian couples as more visible and complex.
Yesterday a jury convicted the two individuals responsible for the
dog that mauled Diane Whipple to death outside of her apartment
door. Her surviving partner, Susan Smith, has brought a wrongful death
action, one of the first to get beyond a motion to dismiss in a trial court.
For twenty years people have been trying to argue that domestic
partners or unmarried partners should have standing to bring wrongful
death actions. This is one of the first cases, at least that I'm aware of,
where the court has ruled squarely that she has stated a cause of action.
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Again, because of the vision and strategy of activists over the past twenty
years, the court had a context in which to see Susan Smith not as a
roommate with no legally cognizable relationship to Diane, but as a
living, breathing person who has experienced the most horrible death of
her long time partner. Had we long ago only focused on the right to
marry, we would have totally missed the opportunity to do justice to
Miguel Braschi, Susan Smith, and the gay surviving partners of those
who died on September 11 in New York and Washington.
An uncountable number of institutional policies have changed in
the last twenty years to reflect a growing acceptance of the idea that we
need to look at the practical aspects of excluding certain couples (i.e.,
gay and lesbian couples) from marriage. And the ironic aspect of some
of this is that by the total exclusion of gay couples from marriage, the
incentive to try to find alternatives, to seek out alternatives, to convince
courts and legislatures about the need for alternatives, was augmented. If
gay and lesbian couples were allowed access into the institution of
marriage it probably would have taken the steam out of developing
alternative structures.
But there are dozens of city laws. Significant developments in
California, Vermont, and Hawaii-Vermont being the most broad-
based with its civil union law-where states are beginning to change
their laws but-California's, I think, their state domestic partnership
law became a legislative reaction to the wrenching political battles over
marriage initiatives.
In looking a bit to the future, we now have the beginnings of
widespread empirical data on cohabiting same-sex couples that was
collected in the 1990 and 2000 federal Census. In 1990, the United
States Census Bureau for the first time counted people who designated
themselves as unmarried partners on the census form. What many of us
knew immediately when this plan was announced in the late 1980s was
that there also would be a way to pull out of the data all of the same-sex
unmarried partners who'd reported as such on the form. And sure
enough, the 2000 data has begun to show us a huge leap in the numbers
of same-sex households being counted and I think will provide us with
at least some of the statistical empirical research that we have lacked in
being able to establish the case of not only our existence, which is pretty
self-evident, but at least what our households look like that will help us
into the future.
And so we see in all of this how cultural acknowledgment and
cultural influence has been very significant. September 11 th became a
time in which our work had its desired effect at a particularly critical
time. All of those conversations with the governor, the mayor and other
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decision-makers took hold. It's probably by no means the end of the
battle within New York City or within that particular context, certainly.
But it is an indication, I think, that people are aware and trying to find
a way to do some equity to same-sex couples' relationships.
Thank you.
LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER: Thank you Paula and Steve.
Let's try to stay on schedule as much as we can, but let's go ahead and
have questions until about 12:15. So we welcome questions from the
audience.
QUESTION: Given how significant same-sex unions are in
changing the laws, how have those responded to morality-based
arguments underpinning the laws?
PAULA ETTELBRICK: Well, that has yet to be determined, to
tell you the truth. I think that certainly finding allies in the place that
has been the most stringent of obstacles (i.e., organized religion, by and
large) is very important. When they speak to legislators, when they
testify in court, it forces us to address some of the moral concerns on the
minds of the policymakers and lawmakers. The morality context for our
relationships led many gay and lesbian couples to kind of mimic
heterosexual marriage rituals as a means of gaining status within their
extended families. I mean that's a thing that I think is probably more
profound than the public aspect of it. It somehow has allowed parents
to see their kids as equal. Their lesbian daughter and their straight son,
as kind of engaging in the same kind of processes and the same kinds of
values or rituals. And it's really helped a lot in terms of people
understanding the level of commitment in gay and lesbian relationships.
QUESTION: What are the differences between the American Law
Institute and the Uniform Law Conference? What would be the
different ramifications of each adopting a model law or definition?
LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER: The American Law Institute is a
private organization. The Uniform Law Conference is quasi-public,
because the members of the Uniform Law Conference are actually
gubernatorial appointments. The American Law Institute is not. The
American Law Institute is composed of practitioners (you have to be
elected), judges and legislators. The American Law Institute has about
twenty-five hundred members, something like that. It's quite influential.
In fact in Arizona, there's a Supreme Court decision that suggests that
anything that's in the Restatements is the law of Arizona! So over the
years it's been very influential because of the status of the membership.
The membership really is the elite. The graybeards, I guess you could
say, of the bar and the judiciary. The Uniform Law Conference does
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have it's influence. Some of its statutes are very successful. It's only
successful to the extent that they're actually enacted. The most
successful Uniform law is the Uniform Commercial Code which is
enacted everywhere. The Uniform Probate Code (UPC) is enacted only
in about fifteen to twenty states, but it's had influence in the legislation
in nearly every state because when you look down at their statutes, they
might not be a UPC state, but when we look at their actual individual
sections a lot of times it's a UPC section. So the American Law Institute
does have a lot of clout. It does have a lot of influence in this country.
QUESTION: Do the social classes and races understand marriage
differently?
STEVEN L. NOCK: I'm generalizing from the states that we've
been doing intensive analysis in. Marriage earlier was said to have
evolved from a primarily economic to a primarily emotional
relationship, and I think that's clearly true among middle-class white
people. It is clearly not as true among people of color in the states we're
studying, especially poor women. To them marriage is more a venue in
which children can be raised, and the security and the predictability of
that relationship is of paramount importance. Especially the
employability and stable employability of a partner is much more
important than the emotional quality. I'm always struck by how we
have accepted this dominance of the emotional model of marriage, the
love dominating all else, and I think that's true for middle-class white
people. But it's night and day in our results that when you get below the
middle class income level, or educational level, that women of color do
not view marriage in exactly that way. It's much more of a traditional
arrangement for securing an environment for rearing children and
providing.
QUESTION: What does the case law say about who is and isn't a
surviving spouse?
LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER: First of all, there's very little
litigation on this question as to who is and who isn't a surviving spouse.
Most of the traditional litigation has been over bigamist marriages. The
decedent was already legally married to somebody else, unknown to the
person who thought that he or she was the surviving spouse. You do
have a trickle of that kind of litigation. The case that you're mentioned
is quite new, and I've forgotten myself. Has that been decided by an
appellate court?
PAULA ETTELBRICK: The Kansas Supreme Court.
LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER: The Supreme Court do you
think? Okay. Well, I'm sure that there will be more cases like that,
although we can sometimes exaggerate the frequency of that kind of a
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situation. The definitions, I suppose, of a domestic partnership in the
Principles (since they don't distinguish between same- and opposite-sex
couples) could obviously transcend that and if adopted would preclude
that as an issue I would think. It wouldn't matter which gender the
survivor is! But that's a long way off. More questions?
QUESTION: Are the traditional gay rights organizations also
working on behalf of unmarried, heterosexual domestic partners?
PAULA ETTELBRICK: Well, I think all of them nominally are,
because there has been a trend over the last twenty years to establish
within certain contexts a broader vision (if not definition) of what
family is. I think all of them are still involved to some degree in that
effort. Lambda Legal Defense, for instance, signed onto a Seventh
Circuit brief that drew the ire of Judge Posner when he decided the case.
They argued for the right of a straight teacher seeking to get health
benefits for her partner. The Chicago Board of Ed allowed only same-
sex benefits and marital benefits. The teacher argued that the policy
violated marital status and sexual orientation-based laws. Judge Posner
basically chastised Lambda, saying, "What are you doing here on this
case? Get back to your gay rights work!" So, I think that there is an
understanding that all of the groups need to continue to challenge the
injustice that results when some families are protected but others aren't.
There is a certain timidity about challenging the marriage laws, quite
frankly. I'm not sure that it's because there's such a strong feeling about
expanding definitions of family; I think that's been waning actually. I
think many in the community finds the domestic partnership approach
to be irritating. People talk about it being too incremental. I sort of
point to the relative success of that over the relative success of marriage,
where at least you're kind of succeeding. I think that beyond the
national groups, what you find is a little more radicalism on this issue at
the local level, to tell you the truth. Maybe it's not radical, it's more just
pragmatic. When you deal with the state legislature, you're not thinking
you will ever pass a marriage bill but you think you might be able to
impact the healthcare proxy laws or other kinds of things that would be
very significant.
LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER: Let's have maybe one more
question.
QUESTION: What is the terminology used for non-covenant
marriages?
STEVEN L. NOCK: Standard marriage is the term they use.
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QUESTION: What is incidence of domestic violence in covenant
and standard marriages? Does covenant marriage really eliminate
incidents of domestic violence?
STEVEN L. NOCK: I shouldn't over-dramatize the magnitude
here. I mean for all the attention, domestic violence is a big issue, but
prevalence-wise it's not that great. I mean five to eight percent of
couples might experience some form in any one year, that's the
incidence. Prevalence-wise it might be up to eighteen percent over the
course of a lifetime. So we've been studying couples for three years. So
the incidents or the prevalence of domestic violence, if it's physical, is
relatively low. The incidents of domestic violence if it's emotional is
much higher. Using any of those things, for whatever reasons, we
believe it has to do with the style of dealing with conflict. There are
different styles of conflict that we've got built into our study. The way
covenant couples seem to deal with conflict is to bring in third parties,
especially family members, rather than to work it out themselves, and
that does tend to reduce the incidents of escalating violence.
QUESTION: What accounts for the difference between covenant
and standard marriages?
STEVEN L. NOCK: See, we think that ninety-well, it might be
one hundred percent-of the difference between covenant and standard
marriages is a selection fact.
QUESTION: Well, I do, too. What accounts for the low rate at
which couples in these states choose covenant marriages?
STEVEN L. NOCK: Okay, so this is just guessing, okay. I made
this presentation a year ago at the Population Association of America
and talked about the abysmally low rate of adoption in the three states
that had passed covenant marriage because everybody had predicted this
landside of coercion. In fact the ACLU had brought a lawsuit-
QUESTION: It seems that if the state really wanted to promote
covenant marriages, they would become the default choice rather than
standard marriages.
STEVEN L. NOCK: Right, right, right. And none of that seemed
to happen, in fact, quite the opposite. Nobody seemed to be adopting
covenant marriages. And I was saying, you know, you've got "two,
three, four percent," depending on which state and which estimate you
got in the first two to three years who adopted covenant marriages. It's
quite obvious that this policy has been a dismal failure if we focus only
on expected adoption rates. But compared to something like Roth IRAs
or any other form of complex legislation, this is an outrageous success.
It's a compared-to-what question. And so four percent compared to say,
what percentage of people adopted IRAs in the first five years is
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enormously high. So these innovators are a very small percentage of the
total population, but compared to innovators in other forms of
legislation, they actually are a large percentage. You've got to remember
also in any one year, the percentage of people at risk of getting
married-whatever you want to call it, the people who are eligible to get
married-those who are not married but who are at the age to get
married, is a relatively teeny fraction of the total population. Maybe
three to five percent of the entire population of a state. So I don't know.
Like I said, that's my guess compared to other forms of legislation. I
don't know whether it's fair to compare it to Roth IRAs, but there are
probably more covenant marriages as there are Roth IRAs in Louisiana.
Whatever that's worth!
KEYNOTE ADDRESS
DAVID L. CHAMBERS: Welcome back to the Symposium. We
have a speaker about to begin who will, I'm sure, continue the high
standards that we had set for us this morning. I thought the first two
sessions were wonderful, and we should all be grateful to the Journal for
bringing us together.
I'm going to keep this introduction very short. "Great," she said!
She said that because I know too much about her and she thinks that if
it's short it's likely not to reveal too much! Several of you who are in this
room have seen Beth Robinson before. You've seen her in the course of
taking a course from me in family law and getting a chance to watch a
video of the oral argument in the Vermont Supreme Court case of Baker
v. State. Beth was one of three attorneys representing the plaintiffs in the
suit seeking the right for same-sex couples to marry within the state. I
showed it in the course because I believe it's as fine an example of an
oral argument as I've seen, and because it provided a wonderful way to
introduce a subject that is not just complex in itself, but arises in a
historical context that oral argument helped set very well. Not only did
Beth (and her co-counsel) triumph in the case, leading to a holding
(which she will certainly discuss) that tossed the matter to the
legislature. Beth then led the effort in the legislature to secure
legislation. And then worked hard during the elections to secure the re-
election of the legislators who had supported the legislation. And it
never stops, because this year is another election year in Vermont, and
the same controversy about both same-sex marriage and civil union
persists. We are lucky to be able to pull her away from Vermont long
enough for her to speak to us.
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Beth is a graduate of Dartmouth College and the University of
Chicago Law School. She practices with a wonderful, small firm in
Middlebury, Vermont that probably devoted as high a portion of its
revenues to the pro bono support of this case as any firm has ever done.
It's my warm pleasure to greet and introduce to you Beth Robinson.
BETH ROBINSON: A thank you to the Journal of Gender & Law
and Nicole and all the folks who have done the great organizing. It's
great to be here. I'm thrilled to have been included and it's nice to get
away from Vermont because it's bitter cold there right now!
I kind of see my role in this post-lunch session, being the private
practitioner of this crowd, as bringing the intellectual level down a
notch so that you all can digest before you climb back up in the next
panel. So I hope you'll indulge because I'm going to try not to tell too
many war stories, but it may come out sounding that way.
What I would like to do is share with you some of the lessons I've
learned through the course of our work in Vermont.
I.
It's especially important to me to think about the first issue in the
context of the incredible panels we heard this morning. I wish I'd come
to this symposium before we litigated the case because I would have
been so much smarter! But I think lesson number one is that it's critical
to remember that as interesting as legal arguments are and as fun as it is
to craft arguments and parse language and be a lawyer, you can't forget
that the law is about real people. It's a powerful force that shapes and
affects the course of all of our lives. And that's something that's been
with me from the start of this process and it's something that's not very
scholarly to talk about, but it's vital, I think, to the debate about all of
the topics that we're talking about today.
Some of my inspiration to get involved in this case involved
experiences both with clients (as a practitioner) and with friends.
Through the years preceding our work on this case, I had so many
experiences in which I was confronted with somebody who was faced
with a profound disadvantage or disability because the laws didn't
recognize the reality of their lives and the reality of their families.
I think about Nina and Stacy, who ultimately became plaintiffs in
the Vermont marriage case. Nina had her first child by home birth.
Things went very much awry in the middle of the labor and they had to
rush her to the hospital. Both her life and the life of her to-be-born baby
were hanging in the balance. As they rushed into the door of the
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hospital and took Nina back into the room where they were going to
work to save her life and save the baby's life, they stopped Stacy at the
door and asked her if she could produce some paperwork to
demonstrate that she had a legal right to be there while her life partner's
and child's lives were hanging in the balance. Now Nina and Stacy are
actually pretty sophisticated people. They had the knowledge that they
needed durable powers of attorney for health care. They had the
wherewithal to pay lawyers to draft them. And somehow, even in that
moment of crisis, Stacy had the presence of mind to go to the file
cabinet, get those papers, and take them with her to the hospital. So she
got in the room. But I have to tell you that when they describe that
experience, getting in the room won't begin to erase the sting of the
assault on the integrity of their family at a time when they were most
vulnerable.
And this kind of thing isn't unusual. I talked to a friend, Jay, who
lives in Vermont. His partner is a disabled veteran. A couple years ago
Jay took his partner to the Veterans Hospital, to the emergency room. It
wasn't a traumatic injury, I don't think it was life-threatening, but it
was something urgent enough to cause him to go to the emergency
room. I've never actually asked what it was. Jay was sitting in the
waiting room reading People Magazine while his partner was back in the
examining room. At that point, somebody "coded."
Who here watches ER? Whenever I think of this story I always
picture crash carts flying around and noises and everybody in high gear.
So Jay was sitting in the waiting room, and he started to get a little
nervous. He knew that his partner didn't have a life-threatening
condition, but, again, you guys watch ER-so, you know people come
in with a hangnail and fall into a coma and die. Right? It happens all the
time!
So Jay got a little nervous and he went up to the desk and he said,
"Excuse me, I'm just looking for some reassurance that my partner is
okay. Could you tell me what's going on with him?" And the woman at
the desk said, "Who are you again?" He said, "Well, I'm his life
partner." She said, "I'm sorry, we've got rules here and we can only
discuss medical conditions of patients with family members. I'm afraid
you'll have to take your seat and wait until he comes back out."
These stories aren't made up, they happen. And now that's just one
type of example. As a lawyer, one of the things that I see a lot involves
the Vermont property transfer tax. It's a tax you pay when you transfer
property from one person to another. It's about $500 on the first
$100,000 in value and then it goes up incrementally beyond that. Over
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the years I've represented many same-sex couples who live in a home
titled to one partner only. At the time they got together maybe one of
them owned a home so it wasn't in joint names. At some point they
refinance or they decide to put the home in joint names for one reason
or another. That's what happened to Deb and Carol. When they went
to their lawyer, their lawyer explained to them that if they put the house
in joint names they would get whacked with a property transfer tax. It's
a tax that would never apply to a married couple or a legally recognized
family in that way.
I think about Janice and Susie. Janice has worked now for twenty
plus years for a GE plant in Rutland, Vermont. In the course of her
twenty plus years there, she's built up quite a pension. She and Susie
have been together for probably seventeen of those twenty years. Susie
works as well, but Janice is clearly the primary breadwinner of the
family. If something were to happen to Janice tomorrow, Susie wouldn't
get a penny of that substantial pension that has built up through the
years. She wouldn't get a penny of her social security. If she were a man,
if she were a husband to Janice rather than female partner, she would.
Some of the disabilities that people face when their families aren't
legally recognized (and we heard a little bit about this this morning),
ironically, involve divorce. One of the most important sets of
protections in our marriage laws are the divorce laws. In the course of
my practice I have encountered a lot of couples, a lot of same-sex
couples, who have been together for a substantial period of time, who
have merged their finances in a way that many heterosexual married
couples do, and who break up. And when they break up, they find that
they don't have the same recourse to the family courts that heterosexual
married couples have historically had. And they don't have the same
recourse to the principles of divorce law that have been available to
married couples.
I think about a client, Susan, and her partner. They were together
for a number of years, and Susan's partner owned a farm. Susan put her
life savings into this farm. The two of them were raising animals
together. They broke up, and it was a very ugly break up. Susan came to
me and said, "Look, my life savings is in this farm that's got her name
on it." Now if they had been legally married at the time we could have
gone to the divorce court, could have prevented the partner from taking
any action in terms of disposition of the property, and probably could
have gotten an order to sell the property and divide the proceeds in
some equitable way. What we ended up having to do is go to the
Superior Court, which is a court that's designed to deal with things like
business conflicts, and we had to craft theories that were designed to
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deals with business partnerships breaking up and deals gone awry that
weren't really formulated in the context of family relationships. We had
to try to engraft those principles onto this case, get a court order, and
try to enforce the order. Long story short: my client lost her life savings,
and racked up a substantial bill to me at the same time.
Some of the stuff that I've seen seems trivial, but doesn't necessarily
feel trivial. I talked a little bit about Janice and Susie a second ago. A
few years back, Susie's brother died. Now Susie's brother was, for all
intents and purposes, Janice's brother-in-law. She had been part of the
family, they'd been family to one another for many years. Janice's
employer had a bereavement leave policy that allowed workers to take
paid leave to go to the funeral of a family member, and that was defined
to include a brother-in-law or a sister-in-law. But because the law didn't
recognize Janice's partner's brother as having any legal relationship to
Susie, she wasn't able to take that bereavement leave. It wasn't the end
of the world. She just took a vacation day. It wasn't like she didn't get to
go to the funeral, but, again, it was that slap in the face at the time when
she was feeling most vulnerable. Her family's grieving and she's told that
her family isn't really family.
The one example that struck me the most (and this is the only one
that isn't somebody that I know personally-I read about it in the
newsletter of a national advocacy organization) involved two men who
had been together for many years. One of them died. The surviving
partner buried the deceased partner, put up a tombstone, planted the
flowers, and grieved by the graveside. One day he came to the grave to
visit his deceased partner, and there, where his partner was supposed to
have lain for eternity, was a hole in the ground. The tombstone was
broken in pieces and it was lying by the dumpster. The deceased
partner's biological family had retrieved the body to bury it in the
"family" burial plot. The kicker is that under existing law, they may
have had every right to do that.
These are all examples of the way that the law, in a very specific
way, allocates benefits, burdens, rights, and responsibilities that aren't
available, or in some cases previously weren't available, to same-sex
couples anywhere in this country.
One of the things that I came to appreciate during the course of
this case is that what we're really talking about here is a lot more than a
set of benefits. That's not something I appreciated when I got into it.
Because I'm a lawyer, that's sort of what I think about, but the law does
more than just assign benefits and responsibilities. There is an
interaction between our law and our society. I think somebody before
2003]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
was talking about the "social norms/legal rules feedback loop." And it
really is true.
I think about Sandi and Bobby, who just celebrated their thirty-
fourth anniversary, and actually it's probably thirty-fifth anniversary by
now. About six years ago Sandi was diagnosed with cancer. So the first
thing she said to her doctor was, "Before we go through all the
treatment options and we figure out what we're going to do, I want to
schedule another appointment so that I can come back with Bobby and
we can go through this all together." The doctor bristled and said, "Well
I think this is between you and me and I don't see any reason for Bobby
to be here. I'm not comfortable with that." Sandi was shocked. She said,
"Doctor, you know that you've got in your files a durable power of
attorney for health care that I've signed that says that Bobby's the one to
make medical decisions if something should happen to me and I
become incapacitated." And the doctor said, "Well yeah, and if you
become incapacitated, then I'll start dealing with Bobby. But now, this
is between you and me."
Now that wasn't strictly a legal problem. I mean the solution was
obvious. Sandi got a new doctor very quickly! But the point of the story
from my perspective is that doctor didn't just make this up out of
nowhere. That doctor was taking his cues from the laws and the law said
to this doctor that Bobby was a legal stranger to Sandi, with no legal
relationship and no role to play in this decision-making process.
And that really is part of this "social norms/legal rules feedback
loop," because I think our laws do tell a story. They tell a story about
who we are as a people, what our values are, how we view ourselves and
one another. And it's a story that's constantly evolving. The story affects
the laws and the laws in turn affect the reality of who we are. And for
that reason I think that the struggle that we've been waging in Vermont
is a lot more than a struggle for a package of benefits, because I think
that it is in part about the story told by the laws, and that story doesn't
just impact the committed same-sex couples who seek benefits for their
relationship. That story affects every person in the community, whether
it's the single gay and lesbian person struggling with her or her own
internalized homophobia; whether it's our families-whether it's the
laws giving our families the message that it's okay to shun us; whether
it's the laws giving the message to the kids on the playground that it's
okay to make fun of the kid who's got two mothers; whether it's the
laws telling our employers that it's okay not to hire us. The law, prior to
the civil union law in Vermont, and the law in every other state in this
country, essentially denies that same-sex couples exist in committed
relationships, or suggests that if they do, those relationships don't have
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value, they're not worthy of acknowledgement by the law. And that
story is so out of sync with the reality that I know that it becomes
untenable.
So that's sort of lesson number one: real people and real lives. We
can't lose sight of those when we're talking about all of these issues.
II.
The second lesson, from my perspective, is a very practical one,
which is that laws don't exist in a vacuum. Courts don't operate in a
vacuum. And as fun as litigation is, one can't litigate in a vacuum. We
actually had an opportunity in Vermont to do a marriage case several
years before the case that we actually did. When I say we, I'm including
my law partner Susan Murray. I shouldn't say we-she actually had the
opportunity. The clients approached her back in 1995 and asked her to
represent them in a marriage case.
Now our assessment of the merits of the case in 1995 weren't any
different from our assessment of the merits of the case in 1997 when we
ultimately filed suit. But we believed that you couldn't just go into court
and file a suit, no matter how right you were, without doing community
education, without doing political work, without laying the
groundwork, without trying to create a world in which this could
happen, and without anticipating that every court decision can invite a
political response, whether it's a statutory change or a constitutional
change. So rather than taking the case in 1995, we formed the Vermont
Freedom to Marry Task Force and spent several years working with
volunteers all around the state, training speakers, preparing a video that
played on public access TV, and going to the Rotary clubs and other
civic associations. We had booths at the fairs. (I think now we're up to
thirteen or fourteen county and local fairs a year.) And the goal of this
work is to talk about the reality of our lives, to tell the stories about who
we are, and to talk about some of the types of stories I just shared with
you.
We talk about other things, too. We talk about the evolution of
marriage through time. You've heard about that this morning, so I'm
not going to wade into those waters because somebody here who knows
a lot more than I do will correct me! We talk about the distinction
between civil marriage and religious marriage. We try to help people
untangle these concepts. People, I think, in this room understand that
distinction, but it's true that they're sort of confused in the way people
think about marriage sometimes. We try to make sure people
20031
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
understand that long after every state in this country allows same-sex
couples to marry, there will still be churches that decline to recognize or
celebrate same-sex marriage, and we're not suggesting that should be
otherwise. Well maybe it should be otherwise, but that's not our
mission, and I've always said that if somebody tried to force the
Catholic Church to do a gay wedding, I would represent the church pro
bono. So that's not what this is about. And there are already lots of
churches that have celebrated same-sex unions long before any states in
this country recognized those unions for civil purposes.
It was about a year ago that I did my last fair shift. It was a spring
fair, it wasn't a summertime fair, and it was at the ice hockey rink in
Lyndonville, Vermont at the Northeast Kingdom Home Garden &
Lawn Show. And there we were with the Vermont Freedom to Marry
Task Force booth right next to the fudge booth and the chimney sweep
booth. And the one next to me, which I just love, was called "Blazing
Needles, Custom Embroidered Baseball Caps While You Wait!"
So I guess the point of lesson number two is-I suspect I'm talking
to a lot of lawyers, lawyers-to-be, and practitioners-the legal work that
we do in courts and even in legislatures is very important. But unless we
or somebody that we're working with closely is standing in the booths at
the county fairs, or going to the Congregational churches on
Wednesday night for coffee and information sessions, or doing some
form of educational outreach, our legal work isn't going to have the
impact that it should.
III.
In terms of the actual marriage case, just a quick summary of how
it proceeded. We represented three couples: Stan and Peter, Holly and
Lois, and Nina and Stacy. Stan and Peter are very articulate, well
spoken, thoughtful guys, whose courage I truly admire. I think for two
gay men to stand up and publicly speak of their love and affection for
one another exposes them to that particularly violent kind of backlash
that I don't see lesbians triggering as frequently. And Stan and Peter
were willing to be up front and talk about that, and are true heroes to
me for that reason. They really approached this as a reflection of deep
respect for the institution of marriage. They think that marriage is an
important institution in our community-one of the many institutions
that weave us together as a people. They wanted to share in that.
Holly and Lois had been together, at the time we filed suit, twenty-
five years. During their twenty-five years together they'd served as foster
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parents for over a dozen kids. They'd been deacons at their church and
on town boards. They'd go pick up litter on litter pickup day every year.
They'd do the bike-a-thon for lung cancer every year, and were very
active and involved in their community. They had also been closeted.
When they came to their first Vermont Freedom to Marry Task Force
meeting some time in 1995, that act of showing up in a meeting with a
dozen people in the basement of the Episcopal Church in Montpelier
was for them an act of coming out. And then they finished the job a few
months later on the front page of the New York Times! Again, the
courage that they showed in doing that, I'm in awe!
Nina and Stacy, whom I talked about earlier-they really came to
this case as parents. We asked them, "Why are you doing this, why do
you want to go through this?" They said, "We're doing it for Noah. If
there's something about marriage that's good for kids, if there's
something about marriage that creates a more stable environment in
which to raise children, then Noah deserves to have that as much as any
other kid. He deserves to grow up knowing that his family is as much a
family, respected and protected by the laws, as any other family." And
that was really their inspiration.
That's actually where this case took a tragic turn. Noah had been
born with a congenital heart problem. It had not been problematic
significantly until about a week before we filed the marriage case, when
his heart failed and he spent about six weeks on life support waiting for
a donor heart. He ultimately died. Now at that point we fully expected
that Nina and Stacy might say, "We can't go forward as part of this case;
we're dealing with unimaginable grief, and we need to pull back and
focus on that." And we would have understood that; we were fully
prepared for that. That's not what they did. They took time and they
grieved. And then they came back and they said to us, "We got into this
case for Noah, and we can't think of a better testament to his life, a
better way to honor his memory, than to continue forward in his name
and in the name of all of the other children out there being raised by
same-sex parents." From that point forward, Nina and Stacy were
powerful spokespeople for parents, same-sex parents of children, and for
children being raised by same-sex parents.
We filed the case in July of 1997. It was very quickly briefed on
summary judgment motions. We were dismissed by the trial court by
December, filed our appeal, briefed the case in the spring of 1998 and
were actually up in the Vermont Supreme Court arguing by November
of 1998. So the case moved relatively quickly in litigation terms.
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We made all of the arguments you would expect, and I'm not
going to run through them all today. They may come up in discussion
to the extent people are interested. But we made all the different
arguments about why heightened scrutiny would apply: sex
discrimination, sexual orientation discrimination, fundamental right.
We also spent a lot of time talking about, even in the absence of
heightened scrutiny, how do you really apply the constitution? This was
actually interesting for me. Maybe you all are still enough in a scholarly
world where it's not a revelation, but by the time we brought this case I
was enough out of law school that my recollection of equal protection
jurisprudence was: If you get heightened scrutiny you win, and if you
don't get heightened scrutiny you lose! And I think that sometimes we
get a little lazy and we think that's how the Equal Protection Clause
works. But when you start reading the cases (and this is true under
Vermont's equal protection jurisprudence and is also true under federal
equal protection law), it's not really quite that simple. Even in cases
where courts don't apply heightened scrutiny and they're purporting to
apply something like rational basis, there's a difference in how hard they
look and how demanding they are of the state in justifying
discrimination, depending on the type of discrimination at issue. We
spent some time talking to the court about that and suggesting that even
under a rational basis kind of approach, you still have to have a reason
that makes sense.
One thing was kind of new about the Vermont case-it wasn't
completely new but it was a step forward. We were really building on
the work of the folks in Hawaii who'd worked very hard in the Baehr v.
Lewin case, which led to the first state supreme court in the country
acknowledging that there's a real constitutional problem here and
sending the case back for trial as to whether there's a compelling interest
to justify the discrimination. What we did in the Vermont case is we
said, "Okay, we've got all these arguments about heightened scrutiny,
but putting aside the level of scrutiny, put your reasons out there. We
don't think you have any reasons that are even going to pass the laugh
test. We don't think you have any reasons that are going to satisfy
whatever level of review the court decides to apply." Much of the
Vermont case was about the State trying to articulate its reasons and
trying to come up with something that made sense.
The trial court dismissed our case, but only one of the State's
rationales got more than just the back of the hand. The trial court said
that most of the reasons that the State offers just don't make any sense
at all; they don't even pass the laugh test. The one that got the State
through, that got them the dismissal by the trial court, was a rationale
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that had to do with procreation. The idea was that there is a connection
between the fact that only a man and a woman can biologically beget a
child together and the State's right to deny Holly and Lois, Stan and
Peter, and Nina and Stacy marriage licenses. (Just as an aside for those
of you who have seen the oral argument, that assumption was
something that Justice Morse actually questioned at one point during
the State's argument. He pointed out some of the advances in cloning
research and questioned whether the State's argument would change
when procreation no longer required a man and a woman. It was kind
of a funny moment because I don't think the State-you know how you
prepare for every question you could conceivably get on oral
argument-I don't think the State had anticipated that question!)
We made those arguments. We get to the Supreme Court, we
argue it in November of 1998, and the decision comes down in
December of 1999. (Just another aside, a month before the decision
came down (and this is a slightly happier twist to the Nina and Stacy
story I told you earlier), their second son was born, and he's a happy,
healthy one-and-a-half-year-old now. So that's exciting! And he was a
great addition to the press conference. Anyway, the decision came down
in December of 1999, and the court essentially agreed with us. It didn't
apply any kind of heightened scrutiny, per se. It agreed that you've got
to have a reason that makes sense, and went through the reasons that the
State had articulated. It gave most of them the back of the hand.
The reason that it spent the most time discussing was this
procreation argument. And it made two observations. I draw an
illustration from my own life. When I was in sixth grade, my
grandmother, who had been widowed for a number of years-she was
like seventy-she met this dashing widower whom all of the widows
were after, and she got him! And they got married. And, you know,
when we were in the church there celebrating their wedding, and when I
was out drawing on her windows with soap and "hot springs tonight"
and all that stuff, nobody thought for a second that Babbo and Dudley
were going to biologically beget a child. I mean it was the furthest thing
from anybody's mind. But nobody questioned the value of what they
were doing, and nobody could begin to suggest that the State could
deny them the legal rights or responsibilities and legal status of being
married because they couldn't and weren't going to biologically beget
children. And the Vermont Supreme Court essentially made that point.
There are lots of couples that we know who either can't biologically
beget children, or choose not to. Some bring children into their families
through adoption just like many same-sex couples; some use the same
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reproductive technologies that many gay couples use. So the procreation
argument sort of breaks down on that side.
The flip side is we have a lot of same-sex couples with children,
including Nina and Stacy, obviously. Holly and Lois actually adopted
one of the foster kids that they raised, so they had a child as well. What
the Court essentially said is, it can't really be that we're so obsessed with
how the child is conceived. If there is a legitimate purpose of marriage
involving kids, it has to do with creating a stable environment in which
to raise those children. But that purpose doesn't support denying Nina
and Stacy, and Holly and Lois, and Stan and Peter marriage licenses. If
anything, that purpose would point in favor of giving these folks
marriage licenses. So the procreation argument broke down.
The Court concluded (this is the one quotable paragraph from the
Court's decision, and it is a pretty quotable paragraph):
The past provides many instances where the law refused to see
a human being when it should have. The future may provide
instances where the law will be asked to see a human when it
should not. The challenge for future generations will be to
define what is most essentially human. The extension of the
common benefits clause to acknowledge, [that's the Vermont
Constitutional Provision at issue] plaintiffs as Vermonters who
seek nothing more nor less than legal protection and security
for their avowed commitment to an intimate and lasting
human relationship is simply, when all is said and done, a
recognition of our common humanity.
In that respect, the Baker decision was absolutely groundbreaking. I
mean having read what courts have been saying about gay and lesbian
people for many years, the simple recognition of our common humanity
is fairly leading edge. And as obvious as it may be, it was
groundbreaking. The Court said, in light of this recognition of our
common humanity, there's no basis for making the distinctions that the
State is making. The State is required to provide all the same benefits of
marriage to same-sex couples.
So up to that point the Baker decision was absolutely
breakthrough, groundbreaking, etc. What the Court did next was as
disappointing as what it did first was exciting, because rather than
ordering the State to issue marriage licenses to our clients, the Court did
two things. First, it kind of redefined the case as being a case about
benefits, only about benefits. Then it drew a distinction between the
benefits of marriage and the legal status of being married that hadn't
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been drawn in any of the nineteen briefs that had been filed. It had been
raised in a fleeting question at the end of the oral argument that I relive
every night in my dreams, wishing I could go back and answer it again.
That was the only hint that that's a distinction that the Court was
considering. So it redefined the case in terms of benefits and it said, it's
clear that the State of Vermont has to extend all of the same benefits of
marriage to same-sex couples as it makes available to heterosexual
couples, but we're going to withhold judgment on the question of
whether the State of Vermont has to make the legal status of being
married available to same-sex couples, as if somehow the legal status of
being married isn't one of the benefits of marriage!
Then the Court said, rather than issue any relief at all for these
folks, we're going to sit back for some undefined period of time and
we're going to give the Vermont legislature an opportunity to respond,
if it so chooses, to this decision. The legislature could pass a law
allowing same sex couples to marry. Or it could pass a law-it could
consider passing a law-like the European Registered Partnership Laws
or through some other mechanism that would create a parallel structure
that delivered those same benefits but under a different heading. Then
the Court said, we're not actually going to decide today whether that
second option that we just spent a page and a half suggesting you might
consider is actually constitutional, we're going to reserve that question
for some future day, and in the meantime we're going to sit back and
see what the legislature does."
So, I don't want to sound too harsh because obviously Baker v.
State was groundbreaking, but it was this strange fusion of Brown v.
Board of Education and Plessy v. Ferguson in the same decision, because it
made very lofty statements about principles of inclusion as they applied
to same-sex couples, but then it fell short of actually seeing those
statements through to their logical conclusion.
I was disappointed because we had just spent four years going to
the legislators one by one talking about these issues and saying we're not
going to ask you to do anything affirmative on this issue. We just want
you to stay out of the way and do nothing so that we can do this in
court. And then the Court sent us to the legislature. So I had to go back
with my tail between my legs and say that everything I had said for the
last four years was not really true!
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IV.
We started off in the legislature in January of 2000. We had about
a week to adjust to the notion that we had neither won nor lost and that
we were finding ourselves in the legislature. We had to craft a legislative
policy. We had to hire some lobbyists. We had to figure out how the
legislature works, and we had to figure out what we were doing. The
legislature, in the meantime, also had a week between when the Court
handed down its decision and the beginning of the session to throw its
entire agenda for the session out the window and figure out how it was
going to deal with this issue. So it was really a shock for everybody
involved in the political process in Vermont because of the timing and
the weight of what was going on.
The decision was made that the work would start on this in the
House Judiciary Committee, which consisted of eleven people. These
are citizen legislators. These are not professional politicians. These are
folks who come to Montpelier four or five months a year, and then the
rest of the year they're home within their communities doing their
thing. This committee had five Republicans, five Democrats, and one
Progressive. They had two retired state troopers, a retired teacher, a
social worker, a saleswoman, and a housewife. It was a diverse cross
section of the community. There were actually only three lawyers on the
committee.
For the next six weeks this committee took testimony every day
from scholars, from people like the distinguished panelists we're hearing
today, from gay and lesbian people, from clergy. There was actually a
significant clergy involvement, which in itself could be a whole
symposium as to why that is and its significance. There was the day
when the Catholic bishop came down and testified against doing
anything. And then the next day the Episcopal bishop and the
Methodist bishop came and testified in favor of including same-sex
couples in marriage. It was the battle of the bishops! Then there were
the Rabbis, the pro and the con!
The committee also held public hearings drawing unprecedented
numbers. Remember, Vermont has a population of about six hundred
thousand. There were two public hearings in the State House. One of
them was in a snow storm, and they still filled the State House. They
literally had to stop letting people come in because it got so crowded.
There were over two thousand people crowded into the Vermont State
House putting their name in a hat in the hope that they get drawn and
have their chance to speak for two minutes.
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And I've segued into my next section because I divide this into the
different lessons and I have moved beyond the court lesson, which I
always called expect the unexpected! Usually I tell the story about how
the court decision came down on a Monday. They always hand down
their decisions on Fridays, and I was wearing the wrong suit! But
anyway!
The title in my mind for this legislative process (and there are a lot
of potential tides) really is "There are Heroes Among Us." I was so
amazed throughout this process by the number of heroes around me in
our community in all sorts of roles. This was not just some debate
buried in the newspaper. Every single day it was on the front page of all
of the Vermont papers for six weeks/eight weeks, even actually four
months. You couldn't find a person in Vermont who hadn't been
sucked into conversations around the water cooler, who wasn't involved,
who didn't have an opinion. And it was an increasingly volatile and
divisive environment. And in the midst of that, there were so many gay
and lesbian people who had been leading perfectly contented lives in
their small towns in Vermont-closeted, maybe not to family and close
friends, but closeted at work and closeted in their community. Many of
these folks didn't choose this battle, wouldn't have necessarily wanted us
to engage it, and though they were not necessarily happy with their legal
lot in life, were not seeking to stir up trouble. The number of those
people who heard the call and stepped up and spoke to their co-workers,
their neighbors, the members of their community, and their legislators
at public hearings about the reality of their lives, at great personal risk,
was absolutely awe-inspiring to me. And I think that's probably what
made the biggest difference in Vermont-the cumulative courage of all
those individuals sticking their necks out that way.
There were also some really wonderful friends, allies, and family
members who also stuck their necks out. One of them, who came to our
attention through a letter she'd written to her senator which he read on
the floor of the senate during the debate, actually became the anchor
person in a television, newspaper, and radio ad campaign that we put
together. We found her to be so compelling. I'm going to read you the
paragraph from the letter that she wrote to Senator Leddy that brought
her to our attention.
Dear Senator Leddy: I'm a seventy-eight-year-old Catholic
mother of eight. This is not about statistics or biblical
interpretation. It is about a farm family and a son who
announced twenty-six years ago that he is gay. What could we
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do? Cast him out or accept him instantly? Patronize him or
love him? We brought up our eight children with the same
value system. Did we do something wrong? Our son would
not choose emotional and cultural persecution. He was just
plain born gay. I can only say that God blessed us with eight
children, and God made no mistake when He gave us our gay
son.
I've talked about all the testimony and the pressure of the legislative
process, but what I haven't actually talked about is its substance. There
were three options before the House Judiciary Committee when they
started this process. One was to pass a law allowing same-sex couples to
marry, or just including same-sex couples within the marriage laws. The
second option was to do nothing, ignore the Court's decision, and
maybe think about impeaching some of the justices. Those were the two
main options. The third one was to try to find a middle way.
Now the way the advocacy broke down, as you can imagine, is that
there was a powerful voice for option number one coming from the
Freedom to Marry community. There was a powerful voice for option
number two coming from opposition. There was no voice whatsoever
for option number three. You could not find anybody to come to the
public hearing and testify for option number three. You couldn't find
anybody to say that's the way to go, because the people who cared most
passionately about this issue, those of us who seek equality for same-sex
couples, wanted true, full, and complete equality. For the folks who
oppose equality for same-sex couples, the concept of parity or "almost
equality" or "equality-lite" is in some ways just as unacceptable. So the
options really were the extremes.
Political reality being what it is, the House Judiciary Committee,
after debating for six weeks, seemed to be resigned and morose on the
day that they finally took the vote to figure out which direction to go.
I'm happy to say that not a single one of the eleven members, after
listening to all the testimony, concluded that do-nothing-and-impeach-
the-Vermont-Supreme-Court-Justices was the right road to follow! Of
the eleven, eight of them opted to try to find some middle road. Three
opted to promote marriage inclusion for same-sex couples.
So they started to craft a bill that was going to be a parallel
structure. That put us in a difficult position. We just spent six weeks
saying anything short of full equality we can't support. We've thankfully
gotten past the days in which concepts of "separate-but-equal" were
acceptable in our legal system. While this is a different context (and I'm
not trying to say it's the same thing), there certainly is a strong analogy
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between the type of separate structure we were contemplating and what
we saw in the "separate-but-equal" law of the 1940s and 1950s.
So there we were. It was clear that marriage wasn't going to happen
and we had to decide what to do. We didn't decide anything until we
saw the product, because we wanted to see that it truly was as equal as it
could possibly be without being truly equal. In other words, we wanted
to ensure that the bill that was offered in lieu of marriage did provide all
the same benefits and was equal in other respects. We ultimately
decided, after much gnashing of teeth, and many tears, and people
quitting the organization and then joining it the next day and then
quitting, and fighting, and all of the things that you can imagine.
Everybody ultimately came back together and we formed a consensus.
Those who didn't necessarily agree came together in consensus anyway,
and we opted to support the civil union bill.
I think there were four reasons that that decision was made. First,
the benefits under the civil union bill are comprehensive. It wasn't a
laundry list of a dozen benefits that were now going to be available to
same-sex couples. This bill incorporated by reference all law in
Vermont, whether it was by statute, regulation, administrative rule,
what have you, that relates to married couples and said such law applies
now with equal force to couples joined in civil union. That was
important to us.
A second factor is that the process of entering a civil union and the
process of dissolving a civil union are the same as a process for marrying
and divorcing. In other words, you've got to go to your town clerk's
office, you've got to get the license, you've got to take the license to a
justice of the peace or a minister or judge, you've got to have it certified,
you've got to come back and file it. And that's important. It's important
because it connects with the story told by the law. It's important as well
because we're talking about all the same benefits of the law: the way we
get in and the way we get out. We may not like it, but the way you get
in and the way you get out is part of the structure of marriage. It's part
of the benefits. It's part of the responsibilities. And to the extent people
have criticisms about changes they'd like to see, those criticisms ought
to apply with equal force to same-sex and heterosexual couples.
The third reason is that, even though the story told by the civil
union law is not a story of full equality, it's a story of a tremendous step
forward. I'm going to read to you language from the preamble to the
law. Knowing what legislators have written about same-sex couples
through the years, I thought this was pretty impressive language. The
law says:
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Despite longstanding social and economic discrimination,
many gay and lesbian Vermonters have formed lasting
committed, caring, and faithful relationships with persons of
their same sex. These couples live together, participate in their
communities together, and some raise children and care for
family members together, just as do couples who are married
under Vermont law. The state has a strong interest in
promoting stable and lasting families, including families based
upon a same-sex couple.
The last reason that we opted to support the civil union bill was
that we believed, and continue to believe, that it would be a positive
step in the right direction rather than a step backwards. Whether the
civil union law has been a step backward or a step forward was a subject
of debate and still remains a subject of debate, but we believed, and I
still believe, that in the end it's a step forward. And the reason it's a step
forward is because it would give Vermonters and the world an
opportunity to see that the sky didn't fall; that whatever parade of
horribles they were imagining didn't come to pass. That in turn would
make it easier in Vermont and everywhere else for folks to come to
terms with the notion of full equality for same-sex couples and full
inclusion in our community, both as a social matter and as a legal
matter.
So we supported the bill.
I could tell lots of legislative war stories, but long story short, it
passed. It passed by the thinnest of margins. It passed in the Senate by a
lot, but it passed the House by the thinnest of margins. On the day of
the last vote of the House, the House was packed because people from
all over the state were coming to see this historic moment when they
were hopeful that the House was going to pass this law. There was still
some doubt. The House spent the first hour on this mobile home septic
regulation bill. None of us could figure out what was going on. The
reporter of the bill was literally standing up reading the bill line by line
and word for word, which was a little bit unusual. The crowd was
getting restless. Then I saw one of our strong allies fly through the back
door, rush to her seat, and take off her coat. The second that happened,
the reporter of the bill put the paper down and said, "Mr. Speaker, I
think we're prepared to submit this for a vote." I guess our ally's car had
broken down that morning on the highway, and we needed every vote
we could get!
There were some real heroes in the legislature. The vast majority of
the legislators had the good fortune of representing districts in which
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the constituents' own collective views about this issue pretty much
matched their own, but there were probably about a dozen or more who
didn't have that good fortune and whose own conscience on the issue
didn't match the collective consciences of their constituents, and they
knew it. One of them was John Edwards, who was a Republican former
state trooper on the House Judiciary Committee. He would have been
in the "do nothing" camp if we'd had the vote on day one. He was from
a Catholic conservative district on the Canadian border-a farming
community. However, from his law enforcement background, he was
accustomed to trying to keep an open mind and hear all sides before he
made a decision. He sat there every day for six weeks in the pressure
cooker, with the cameras in his face, getting thousands of emails a day.
Normally, if a Vermont legislator gets five letters on a given issue, it's a
groundswell. These people were getting hundreds and thousands of
letters. They were getting calls at their home. They were getting emails.
John Edwards was one of them. He listened to all of that and in the end
not only did he vote for civil unions, but he stood up in front of a
packed gym in St. Alban's with six hundred plus hostile people booing
him and heckling him, and he tried to explain to them why this was the
right thing to do. Not surprisingly, he did lose his reelection battle by a
lot. And he'll tell you that losing the reelection battle wasn't nearly as
painful as the friends and neighbors who had known him for years who
wouldn't speak to him anymore because of his vote on that. He still says
it's the best thing he ever had an opportunity to be part of as a legislator,
and it's his proudest moment.
Marion Milne, a sixty-eight-year-old grandmother, kept pictures of
her grandkids on her desk in front of her, and she looked at them all the
time. She would look at them to remind herself whom she should be
keeping in mind when she cast her votes. She looked down at those
pictures, and stood up in the middle of the House debate and said, "I
know that my constituents probably are going to throw me out of office
for this, but I can't look at those pictures and stand here and vote to
exclude a group from the protection of the laws in Vermont. It's not the
right thing to do, and I'm going to have to vote with my conscience."
And she voted her conscience. She was soundly defeated in the
Republican primary. She actually got the Democratic nomination by
write-in votes! She declined it, ran as an independent, and then lost
soundly.
I know of one legislator who, I'm told, is a devout Catholic mother
of seven, has been very active in her parish for twenty plus years, and
was reportedly asked by her priest to stop coming to church because her
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presence was too divisive. I know another Catholic legislator who-and
I'm not trying to pick on the Catholics, this spanned religious
traditions, these are just the stories I happened to hear-when he went
to his parish and sat down in a pew, with his family, if there were other
people sitting in the pew they would get up and move and leave his
family isolated in a pew by themselves. There was tremendous personal
sacrifice by a lot of legislators with a great deal of courage.
I titled this section "There Are Heroes," because of the gay and
lesbian people who put themselves on the line, the Helena Blairs of the
world who talked about their family honestly and openly, and the
legislators who made decisions which they knew would cost them the
ultimate political price but felt that their duty to all of their
constituents, to history and to justice outweighed their desire to get re-
elected. I can tell you John Edwards, the retired cop from St. Alban's,
would not have chosen to make gay couples the issue that he went down
on. But when the issue was there, and he was confronted with it, he rose
to the occasion and was truly a hero.
V.
The last lesson from Vermont is for me probably the most
important, which is that the sky didn't fall. The sky hasn't fallen. It's
kind of gray and snowy, but it's gray and snowy here and you guys
don't have civil unions, so I don't think that's what's going on!
I went to a lot of weddings in the summer of 2000, and I continue
to go to a lot. There are a lot of couples who are very excited to have the
opportunity to take advantage of not only the legal protections that civil
union offers, but the legal and public commitment that a civil union
represents. And the form that those commitments take in terms of the
ceremony that surrounds them are as varied as my friends Mary and
Cheryl, who had a very private ceremony with just them and their
minister followed by a gathering with close friends at their home, to
Joseph and Michael who had a small ceremony in the town hall in their
town performed by a justice of the peace who's close to them, to Stan
and Peter who had a very colorful, high church, lots of incense, two-
and-a-half-hour long mass at the Episcopal Church in Burlington, to
some lovely outdoor garden weddings where people spoke very honestly
and openly from their heart about their love for one another.
I think one thing that all of these ceremonies have shared is a little
moment of excitement when you get to the moment where the
presiding official says, "And now by the authority vested in me by the
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State of Vermont, I hereby join you in civil union." The recognition
that we, as a body politic through the institution of the state that we've
created, are recognizing you as a couple and embracing you as part of
our community, has far more meaning than I could have anticipated
when we started this battle.
So the sky hasn't fallen. Life goes on. I'm hopeful that that lesson,
if nothing else, is the lesson that will be remembered in terms of
Vermont. Nobody's any worse off. We had a tough time. I don't want
to deny that the fall of 2000 and the aftermath of the civil union law in
terms of community division and bad feelings and tough times in
Vermont was really hard. I feel like we're coming through it as a state.
We're stronger. Nobody's worse off, and there are some families that
now have additional protections and additional security for themselves
and their families, and an additional sense of being a part of the
community. So that's the lesson in Vermont. And I actually do have
time for questions.
QUESTION: You mentioned that there is a continuing debate
concerning whether the civil union legislation is a step forward or step
backward in the fight for full equality for same-sex couples. What is the
argument for saying that it is a step backward?
BETH ROBINSON: Well, here's the argument for step backward.
If the concept of civil union becomes a new ceiling, a new step in the
evolution towards full equality, that everybody in every state in the
country has to pass through before marriage for same-sex couples is a
reality in this country, then what we've done is we've set back the
movement by a generation. That's one vision. All of a sudden there's
this new creature called civil union that is kind of marriage-like, and you
can't go to a legislature and ask for marriage because you haven't gone
through marriage-like. And you can ask a court for marriage, but now a
court's going to look and see what Vermont has and it's going to think
that seems to be good enough and do what the Vermont court did. So
my hope is that the Vermont court's decision in Baker is a building
block for the next court that considers this in the same way that we built
on the work in Hawaii, rather than Baker becoming a ceiling against
which other people are pushing.
QUESTION: Ultimately what are you seeking to achieve?
BETH ROBINSON: I'm seeking full equality for same-sex
couples, which means inclusion of same-sex couples in the marriage
laws. There's no question. There's been some great discussion this
morning about the possibility of other non-marital structures to present
different options, and I'm not averse to those at all, but to the extent
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that marriage is one of the structures, I'm very strongly committed to
full inclusion of same-sex couples in that.
QUESTION: Do you have any idea how many civil unions have
been celebrated? What have courts in other states said about the effect of
Vermont civil unions?
BETH ROBINSON: There have been about four thousand
celebrated. There haven't been any direct challenges in other
jurisdictions. There's been one court case in Georgia. There was a
divorce order, a custody order, in a case in Georgia that said that mom
couldn't have kids with her for overnights (and I'm probably botching
this a little bit)-if she had an adult staying with her to whom she
wasn't married or family. She had a same-sex partner, and they had
come to Vermont and joined in a civil union. One question was, was
their civil union in Vermont tantamount to making them married? And
the court answered no to that.
A question that the court didn't really address that was briefed and
I didn't see it answered to my satisfaction, is did the civil union in
Vermont create a family relationship. I didn't see the court address that.
But that issue was there in that case.
I talk to people from around the country who have joined in civil
union in Vermont, and I hear a variety of experiences. Private parties,
non-governmental parties, seem to be more readily recognizing civil
unions as having some legal meaning. So in other words, employers
around the country are extending insurance to partners of couples
joined in civil union; health clubs are giving family membership rates to
couples joined in civil union when they bring in their certificate; or
museums and zoos are giving family membership rates. I'm only aware
of one trivial case where a state agency waived a fee for changing your
name on your driver's license for a couple who had changed their name
due to civil union because they waive it for people who are changing
their name due to marriage. That's the only governmental
acknowledgement that I'm aware of.
QUESTION: There seemed to be a backlash in the aftermath of
the Baker decision. Do you think there was a latent anti-gay sentiment,
or this was just a reaction to the case itself?
BETH ROBINSON: Yeah, and I don't know. I'm not a
sociologist. I don't pretend to be able to figure that out. I was a little bit
surprised. What was most surprising to me is that the most violent
polarization and bitterness in Vermont didn't occur during the court
case. There was very little community discussion during the court case.
Things began to turn up during the legislative process, but there was
still a tremendous sense of civility and unity even among differences.
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The ugliness didn't come into play until about August (the law was
passed in April). It was four months after the law was passed when it
started getting really ugly. That happened to be campaign season and an
election year. I do think that a lot of the opposition was very real,
visceral, and I'm not going to suggest that it was manufactured by other
folks, but I think that because it was occurring during the campaign
season, it spiraled in a way that I don't think it would have in a different
political context. So that's part of it.
I think there is something about marriage, and I don't think it's
about the word marriage because this isn't the word marriage. I think
there was a prediction that if we don't give them marriage but we give
them civil union, we try to make it as close to marriage as possible but
not call it marriage, then we're not going to have nearly as bad a
political backlash, but they're going to get their benefits. That was the
political compromise. I wasn't happy about it, but I wouldn't have
necessarily questioned the judgment that went into that calculation. As
it turned out, the calculation was wrong. This isn't just borne out by my
anecdotal experience: it's borne out by the polling that we were doing all
the way along. If you compare the polling done asking people if they
think same-sex couples ought to be allowed to marry, and the polling
done asking people whether they like the civil union law, the polling
was the same. Perhaps one or two percent of the voters were swung by
the compromise, but what we ended up doing was compromising the
concept of full equality in exchange for a community harmony that
didn't materialize. I think it was the concept of comparing heterosexual
couples and same-sex couples that directly and clearly pushed some
buttons. And I understand that. One of the things I think we need to be
cognizant of as advocates-and I don't back away one bit from my
belief that same-sex couples have the right and ought to be allowed to be
married in every state in this country, and I don't think we ought to be
shy about moving forward with that advocacy-but I do think we need
to be conscious of the fact that that makes some people feel very
threatened and is very hard for people to come to grips with. I think it
puts the responsibility on us, even though maybe we shouldn't have to
bear this responsibility, of telling our stories and allaying their fears and
talking about the reality of our lives and addressing the myths that cause
them to have those feelings.
QUESTION: Did you use Johnson to make a sex discrimination
argument?
BETH ROBINSON: Absolutely. Actually Johnson is speaking of
sex discrimination! We made the sex discrimination argument. I
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personally think that that's the argument that's the truest in terms of
just truth. I'll tell you an interesting anecdotal story. We did two moot
court sessions preparing for this oral argument. The first one I did down
in Boston with a group of folks who were almost all gay except for ones
who were straight feminists. Everyone present at the moot court session
felt as though the sex discrimination argument was the strongest, and
would win the case for us. I did a second moot court session with a
bunch of heterosexual male lawyers in Vermont, some of whom actually
were not sympathetic on the merits of the issue. The lesson that came
out of that moot court session is that the sex discrimination argument
made no sense to them. They felt it was funny wordplay like "girl, girl,
boy, boy," but not sex discrimination. I think the sex discrimination
argument is real, but the second moot court session taught me that we
would have to climb a lot of learning curves in order to persuade a
court, which included three heterosexual men, that the sex
discrimination argument was true. I think that's a place where how I
would think as a scholar and how I think as a tactician in a courtroom
part ways. You have to have a feminist consciousness to understand why
this is sex discrimination, and I think that's a lot of water to ask a
litigator to carry in a case like this. You've got to give the court a
feminist consciousness and you've got to then explain how this
argument works.
PANEL III
THE SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF EXPANDING
MARRIAGE AND FAMILY CONVENTIONS
RICHARD 0. LEMPERT, MODERATOR: I'm Rick Lempert.
I've been asked to take about five minutes to introduce this panel. As I
thought about this panel I was reminded of a song of my youth, "Love
and Marriage," which was built around the refrain "Love and marriage
go together like a horse and carriage." This is a close link, but even more
closely linked than love and marriage has been the ideal of marriage and
family. We have long since seen in our rising divorce rate a break in the
link between love and marriage. Today we are seeing social and
structural changes that are leading to a break of the link between
marriage and family.
Many factors have played a role in the break of this link. In my
lifetime perhaps the most important has been the increased access of
women to work. This has fundamentally changed power relations
within families while increasing the ability of middle and upper class
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women to live singly while raising children and to do other things that
families do. Second, as we have just heard, there is a new openness in
many segments of society to so-called non-traditional couples, particularly
gay and lesbian couples. Third, and perhaps causally prior to the access of
women to work, is the sexual control we, and women especially, have over
reproduction. Finally, new reproductive technologies are further
destroying the link between formal recognized relationships and
procreation. Our panelists are all going to talk about the social
ramifications of these and other changes and how they affect these
issues.
The last point I want to make is stimulated by the marvelous talk
we just heard. This concerns the intersection between the law and
people's minds. Stacy recounted how, when she accompanied her same-
sex partner to a hospital, she was stopped at the emergency room door,
and would not have been allowed in if she had not had her power of
attorney for health care with her. I was struck by the contrast between
her experience and my experience in Washington, D.C. about six
months ago when I had to go to the emergency room. My fiancee was
with me, but she had no power of attorney allowing her to play a role in
my health care, nor any other legal relationship to me at that time. It
didn't matter. She wasn't questioned at all! The point is that it wasn't
just the law that led to Stacy's presence being questioned. The hospital
authorities weren't just enforcing legal rights. Rather they had a mindset
created by social structure and history, which, when a same-sex person
wanted to be with her partner said, "You are not welcome here." When
in my case it was an opposite sex partner who wanted to be with the
patient it didn't matter that she had no legal relationship to me. The
health care provider's view was, "Come on in. Tell us what you think!
Be there. He needs you!" This is all I have to say by way of introduction.
Now I'll let the speakers talk.
WILLIAM J. DOHERTY: Good afternoon! That was almost too
good an introduction in terms of a powerful story. I'm from the
University of Minnesota, so I actually came to warmer weather here and
have appreciated the warmth of this climate! I also want to say that for
me this is an intergenerational experience in that I am a social scientist
and family therapist, but my mother always wanted me to be a lawyer,
and I missed that opportunity. But my son Eric Doherty is a third year
law student here at the University of Michigan. So this conference was a
chance to come and spend time with him at his law school. My mother,
when I told her I was going to speak at the Law School, was most
impressed that after all these years a law school invited me to speak!
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I was asked to address the implications of changing marriage and
family forms on fathering and fatherhood. I'd like to start with a story
about a young African-American father. This young man was excited to
be a father, and even though he and his girlfriend broke up, he stayed
connected with his baby. He had his six-month-old son for a weekend,
and when he got the baby home, he noted that there were bites on the
baby that looked like animal bites, like rodent bites. He took his baby to
the emergency room, whereupon the nurse swept the baby away from
him. The medical professionals determined that these were animal bites,
and that it was a sign of child neglect. They put the baby in a foster
home and would not even communicate with the father about what had
happened. They would not even tell him that these were animal bites.
They would not tell him where his baby was. He had no legal status as
the father of the baby. During the interview for our study, he told us
with an incredulous voice, "I was the one who brought the baby to the
hospital." This story underlines the core point of my talk: that
fatherhood in American society is inextricably linked to marriage,
because fatherhood is inextricably linked to the mother/father
relationship. Because he was not married to the mother, or even in a
relationship with her, this young father faced large hurdles in staying
involved with his child.
Specifically, outside of marriage, you have the issue of declaring
and proving of paternity. Outside of marriage, the stability of the
father's relationship/contact with the child depends in practice, if not in
law, on the stability of the relationship between that man and the
mother. New research on fragile families-low-income, unmarried
families-indicates that the majority of these couples want to be a
couple and want to raise this child together. In fact more than fifty
percent say they would like to marry some day. If that does not occur
(and often it does not occur partly because the father sees himself or is
seen by the mother as not providing the kind of income stability that
might be needed for marriage), most of those relationships do not
continue as coupled, committed relationships. When the breakup
occurs, the father-child relationship often suffers. It may be that the
father still wants to be involved but the mother may not want him to
be, especially if he cannot leverage child support payments. The mother
may have a new boyfriend, or the mother's mother may not want the
father around. The law then gets involved by asking the father to
support the child financially. Often these fathers have very little contact
with the child, and many, particularly the low-income fathers, have very
little way to provide that economic support. Non-marital childbearing
puts fathering and father-child relations in a precarious situation.
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We also have a lot of research among married-couple families
indicating that after a divorce mothers are the residential/custodial
parent in most of the cases, and that for fathers, even when they are
involved substantially early on, there is unfortunately a substantial drop-
off in their involvement with the child that occurs over time. Divorce,
then, is another major hurdle to fathering.
The third strand of evidence is that, even within a marriage, the
father-child relationship suffers more when the relationship goes sour.
There is more of a decline in the quality of the father-child connection
when there is a decline in the marriage relationship than there is a
corresponding decline for mothers. Studies show that when fathers and
mothers are not getting along, fathers tend to withdraw from the
children and be more irritable with their children. There is less of a
decline in the mother-child relationship when the marriage is in trouble.
We also know that when men are facing unemployment, there is more
of a decline in their relationship with their children than there is when
the mother is unemployed. There are many of these kinds of contextual
factors-relational factors, economic factors-influencing fathering in a
unique way.
Mothers are important to fathering even when marriages are
satisfactory. Many studies have shown that the mother's attitudes and
expectations of the father are more strongly correlated with his fathering
behavior than his own attitudes and expectations are. In other words, if
you design a study in which you ask fathers what they expect of
themselves and what sort of fathers they want to be, and you survey the
mothers, and then you look at the actual behavior of fathers, the
mother's expectations correlate with the father's behavior far more than
his own expectations. In some of the studies, the father's own attitudes
and expectations correlated about zero with his actual behavior.
There are two ways to conceptualize the point I am making thus
far. One is that fathering is more ecologically sensitive than mothering
is. That is, there are more third-party influences on fathering--both the
stability and quality of fathering--than there are third-party influences
on mothering. Third party and other external factors have more impact
on fathering than on mothering. The second way to frame this issue is
that culturally mothering is seen as a dyadic relationship and fathering is
a triadic relationship. That is, fathers tend to parent in a triad or a
triangle with the mother of that child. Mothers seem themselves more in
a one-to-one relationship that's going to endure no matter what
happens to her relationship with the father. You're a mother until death
do you part. You're expected culturally to be involved in an everyday,
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even in an obsessed way, with this child regardless of what happens to
the father. But men are not expected to have that kind of enduring
substantial relationship with the child if the relationship with the
mother dissolves. And how the mother views the father's success in the
world-particularly economic success-is a key to how she will relate to
him as a partner and co-parent.
So we have to think of fathering, then, in that triadic way, which
means that the changes we have been talking about in marriage have
had, in many ways, substantially negative effects on fathering. Now I'm
going to say at the end that there are also some positive effects.
I want to say something briefly about cohabitation, in order to
indicate that it is not a viable substitute for marriage, at least for fathers.
(By the way, all the research I am referring to is on heterosexual fathers;
we know little about gay fathers and their coparenting partnerships).
Research on cohabiting relationships in which a child is born has shown
that these relationships are less stable than marriage relationships. We
also know that if those relationships break up, fathers are even less apt to
be involved with their children in the future. It seems that something
about having been married and having a child in marriage creates the
expectation among all parties that the father will be involved later.
Cohabitation is not an adequate substitute for marriage, at least
sociologically speaking, when it comes to father-child relationships.
Let me just say a few words about how I see law fitting into this
picture. Because I am not a lawyer, to my mother's great
disappointment, I cannot speak with authority here. But my observation
is that the law tends to see unmarried fathers in terms of their income
contributions, and many unmarried fathers have very little income to
contribute. The law does not support them in maintaining contact with
their children. It's clear from the studies that there is a link between
involvement with a child and willingness to pay child support. By the
way, the research on non-custodial mothers' child support payments
indicates that they are no better than fathers in terms of paying child
support. I suggest that the nonresidential parenting makes financial
support (even though it is the right thing ethically and legally) very
difficult to manage over the long haul outside of a committed
relationship with the other parent. All law cares about, from the point of
view of many never-married and divorced fathers, is your dollars, not
your nurturing involvement with your child, an involvement that can be
readily blocked by the mother with few consequences.
The way divorce laws have been interpreted causes mothers to be
seen as the parent who should get custody unless there's some reason
otherwise. We know that women initiate about seventy percent of
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divorces. I'm not arguing that there are not good reasons why they do,
but I'm suggesting that divorce in the United States for a new married
father is not only a threat to his marriage but also his fathering.
Welfare laws, as you know, have inhibited the formation of
marriages and the stability of marriages. The welfare laws are trying to
change that now, but there is still powerful disincentive for women to
marry the father of their children, adding his income in, and then losing
benefits. This problem in the law needs to be addressed.
I also want to mention an evolving family form that has not come
up here. The biggest evolving family form is stepfamilies. Over forty
percent of all new marriages in the United States now are a remarriage
for one or both parties. I heard this wonderful term today, "legal
strangers." Stepparents are legal strangers to their stepchildren, and most
residential stepparents are fathers or stepfathers. We are not encouraging
stepparents to invest in these children that they are helping to raise.
They have no more legal right than a stranger down the street. In
England, I'm told that there are stepfamily laws that allow a child to
have more than two legal parents. In England, if the biological or
adoptive father agrees to it, the new father, in the case of the mother
and the stepfather, can also legally adopt the child so that the child will
have three parents. I think that's something we have to consider as we
look at the future of the family in the United States.
My final overview point is that when it comes to child-father
relationships, we live in the best and the worst of times. If you are a
child whose parents are in a good, quality marriage, your father and
your mother living with each other and care for you and each other, you
have a higher likelihood than any child in history of having a high-
quality relationship, nurturing, committed relationship with your father.
If you are in any other arrangement than that kind of high-quality
marriage, you have a very good chance of having a minimal relationship
with your father for most of your life. My main point, then, is that as
we think about changes in family forms, we should consider carefully
the impact on fathers and their children.
Thank you.
MARTHA E. ERTMAN: Before I jump into my topic, Marriage
Markets, I'd like to thank the Journal of Gender & Law and the
University of Michigan Law School, as well as the various departments
that have sponsored what is one of the most interdisciplinary
conferences that I've ever attended. The last panel and Beth Robinson's
talk just now, along with this morning's panels, show how conversations
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across disciplines can enrich our analysis of whether marriage is cutting
edge or obsolete.
My own particular intervention into this topic, on this panel titled
"Expanding Marriage and Family Conventions," has to do with talking
about how we might expand what it means to be married. Beth
Robinson's incredibly moving talk (given her rhetorical skills it is no
surprise that she and the lawyers at GLAD-Gay and Lesbian Advocates
and Defenders) won the Vermont marriage case-addressed the point
about who gets to marry. Mine goes to the level of asking what it means
to be married. What does it mean to be a husband? What does it mean
to be a wife? This question goes to the heart of the purpose of this
Journal as I understand it, to investigate the way that law constructs
gender and of course the way gender constructs law. Any time we talk
about gender, of course, we're very deeply in the territory of sexual
orientation, class-related issues, and race as well.
My talk today has to do with ways that business models and
commercial models, and contractual understandings generally, can
enrich our understanding of domestic relations law. In particular, what I
do in my work is challenge what I call the naturalized understanding of
family. Generally, in both law and culture, we think of intimate
affiliation as either "natural" or "unnatural." This morning, talking
about estates and trusts, we heard phrases like "who is the natural
beneficiary of one's bounty in a will," reflecting legal and cultural
tendencies to think and talk about what is a natural way to organize
one's life.
I would argue that naturalized understandings of family are
intimately associated with either ideas of divine mandate (they're natural
because some divine being dictates that it be so) or biology (that because
men are built one way and women are built another, they fit together to
procreate, a pattern that is natural, rendering all else unnatural and thus
unworthy of legal recognition). There's a third way of thinking about
what we mean when we use the term "natural", an understanding that is
particularly legal. In tort law we refer to a particular type of liability as
res ipsa loquitur. This phrase literally means, "the thing speaks for itself."
Similarly, calling something "natural," relieves the speaker of any
burden of explaining why it's a good thing. We just defend it by saying
it's natural, the way things are. Perhaps it's divinely ordained, perhaps
it's biologically mandated, but it is nothing we have to think about, nor
do we have to present reasons why a particular outcome is good.
There are a lot of inadequacies and inequalities in domestic
relations law, both within relationships and among different kinds of
relationships, which are artifacts of this naturalized model. Thus we
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need a new model. The major competitor to the naturalized model is
the business-type market analysis. In the legal academy, of course, we've
been exploring all kinds of topics-including abortion and accidents-
from a legal economic perspective for some thirty years. That rich
literature suggests that maybe we can think of intimate affiliations as
being, not just about love, pet names, notes left in lunch bags, hearts
and flowers, but also about how intimately affiliating with other people
also involves engaging in economic transactions. In other words, our
hopes for living happily ever after are as much about economic issues-
having a beautiful home, for example, or sending children to the college
of their choice-as they are about the more abstract rewards of
emotional intimacy and jointly shared lives.
What I propose to do is to build on traditional law and economics
approaches. I do this in my work by suggesting that we think about
intimate affiliation in market metaphors. If we think about contract-in
other words, about intentionality, consent, and functionality-when we
worry about what rules should govern intimate relationships, then in
fact we'll get a more adequate and a more equal set of legal rules. This
approach would apply to marriage as well as other relationships.
The particular example that I'm using today, marketizing marriage,
demonstrates one way we can import market models to understand
marriage. In my work I have proposed something called a Premarital
Security Agreement. It differs from a conventional premarital agreement
in that it's based on debtor/creditor relations law. This is one of the few
family law conferences I've attended where I am the second person to
mention the Uniform Commercial Code. Ordinarily nobody else does,
but Professor Waggoner mentioned it earlier as the most successful
project of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. For those of you who haven't taken commercial law, took it years
ago, or recall it from a bar review course, I will recap shortly the rules
governing debtor/creditor regulations. What I do is explore the
possibility of treating primary homemaking spouses as secured creditors
in relationship to their primary wage-earning spouses. What would it
look like if a housewife were a secured creditor in relation to her
primary wage-earning husband? I say "she," not because only women are
or could be homemakers, but because of demographic patterns, that
most often in a heterosexual affiliation the person who engages in the
primary house maintenance work is female rather than male.
So what is a security agreement? A security agreement is an
agreement between a debtor and a creditor where there's collateral and
the collateral is personal property. For example, when you go to the car
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dealership, and buy a car on credit, a finance company such as GMAC
helps you finance it and takes a security interest in the car to protect its
right to be repaid. If you stop making payments, or let your insurance
lapse, GMAC has this extraordinary right, the right to engage in self-
help to protect itself, its interests. If you've seen the movie Repo Man,
this is what that movie is all about. Repossession people get the
tremendous right of taking debtors' property without state intervention.
It's private law, largely governed by private ordering. When I talk about
importing U.C.C. Article 9 rules to the law of domestic relations, I am
talking about taking the private law of the family and the private law of
contract, and showing the ways that those two are much more closely
associated than what they're commonly thought to be. You could say
it's taking the private law of family and making it really private.
The way it works in the context of Premarital Security Agreements,
which I call "PSAs," is that there's a debt between wage earners and
primary homemakers. In marriages in which the spouses engage in
specialization of labor, where one is a primary homemaker and the other
is a primary wage-earner, the primary homemaker extends credit to her
primary wage-earning spouse by engaging in household labor and
foregoing developing her own wage labor potential. She, logically,
extends that credit expecting to share in family wealth that is
accumulated as a result of the primary wage-earner doing his part.
What happens when they divorce is the equivalent of a default on a
loan, the equivalent of not making your car payment. She doesn't get
what she had hoped to from the relationship, which is an ongoing
sharing of the primary wage-earner's income. At that point, the debtor,
the primary wage-earner, is in default, and must pay the full amount of
the loan.
Upon default, secured creditors can exercise their self-help rights to
repossession to collect the amount due on the loan. I'll define the debt
in a moment, but first I want to describe the collateral. Generally
speaking, secured transactions involve a debt, collateral, and an event of
default. The collateral under Premarital Security Agreements is half of
the marital property. Secured creditors often over-collateralize, meaning
that they get a security interest in collateral that's worth more than the
debt because there is rarely enough collateral to go around once the debt
goes bad. Consequently, it's in their interest to ensure that the value of
collateral will be greater than the amount of the debt.
How much is the debt? How much is it worth to take children to
soccer matches, shop for clothes, go to parent-teacher conferences, clean
the floors and keep family relations on an even keel? This work, if well
done, often remains invisible, at least as work, like sending out holiday
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cards and making sure that the family gets together at Thanksgiving.
There are a lot of different ways you could calculate the value of this
work, and thus the debt secured by the PSA. Economists have come up
with a range of models. One method, the one that I have employed,
uses a formula to take into account the differences between the spouses'
income at the time of the divorce, the length of the marriage, and the
age of any minor children.
Many former homemakers, known in the literature as "displaced
homemakers," suffer from poverty (or close to it). If in fact we replace
the current alimony regime with a regime of entitlement based on an
investment model, recognizing that the primary homemaker has
invested in family wealth by performing domestic services as well as
foregoing the opportunity to develop her own wage-earning potential,
then she is entitled to a payback.
Treating alimony as an entitlement, a right to be repaid for
contributions to family wealth, would give primary homemakers the set
of rights enjoyed by secured creditors. Because these rights involve the
exercise of power, they would expand what it means to be married by
taking a very weak social and legal role, primary homemaker, and
grafting it onto an extremely powerful commercial role, a secured
creditor.
What I hope would happen in this process of importing law from
the private world of contract into the private world of domestic relations
is that we'd begin to think differently about what it means to be a wife,
to be a husband, to be married. That, if primary homemakers enjoyed
an entitlement to post-divorce income sharing, perhaps their primary
wage earning spouses might increase their respect for the work of taking
care of home and children. Moreover, I suspect that if homemakers
were compensated, people might be less likely to engage in specialized
labor, both spouses instead engaging in both wage-earning and
homemaking labor, because specialization would become more
expensive for the wage earner. Of course, only elite families fully
specialize, where one is a full time homemaker and the other is a full
time wage earner. Even so, compensating homemakers could, in the
long run, encourage more men to more fully engage in homemaking,
and more women to maximize their wage earning potential.
Particularly important to keep in mind is who pays the price for the
conventional arrangements in marriage. Right now current doctrines
that govern the distribution of assets at divorce rarely enforce
meaningful income-sharing after divorce, causing indigency or near
indigency of a number of homemakers. The real reason behind this
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failure to compensate homemaker contributions to family wealth is that
we just don't value the work that's being done. One way to value it is by
putting a price tag on it, and Premarital Security Agreements represent
one means of doing just that.
I want to change the way we think about how marriage is organized
because thinking in economic ways allows us to distance ourselves from
naturalized understandings of family. If we import contract and business
models, then we can think in functional ways that inquire about the
value of particular work being done as opposed to assuming that a
homemaker is specializing in homemaking labor because that role is
divinely or biologically mandated. Finally, having very briefly described
the idea of importing U.C.C. Article 9 to domestic relations law to
remedy the devaluation of homemaking labor, I suggest starting to think
in business ways about conventional marriage opens up the possibility of
thinking about intimate affiliation generally.
One of the major reasons that many people oppose same-sex
marriage is that they think there is one natural superior model of
intimate affiliation that the state should recognize, and that everything
else is inherently inferior. If instead we thought about intimate
affiliations more along the lines that we think about business, we would
likely recognize a range of affiliations. In business law we have
corporations, general partnerships, limited liability companies. There's
no moral judgment that accompanies organizing your business as a
corporation, a partnership or a limited liability company. If we start
thinking about intimate affiliation in functional terms, rather than
worrying about which people or affiliations are morally superior to
others, we can open up the possibility for thinking about both
conventional and untraditional affiliations in new ways. In doing so, we
create the possibility of remedying both inadequacy and inequality in
domestic relations law.
NORVAL D. GLENN: My goal is not to use quite all of my
fifteen minutes. I'll try to keep my presentation to slightly less than that.
However, as you all know, it's very difficult for a college professor to say
anything very important in less than fifteen minutes! We're very good at
taking about ten minutes of material and stretching it out to an hour,
but doing the opposite is very difficult. Of course the best of us can talk
for an hour without having anything to say whatsoever! But I hope
that's not the case with me this afternoon. I am going to go into a topic
on which I do not claim high expertise, but it's such an important topic
that I'm going to play the role of sociologist of law and discuss the
relationship of law to family change.
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I'm going to critique what is often an implicit assumption,
sometimes an explicit assumption, underlying discussions of family law
and family change. That assumption, which seems implicit in the
description of this panel, is that the proper function of family law is to
simply keep up with changes that occur in family structure, family
relationships, and informal norms and values concerning family
relationships. This idea is very similar to a concept we once had in
sociology: that of cultural lag. The concept of cultural lag was the idea
that different aspects of society and culture tend to change at different
rates, that there are certain aspects of society that drive change, and that
there are other aspects of society and other aspects of culture that tend
to follow but with a lag. This causes dissonance and all kinds of negative
consequences in the society.
A widespread assumption about family change and law is that
family change occurs in response to economic and demographic forces
and that the law is always struggling to keep up with trends in the
concrete ways that people organize their lives.
Many if not most sociologists of law would cringe at the notion of
the proper role of law in regard to families that is implied in this view.
There are certainly examples of the law's failure to keep up with family
structure, with how people are organizing their lives. All of us can think
of examples of that. The case of stepfamilies is one good example. We've
had a great increase in stepfamilies, but until recently stepfamily
members-stepparents, stepchildren, and stepsiblings-were legal
strangers to one another. There has been some change in some states,
but in many states that's still the case. And I think this is an example of
cultural lag-one of the cases in which there is a need for the law to
catch up with the concrete reality.
But on the other hand, there are instances in which the law has
gotten ahead of changes in family structure, an example being the no-
fault divorce movement in which change in the law got ahead of
popular opinion. The adoption of no-fault divorce was not the result of
a popular movement, though it was to a certain extent the result of
changes that had already occurred in marriage and in people's values.
Most people in the general population didn't even know what was
happening, and there are still some people who are not aware of what
happened in the no-fault divorce movement. This was a case in which
the law led and had important consequences, though perhaps not quite
the effects that some people believe it had.
So the law can either lead or it can follow, and there can be various
kinds of complicated relationships between legal change and family
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change. Since we have fifty different jurisdictions that are primarily
responsible for family law in this country, we can have very different
situations in the different jurisdictions.
Another problem with this rather simplistic view that families
change and the law follows is that sometimes the kinds of changes that
are supposed to have occurred have not really occurred. Or at least the
changes have not been as pronounced as many people believe, so that
some advocacy for adaptive changes in family law is based on a
misperception of what has occurred.
Those of us who make our living by gauging family change spent a
great deal of time twenty years ago or so trying to convince other people
that a great deal of family change had occurred. Now many of us find
ourselves trying to convince people that not quite as much change has
occurred as is popularly believed. A lot of change has occurred. There's
no doubt about that. But it's very easy to exaggerate the amount of
change, and it's unwise to formulate law or social policy as a whole on
the basis of supposed change that has not occurred.
To give a very simple example, marriages are not as unstable in this
country as many people believe. You have all heard the statement that
fifty percent of all marriages end in divorce. That is not quite correct.
Ideally the projection of what percentage of recent marriages will end in
divorce would be based on the duration-specific divorce rates and the
age-specific death rates that existed during the base period from which
the projection is made. It could be a particular year or a longer period of
time. But unfortunately we don't have the necessary basic data to do a
really good projection of that type. So the different people who have
done the projections have used differing techniques and have come up
with a wide variety of projections. Most of the recent projections,
however, have arrived at a percentage below fifty. Furthermore, we can
now arrive at some pretty accurate estimates of the percentage of
marriages entered into in the 1960s and 1970s that will eventually end
in divorce. Even though those marriage cohorts are apparently the most
divorce-prone ones the country has known, apparently less than half of
the marriages in them will end in divorce.
Furthermore, we often overestimate the social forces that have led
to increased marital instability. One of the most commonly given
explanations for the increase in marital instability in American society
and other modern societies in the last few decades is the increased life
expectancy explanation. It's often correctly pointed out that in 1900 life
expectancy at birth in this country was only about forty-eight years.
Now life expectancy is around seventy-seven years. That's a very great
increase. But it's not the case, of course, that in 1900 everybody lived to
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age forty-eight and then suddenly died. Nor is it the case today that
everybody lives to be seventy-seven and then drops dead. A large
percentage of the increase in life expectancy since 1900 has come about
because of a decline in infant mortality, and the decline in infant
mortality, so far as I can tell, shouldn't have had any effect whatsoever
on the risk of divorce of married people. A great deal of the remaining
increase in life expectancy has come about because of declines in
mortality at the pre-adult ages above one, which also could have had
little or no effect on divorce rates.
Because most divorces occur during the early years of marriage,
only declines in mortality in the early adult years are likely to have much
effect on divorce rates. Those declines have been quite modest since the
beginning of the "divorce boom" in the mid-1960s. In the past two
decades, life expectancy from such ages as fifty and sixty has increased to
an important extent, but I don't think that has had more than a
negligible effect on marital stability. Since 1940 the increase in life
expectancy from the median age at marriage has increased by just over
four years. In order for that to have had a substantial effect on divorce
rates, young adults and early middle-aged couples would have to take
into account their life expectancy in decisions to divorce or not to
divorce. For instance, a young adult who found himself or herself in an
unsatisfactory marriage would have to think, if I were going to live fifty
more years I would divorce, but since it's only forty-five, I'm going to
stay with this marriage! I don't think that happens! I don't think that
kind of thinking really influences decisions to divorce or not divorce. So
I can't believe that the increase in life expectancy has had any
appreciable impact on marital stability and instability.
People who advocate changes in family law should of course take
into account family changes that have occurred and the reasons for
those changes. But their views of family change should be based on
sound social scientific data and theory, not on popular perceptions.
They should have well-founded views of what is happening, and why it
is happening, before they start advocating the passage of laws to keep up
with family change.
JACQUELINE PAYNE: My name is Jackie Payne. I'm a policy
attorney for NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund. I'm also an
alum of the Law School, so it is my great pleasure to be here, and
especially on a panel with two of my former professors. So I guess I've
arrived!
I'm going to talk to you today about welfare reform and the role
that marriage is playing in that. I'm intimately involved in the issue of
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welfare reform, having participated in the drafting of the progressive
welfare bill that's pending in Congress. So I have a pretty good idea of
what's happening and why, and I'm going to try to share some of my
thoughts about that with you.
To begin with, you probably have some memory of when welfare
reform happened five years ago. If you picked up the law now and
looked back at it, you might expect to see in the findings information
about what causes poverty in America focused on education levels,
employment levels, sustaining employment, rates of unemployment, etc.
Actually, what you will find if you look at this law is nearly every single
finding relates to non-marital births and how single motherhood causes
poverty in America and the crisis of non-marital births in America.
Three out of the four purposes of the welfare law focus on family
formation, including reducing non-marital births, increasing two-parent
families and "shifting women's dependence, from welfare to marriage."
Over the last five years we have engaged in a campaign to convince
women and specifically women on welfare, not to have children outside
of marriage. Initially, the focus was on the reproductive side of that
equation, so there was absence on the education, $250 million dollars of
federal money in the last five years was invested in encouraging women
not to have a child until marriage. The illegitimacy bonus, $100 million
dollars every year goes to the five states that do the best job at reducing
non-marital births without increasing abortions. And both of those two
things are irrespective of your class status, so it's really telling that to all
women.
Finally, there's the family cap, which says-twenty-three states
have said to women on welfare that if they bear children while on
welfare, the state will not increase the money they get. Where originally
the government would have given women on welfare an extra let's say
$50 to help pay for the cost of that child, twenty-three states have tried
to take away the financial incentive of having a child by refusing to give
women on welfare the additional money if they choose to bear a child
while on welfare.
The welfare law also actively disregarded women's decisions around
family formation and worked to connect them up with the father of
their children irrespective of their wishes. Thus, in a framework that is
very largely about state flexibility and a hands-off approach, the federal
government tells states specifically what to do with respect to paternity
and child support enforcement. So Congress requires states to sanction
women if they refuse to cooperate with establishing paternity and
cooperating with child support enforcement, while at the same time
changing the rules so that that child support money does not necessarily
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have to go to the children. So it's not that the Congress was worried
about getting more money to kids, because at that time Congress
changed rules and told states to enforce child support, it did not require
them to give it to the children. The state could keep the money for itself
to pay itself back for welfare. And the reason behind that is very clearly
based in a traditional, patriarchal perspective that men are responsible
for taking care of women and children, and that if they fail to do that,
and the state has to step up and fill that role, that men will be held
responsible. Not the woman herself or the child, but the man.
That family formation and the requirement that women engage in
this establishing paternity is irrespective of her wishes. There have been
cases where lesbian mothers on welfare who had a man help them
become pregnant were forced to establish his paternity. Even when they
had made an agreement with him that they would not establish
paternity, the state was interested in that family formation.
Since 1999 there have been several attempts to pass federal legislation
designed to increase father involvement and change child support laws. As
a part of that legislation, however, there has been a marriage promotion
aspect to it. Thus, the money that would be going out to increase father
involvement would be tied with a promotion of marriage piece.
One of the original co-sponsors of this fatherhood legislation is
Representative Nancy Johnson. And I want to read a quote she said in a
committee meeting. "We should not compel young couples to marry,
but we can certainly hold it out as the expected standard and track the
skills necessary to have a successful relationship. If we can restore
marriage to its rightful place at all levels of society, we'll have
accomplished more than could be achieved by any government program
we might design."
So a few weeks ago the Bush Administration released its proposal for
welfare reform. In that proposal it proposes investing $1.5 billion over the
next five years in experimental programs for states to try to figure out how
to promote and maintain marriages. The Administration's plan would
also, as a part of welfare, require every single state to say how it intends to
promote marriage, to provide numerical goals for being successful at
promoting marriage, and would hold states accountable to that.
Based on what states are already doing, we can assume that this
new infusion of money under the Administration's plan would result in
marriage counseling, faith-based initiatives, waiting periods between
getting a license and getting married, possibly preferences for married
couples when resources are limited, and financial bonuses to married
couples. Some states have done a one-time payment, ranging anywhere
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from $1,000 to $3,000. Other states have said, here is a financial bonus
to you for getting married and staying married, and so we will give you
$100 extra a month for every month that you stay married. While a
similarly situated family with the same number of people at the same
income level would not get that extra money as a reward for getting
married. And of course covenant marriages are, as we heard today,
already in place in three states and legislation has been pending in, I
think, eighteen other states.
In some of those states we have already seen states setting goals to
reduce divorce. I believe one state is trying to reduce divorce fifty
percent within the next ten years. As a part of that, they're looking at
ways to make divorce more difficult. So when we demand that states set
new goals for increasing marriage, I think we will probably see states
trying to come up with not only ways to make marriage more attractive
and more possible, but also ideas about how to make cohabitation,
single parenthood and alternative families less attractive or less possible.
We need to ask is what we think about marriage being held up as
the solution to poverty in America, and what the consequences are
going to be of these marriage-promotion policies.
To the first question I would assert that marriage is not the answer
to poverty in America. Since we're in a legal forum, I'll start with the
fact that the Supreme Court has said that we have fundamental rights of
privacy. We have the fundamental right both with respect to whether or
not to bear a child and with respect to decisions around marriage. This
whole discussion really is about the intersection of the two rights: the
decision to bear a child outside of marriage.
With respect to those rights, we have the freedom to make those
decisions without government imposition of direct and substantial
barriers in the way of that decision. The Administration's plan, which
will require states to set up numerical goals and meet them, creates at
least a significant risk of states coercing low-income individuals into
marriage in order to meet those goals.
Second, marriage does not address the root causes of women's
poverty. Nor is it a reliable long-term solution to women's poverty.
While two incomes may be better than one, they may not be much
better. As we heard, non-resident fathers of poor children are, for the
most part, poor themselves. Nearly forty percent of children living in
poverty live in two-parent families. Thus, simply making two-parent
families is not necessarily a ticket out of poverty. Moreover, while sixty
percent of the women on welfare have never been married, forty percent
of the women who are on welfare have been married. They have
followed this prescription for success already and have found that it has
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not worked for them, and they have still ended up on welfare. Thus, I
think our plan for ending poverty in America should empower women
to economic self-sufficiency to ensure their security, whether they marry
or not. In fact, we know that of single mothers who have gotten a
college education and who work full time, only one percent live in
poverty. So education is a way to handle this problem. Only eight
percent of single mothers with some degree of college education who
work full-time live in poverty.
I think that this proposal also fails to recognize the degree to which
poverty causes people not to marry and causes them to divorce. When
you ask low-income women their decisions and their reasons why they
don't marry, they give four reasons. I'm relying on Kathy Eden's study
for this. She's done, I think, four studies on this issue, and she's
interviewed low-income women to find out why it is that they haven't
married. And they say the first is affordability, and that they're not
going to enter into a marriage unless it is going to provide them with
some economic security. For that reason, the fact that low-income men,
and the fathers of these children, are in equally bad or worse situations
financially means that the very fact of poverty right now is a barrier to
getting married. Furthermore, economic stress is very clearly a factor in
people getting divorced.
Third, I think we must recognize that there is an extraordinarily
high prevalence of domestic violence among women on welfare. This is
much too frequently passed over or considered an exception to the rule.
Sixty percent of women on welfare have experienced domestic violence
in their adult life, and thirty percent experienced it within the last
twelve months. A recent study in Colorado said that of domestic
violence survivors, three-quarters said that the batterer is the father of
their children. Therefore, when we have marriage proposals that try to
unite or reunite these mothers with the father of their children, we are
very likely talking about dangerous relationships and relationships where
the women have good reasons not to engage in them. That is not to say
that all men are batterers or that all marriages have violence in them, but
we cannot ignore the data that we have about this specific population.
Finally, I would say that when the federal government says that
marriage is the expected standard and invests $1.5 billion at the outset
to experiment in this area, it's difficult to imagine that public policies
won't simultaneously stigmatize single, divorced, and gay and lesbian
couples.
I want to close up with what I think the consequences are to
choosing this as the path that our government is about to take, and I
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think probably will end up taking, as a major part of the welfare law. As I
said, I think it's very likely that we will end up with coercive tactics to get
at least low-income mothers, if not other mothers, married. Even if it's
wrapped up to look like a gift (i.e., bonuses to couples who marry), it will
actually be a penalty against those who do not or cannot marry. This will
disproportionately impact and further stigmatize African-American
women who have very high rates of non-marital births and who are
currently being held up as the picture of this problem. I think it will also
continue to de-legitimize gay and lesbian families and thereby probably
have consequences for both adoption and custody disputes. And again,
will continue to stigmatize single-parent families. I think, as I said, that
we will see renewed efforts to make divorce more difficult, which should
have a specific threatening impact on domestic violence survivors. And I
think we will see renewed efforts to restrict women's reproductive rights
about when they can decide whether to bear a child. I also think we're
going to see strengthening notions of the traditional family-that
there's one legitimate kind of family, and that is two, heterosexual,
biological parents. Much of the discussion that's happened around the
marriage promotion has not focused on any remarriage, but is focused
specifically on marrying the biological parent of your child. The
emphasis on the biological parents as opposed to an alternative family
structure has largely been driven by Assistant Secretary Horne's belief in
the natural traits of men and women and their gender roles and norms
and the importance of those norms. Instead of promoting healthy
relationships, I think this will also reinforce notions of inequality within
marriage. When the federal law talks about shifting women's
dependence from welfare to marriage, it's specifically envisioning an
unequal, dependent relationship, which is not in my mind a model of a
healthy relationship. It also clearly reinforces the male breadwinner
model, which I don't think is good either for women or for men. And it
will shift the responsibility for economic security to the family unit,
which is the coup d'etat of this proposal. As long as single parents are
the problem, then the government can offer marriage as the solution to
the problem. But if single parents are not the problem, then the
government has to figure out why primary care-giving responsibility
catapults single parents into poverty in America, which would mean
either value in care-giving work, or creating a childcare system that can
support labor market activity. This would mean addressing the fact that
we don't have living wage laws in America, that employers are not
required to give sick days, that we don't have paid family leave, that we
don't have equal pay-all of the costs related to care-giving that single
mothers cannot absorb and that marriage masks. Thus, in the end, a
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marriage promotion policy not only, I think, will badly fail women on
welfare, but in the name of family values will significantly entrench
inequality and social and economic injustice.
RICHARD 0. LEMPERT, MODERATOR: Though we are
running late I'd like to take a few questions, since this has been such an
interesting, provocative panel. You panelists all did a fine job staying
within your time limits, and you deserve the opportunity to answer
questions. If there's somebody specific you're directing the question to,
just say the name of the person you'd like to respond.
QUESTION: What do you think the advantages are for using
contract law in personal relationships? The danger of using contract law
seems to be that people in society who routinely hold a weak bargaining
position (such as women) might get a bad deal.
MARTHA E. ERTMAN: As Ariela Dubler's work nicely points
out, contract is a double-edged sword. It's not a silver bullet that will
solve every problem of inequality and inadequacy in the law. However, I
would argue that it's a good deal better than status, which is the only
other game going. So that the inequalities that happen through, say,
disparate economic positions or disparate social positions, might be
alleviated by contract in some circumstances, but not all. One reason I
like security agreements is that they disprove a myth about commercial
law that it's an absolutely free market, that transactions are conducted at
arm's length, and that the law is hands-off in allowing people to bargain
away whatever they want. In fact, while contract law generally defers to
private ordering, it also provides various kinds of special protections for
weaker parties. So, for example, in Article 9, there are protections for
debtors, because the secured creditor often is a sophisticated repeat
player, while the debtor is often a one-time player who's not as
economically strong, nor as savvy, and who as a result doesn't draft the
pre-printed form that represents the parties' agreement, or even fully
understand most of the agreement's terms. For example, under Article 9
the debtor can't waive its rights to, for example, notice that the creditor
is selling the collateral after repossession when she signs the security
agreement. Instead, the debtor can only waive this right after default. In
addition, the Code provides a floor under which parties can't contract,
namely that parties can't be bound by unconscionable terms.
Unconscionability doctrine provides that the law won't enforce an
agreement that is so unfair that no reasonable person would have
entered it and that no reasonable person would have demanded the
unconconsionable term. In sum, while I recognize that contract isn't
everything, I also think it's a lot. It's a lot in that it presupposes
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functionality, autonomy, and choice, which, granted, are bounded and
contingent, but nevertheless, are better than status.
QUESTION: [INAUDIBLE]
JACQUELINE PAYNE: I think there's a couple things. One is the
data shows a correlation between child well-being but not necessarily a
causal link. It is absolutely true that single motherhood is more likely to
mean poverty and that poverty is likely to mean more pregnancy,
problems in school, incarceration, and drug/alcohol use. So if we dealt
with the poverty issue, I think we would deal with a lot of the problems
at the outset. However, even if you get a single mother out of poverty,
there's still only one person as opposed to two, so you wouldn't
necessarily have as much parental supervision, time with the children,
etc. In terms of that, that's where I get to system issues, which is if we
had better childcare, paid family leave, could society support families, to
make every family, whatever it looks like, better, rather than saying the
only way to succeed is to fit this family?
QUESTION: [INAUDIBLE]
JACQUELINE PAYNE: I think what he was pushing us to do was
to make sure we're looking at childcare accurately as well, and what we
know about childcare in America is it's incredibly poor quality,
expensive and not that available. Therefore, if we invested in childcare
systems or had a system that valued care-giving, so that even if you were
a single mother, you could choose to stay home with your child for the
first two years the way that higher income women are able to because
they're connected to a husband. There are ways that we could change
the system to support people no matter what they look like.
The part two is that I'm not saying by any means that I'm not
supporting people as individuals and in their relationships to improve
themselves and to be better. I'm all for the government requiring all
insurance, whether public or private, to cover counseling, whether it's
for yourself or for marital counseling or whatever..I think that there are
system-wide things that are not targeted at people in poverty that could
improve us all. I'm just saying that I don't think the government should
get involved in pushing people into marriage as a way to solve the
poverty problem.
RICHARD 0. LEMPERT, MODERATOR: Excuse me. I'm
going to interrupt because we have a break scheduled and are six
minutes past break time. I know you can talk to these people
individually. So why don't we just take until a quarter after, shorten the
break a bit, and then return for the last panel.
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PANEL IV
THE FUTURE OF LEGAL MARRIAGE: IS MARRIAGE LAW OBSOLETE?
OR WILL LAW ADAPT TO RECOGNIZE CHANGING
FORMS OF MARRIAGE AND FAMILY?
MELISSA L. BREGER, MODERATOR: Good afternoon
everybody. I'm Melissa Breger, and I teach here at the Law School in the
Child Advocacy Law Clinic. We are very fortunate to have as our final
session a distinguished panel of experts. We're going to hear from
Professor Wardle, then Professor Chambers, then Professor Ettelbrick,
and then we are going to give Professor Wardle an extra five minutes at
the end.
Briefly, let me introduce our panel. Professor Wardle joins us from
Brigham Young University Law School. He is well-known for his work
regarding family law and biomedical ethics and is a prolific writer in
these fields. Professor Paula Ettelbrick is on the faculty here at the
University of Michigan Law School, as well as at NYU Law School and
Barnard College. She is renowned as a policy advocate and attorney for
gay and lesbian rights. Currently, Professor Ettelbrick is the Family
Policy Director for the Policy Institute of the National Gay and Lesbian
Task Force, and we are very fortunate to have her with us today. Finally,
Professor Chambers has been a professor here at Michigan Law for the
past thirty-three years. In fact, he was my professor in family law, when
I was a law student here. He is known for his work regarding the
differing experiences of men and women in the legal field, AIDS law,
family law and constitutional law here and abroad in South Africa. The
Law School will be saddened by his retirement this upcoming summer,
but we are proud to have him here to speak with us at this time.
Today, the final panel will be discussing the broader view of
legally-recognized marriage. What is its fate? What are the social
implications of such? Should marriage include same-sex couples? Should
marriage continue as a socially viable institution? What is the role of
traditional marriage in future society?
Thank you.
LYNN D. WARDLE: I'm pleased to be here and participate in this
wonderful symposium. I want to thank the staff of the Michigan Journal
of Gender & Law for all that they've done to sponsor this program and
bring together the diversity of views that they have invited and for the
multitude of courtesies, and especially to Erin Quinn and Yarmela
Pavlovic who picked me up late last night at the airport. It's an honor
also to be on this particular panel with two of the most thoughtful
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commentators on issues relating to transition in family and family law.
My role in this panel and this conference reminds me of Chesterton's
quip that the defense of virtue (in this case the received tradition of
marriage today) has all the exhilaration of a vice!
Is legal marriage obsolete? I think not. By way of foundation, the
panel title refers to legal marriage, and that reminds us that there's a
difference between private interests in marriage and the social or public
interests. We're going to talk about the public and social interests. It's
important also because the phrase legal marriage reminds us that
marriage can be defined differently in different contexts and for
different purposes. The meaning of marriage in the law may not be the
same as the meaning of marriage in, for instance, sociology, psychology,
anthropology, or a particular religious or ethnic tradition.
The inquiry, "is marriage obsolete?" properly suggests that there's a
relationship between the moral order of society and the legal order. If a
wide gap between the law and moral order develops, one or the other
must change, or the law will be irrelevant and ineffective. I think there's
even more to it than that. Of course, not all social experimentation
constitutes real social change, and not all private lifestyle preferences are
held by even the parties practicing them as public law preferences.
The panel question necessarily raises the issue of how one decides.
By what process is it determined that law reform necessitating social
changes have occurred and that marriage has become obsolete? The fact
that we're talking about legal marriage and legal policy, laws that are
enacted by governments and enforced by government mechanisms,
reminds us that it's important to examine the question about
methodology and procedure, by what method we determine that these
changes occur. Our legal system is predicated on the primary principle
that was declared by Mr. Jefferson over two hundred twenty-five years
ago-that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the
governed. Jefferson's principle teaches us that efforts to significantly
redefine marriage by circumventing the consent of the governed are
unjust and illegitimate. In a democracy, it is not for a set of platonic
guardians, either academic or judicial, to decide what is best for the
people. The definition of marriage is precisely the kind of issue that
Jefferson and the founders risked their lives and fortunes to secure for
the people to decide for themselves by the democratic processes. Indeed,
Jefferson's standard, the consent of the people, helps us distinguish hype
from reality, molehills from significant social mountains, mere tremors
from actual social earthquakes. So the title reminds us that it's
important to ascertain by the legitimate political method whether a
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social phenomenon is merely a fad or represents a real, lasting,
significant change in social values.
Now to the question. In recent years there's been a lot of apparent
change in living arrangements and sexual morals. One can build a
plausible case that the moral image of marriage has changed and existing
standards of legal marriage are obsolete due to such social changes as
dramatic increase in the number of children born out of wedlock,
skyrocketing rates of premarital sex, dramatic increase in non-marital
and premarital cohabitation, falling marriage rates, rising age of first
marriage, three decades of sustained high divorce rates, increase in open
same-sex sexual cohabitation, and proposals to legalize same-sex
marriage and same-sex domestic partnerships with marriage-equivalent
status and benefits. All of these suggest something's going on. However,
most of these conditions are not unprecedented. Prior generations had
children out of wedlock and engaged in non-marital cohabitation and
premarital sex. At various times the marriage rate has fallen, and at
various times the divorce rate has spiked. What we've seen in recent
years in this regard are only differences in degree, quantity or scope.
They're not unimportant, but by and of themselves, they're not new,
and they don't necessarily reflect the kind of social change in
fundamental values that would affect the meaning of marriage.
On the other hand, proposals to legalize same-sex marriage or create
domestic partnership, particularly same-sex domestic partnerships, as a
new legal domestic status in our society or law are different and are
developments that constitute a new metaphysics, a different vision of
marriage and life in this corner of the galaxy. But even these more serious
challenges to marriage do not indicate that current marriage law is
obsolete because of how society has responded to them.
Let's measure them against Jefferson's consent-of-the-governed
standard. While the effort to legalize same-sex marriage has been
seriously pursued now for three decades, no state has yet legalized same-
sex marriage. In spite of huge campaigns, the score in the American
League is fifty-one to zero. In Hawaii and Alaska, same-sex marriage was
rejected by sixty-nine percent to twenty-nine percent and sixty-eight
percent to thirty-two percent in constitutional referenda. In Nebraska
and Nevada it was rejected seventy percent to thirty percent. In
California, home of very active gay communities in both Hollywood
and San Francisco, which waged an intensive campaign, voters
overwhelmingly rejected same-sex marriage sixty-one percent to thirty-
nine percent. Even in Vermont, several months after the state Supreme
Court ruling in Baker, town meetings held in fifty towns across
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Vermont voted unanimously, fifty out of fifty, to reject same-sex
marriage and overwhelmingly forty-six out of fifty against same-sex
domestic partnership. Congress and two-thirds of the states have
enacted laws prohibiting and denying recognition to same-sex marriage.
Even President Clinton, a strong supporter of gay rights, signed the
Defense of Marriage Act that defines marriage, for purpose of federal
laws, as male-female relationships only, and allows each state to refuse to
recognize same-sex marriage if it chooses. The law allows states to
choose for itself whether or not to do so.
Similarly the record concerning proposed legalization of marriage-
like equivalent status, domestic partnership, fails to support the claim that
there's a significant Jefferson standard/Jefferson quality change here.
Today, only one state has enacted anything that approaches the
Scandinavian-style, marriage-equivalent, domestic partnership, of course,
the Vermont Civil Union Law, and we had just a fascinating, very
moving account of the background on development of that law. But it's
the only state. Hawaii and Vermont also have very limited reciprocal
beneficiary laws, which are relatively narrow in scope, and California has
enacted an even more diluted form of partnership with more narrow
benefits. All this has occurred. The point is, there's not been significant
acceptance, as yet, of these new marriage-like alternative institutions
with legal status. Moreover, wherever marriage-equivalent, same-sex,
domestic partnership has been adopted, it's been adopted with a label
different than marriage, and that's been very critical to obtaining
passage of those laws everywhere, from Scandinavia to Vermont.
There's a lot of corroborating evidence that marriage isn't obsolete.
Surveys continue to find that people still want to marry. They intend to
marry. They expect to marry. They hope to marry. Moreover, there's a
growing number of marriage revitalization attempts in politics and in
the profession and even, perhaps most surprisingly, in academia. We've
had reference to the wonderful handouts that we just got from
Jacqueline Payne which are evidence of something that's going on there
that manifests that there is still a belief in the importance of this
institution and not an acceptance of significant change.
If the aforesaid social changes don't mean that marriage is obsolete,
then what do they mean? I want to suggest four possibilities.
One, premarital sex, cohabitation, and the increase in childbearing
out of wedlock may just be the unfortunate, but normal, response to
increased sexual stimuli in society. A lot of feminist writers and others
have documented and criticized the sexual objectification of women in
our modern popular culture, especially in entertainment and advertising,
in the current Barbie generation. The increase in sexual stimuli may have
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caused the increase in sexual behavior and the resulting increase in these
phenomena that I've mentioned. Moreover, participants in these
behaviors and situations generally don't view their behavior or their
relationship as marital. They want to preserve for later, for marriage, the
ideal of love, commitment and generosity, while enjoying temporarily,
on a lark, as it were, lust, exploitation, and selfishness. Now, indirectly
these situations undermine marriage. We can't ignore the transformative
effect upon expectations and relationships that result from significant
involvement with pornography or premarital sexual activity. But they
don't involve evidence of a change in society of the vision of marriage.
Second, to some extent these social phenomena that I referred to
may suggest increasing anxiety about marriage. It's been more than a
generation since divorce, American-style, unilateral no-fault divorce-on-
demand, became the standard in this country, resulting immediately in
the doubling of the rate of divorce and an even greater increase in the
presence of divorce in society. The first generation of the children of
divorce are now of marriage age. They've come of age and they have
misgivings about their own ability to succeed in marriage. They fear
inflicting upon themselves and their loved ones, especially their
children, the pains and disadvantage of divorce, which they experienced
for themselves or saw family members and friends suffer. However,
these people, young and old, seek not to change the definition or
composition of marriage, rather they seek assurance and confidence that
they can succeed in marriage. Many of them experiment with what they
consider trial marriages, tragically, because it appears that so-called trial
marriages decrease rather than increase the likelihood that a resulting
marriage will last. This indicates not that marriage has been tried and
found wanting, but it's been found difficult and not tried. For these
young people, the search for alternatives to marriage is* evidence of
looking for the right thing in the wrong place, because they've seen so
much evidence of the right thing being turned into something terribly
wrong. At the same time, they have a fear of marriage and cynicism
about marital promise. There's a continuing yearning for marriage and
craving for successful marriage relationships.
The current generation is very much like the generation that wrote
the Constitution of the United States, if I can use a different metaphor.
The founders experienced the abuses of a strong central government.
They bravely engineered a prolonged, nearly disastrous revolution against
the government. They had established a weak central government and
found it inadequate for their needs and their desires, and they somehow
summoned the courage to create another government, that was a strong
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central government, for the newly independent nation, despite their well-
founded fear of the abuses of power in such a government. They had the
creativity to establish new ways to cabin the strong government from
becoming abusive. Today, many young couples, I believe, despite the
experience of failed marriages that they have seen, will have the courage
to embrace marriage and creatively find new ways to make marriages
work.
Third, some data also suggest that marriage is being taken for
granted. It's said that we come into possession of our institutions and
our values the same way that we come into possession of public
buildings and monuments. Someone else creates them, and we simply
inherit them. The risk is that if we don't value them, if we take them for
granted, we tend to neglect their maintenance and upkeep, and they
wear out. The consequences are manifest in pervasive social distress,
from discarded former husbands and wives who overwhelm and burden
our remedial classes, swamp our clinics, overwhelm the feeble capacity
of our welfare system to inadequately parented youth who overwhelm
the juvenile courts. Benefits of marriage to society are like water to fish
or air to a butterfly. We're surrounded by them so constantly we get
used to them, overlook them and take them for granted. I'm reminded
of a statement of Oliver Wendell Holmes that, "what we need today is
education in the obvious more than investigation of the obscure."
The fourth possible explanation for these social phenomena is a
growing devaluation of marriage in some quarters. The proposed
legalization and equalization of alternatives to marriage reflects a
devaluation of marriage. I'll return to this in a moment, but now I'll just
note that this phenomena is not new either. Chesterton observed nearly
a century ago that the marriage-based family is now never mentioned in
respectable circles, which, I would pause to note, cannot be said at the
University of Michigan thanks to the Journal of Gender & Law and this
conference.
Apparently, part of being the progressive elite in America
historically, and in Western countries generally, is to periodically express
disdain for marriage, and the marriage-based family; it is simply de
rigueur to call for a leveling of marriage and other institutions, to insist
on the functional deconstruction of the highly-preferred status of
marriage. When marriage is devalued, investment in marriage drops,
and that increases the likelihood of the kinds of problems that lead
people to avoid or be concerned about marriage.
If there really has not been a significant change in basic values
about marriage, should we encourage society to support a redefinition of
marriage to include these alternative relationships anyway? One
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response is to simply ask why. Must all relationships that are valued by
parties be deemed marriages?
The significance of the legal status of marriage for the relationship
can't be ignored. In a time of so much government regulation of our
lives and so many public benefits and private dignities turning on
whether the parties are legally married, it must be admitted that this is a
serious question. I'm out of time, so I'll come back, perhaps in my five
minutes response, to suggest whether we should encourage these models
even though they fail the test. Is marriage obsolete? Have such massive
social changes occurred that we need to redefine marriage? I think the
answer to that is no. But that doesn't mean that we shouldn't redefine
marriage anyway if we think that there are other powerful reasons. But I
don't think there are, and I think there are substantial risks. Thank you
very much.
DAVID L. CHAMBERS: When this panel was first organized,
Lynn Wardle was going to be joined by Martha Fineman, a professor of
law at Cornell and a very formidable speaker. I'm sure as Lynn started
thinking about what he was going to say, it was in that context. Paula
and I are very last-minute substitutes. Mr. Sodom and Ms. Gomorrah.
PAULA ETTELBRICK: What does that mean really!
DAVID L. CHAMBERS: Lynn has written a good deal about his
view of the importance of shoring up the position of traditional
marriage in this country. As he has said here and in other writings, he
believes that there will continue to be large numbers of unmarried
couples living together in this country and that there will probably be a
rise in the numbers of cohabiting same-sex couples. There will be large
numbers of children born outside of marriage, living with single parents.
There will be high levels of divorce. There will be more children living
after divorce with a single parent. And despite this recognition that there
will be very large numbers of people living in different settings than
within traditional marriage, his advice to governments is to stay the
course. Government should insist on one form of state-honored family
relationship only, the traditional, heterosexual, covenant marriage.
He doesn't, as I understand, predict that if we do stay the course,
more of those currently straying will return to live out their lives in
heterosexual covenant marriage. If he doesn't make that prediction, I
think he's wise. I think it is unlikely that the policy he advocates would
have that effect. His point rather seems to be that if states treat these
alternative relationships in a positive manner, in a manner comparable
to marriage, these other relationships will adversely affect traditional,
heterosexual, marriage. He has a view of heterosexual, covenant
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marriage as supremely valuable to the state, to the people of the state,
and that it alone should be the central focus of American family policy.
I may be overstating it, and, if I am, he will certainly correct me.
In the end, the most fundamental source of the disagreement
between Lynn and me is with regard to the appropriate role of the state
in its relationship to the family, and in particular in relationship to
marriage. In a recent article, he states (and I wouldn't disagree) that
marriage is a public status in our culture. He then goes on to say that
public laws are intended to protect and effectuate the public interest,
not private lifestyle preferences. For him, the question is whether the
social interest, the public good is served-not whether some private
interest is advanced by public legislation.
Now I do not disagree that there are public functions served by the
laws of marriage, but one of the most important public functions of law
is to help private citizens lead happy lives, to live lives they find more
satisfying. Government should help its citizens find more comfortable
ways of living the lives that they are already living and the lives they
would like to lead, unless the state has good reasons to believe that those
ways of living are in fact harmful.
As a way of illustrating my view, I'm going to make a few
predictions about the ways the law might change in the future to be
more responsive and facilitative to people in the way they live their lives.
You should take my predictions about the future with a grain of salt. In
1972, I believed that McGovern would beat Nixon. In 1995, I believed
that O.J. would be convicted. In 2000, I believed that the Supreme
Court of the United States would not hear an appeal in Bush v. Gore. So
with that warning, let me speak briefly about several sorts of families in
the future.
First, the married couple. I predict in the future that marriage will
remain the norm. Marriage has been with us as long as we have recorded
history, and it will continue to be. For most people, it will be the
preferred setting for their lives. On the other hand, I would not be
surprised to see that some states would adopt more than one form of
legal marriage. We have had a wonderful introduction to covenant
marriage here today, the experiment being tried in Louisiana and a few
other states. It is an alternative to regular marriage that seeks to
encourage couples to return to traditional, lifelong, heterosexual
marriage. However, we might see other kinds of marriage in the future.
States might create a form of marriage that goes in the other direction, a
form of marriage in which each partner in the union acknowledges more
financial independence from each other than has been the case with
regular marriage.
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A second direction in which we are already heading, is to recognize
the opportunities of people who are within marriage to contract for
different terms than the default marriage law imposes. Today, in every
state, married couples can contract, either before or during the marriage
for different arrangements for holding property and for the disposition
of property on divorce or on death. This opportunity to contract is a
prime example of government in its facilitative mode. So far, despite the
invitation provided by court decisions and statutes to engage in
contracting, very few couples do. I'm not certain that in the future
many more will take up the opportunity but it is possible.
A third area: the law and the unmarried couple. In the recent past,
state courts have begun recognizing contracts between unmarried
cohabitants regarding the financial terms of their relationships. We are
even seeing in a few states like Oregon and Washington, a willingness of
courts to impose at the point of separation of a long-term unmarried
couple remedies that the court simply believe to be just and equitable.
The cases in Oregon and Washington have involved heterosexual
couples who had no contractual understanding, but who had a
relationship in which various kinds of dependencies or reliances had
developed that suggested to the court that a just division of property
would call for something other than leaving the couple as they were.
There's a dilemma for courts and legislatures in trying to be
supportive of people who choose to live in unmarried relationships.
Some would say that the way to be supportive is not to impose state
rules on them other than contract, because they have chosen to live
outside of marriage. Others would say, whatever arrangements and
choices people make at the beginning of a living-together relationship
often fail to reflect what their lives become after a long period of time,
and the state has an appropriate role in protecting those who have ended
up in dependent positions.
I'm going to just mention briefly two other areas of family policy
that may change. One is the place of single persons in our culture. We
will have in the future a higher proportion of single persons at any given
point in time than we have had at almost any point in the past. That is
because people are marrying later, more people are never marrying at all
and more are marrying and divorcing. Moreover, people are living
longer.
The question is what can the state do to help people who are single
find satisfaction in their lives. We have had a change from a time when
women who lived alone past thirty were typically referred to as spinsters
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or old maids. Now they're simply referred to as lesbians, a much nicer
idea.
Lots of women and men who live alone have people who are very
important to them in their lives. We permit them to execute powers of
attorney for people to make decisions for them if they end up
incapacitated. We permit them to write wills, of course. One possibility
for the future is to create laws that permit people who have a really good
friend in their life to register together as "registered friends." Through
this arrangement, each of them might agree to help make decisions for
the other if the other is incapacitated and to make decisions after the
other's death with regard to the disposition of the body or of the organs.
If they die intestate, perhaps some portion of the estate would go to the
friend. This would provide some way of honoring the friendship
relationship, which I think is going to be seen as more and more
important in the years ahead.
Finally, same-sex marriage. I hope Paula will say more. I'm on the
whole warmly disposed to same-sex marriage. In fact, I'm in one, a civil
union in Vermont. A couple of million gay men and lesbians in this
country live together as couples. That will continue. And I would say
simply that the difference between Lynn and me is he says, what
positive values flow to the state from recognizing these sort of alternative
arrangements? I would ask a different question. What positive values
might flow to the couple from recognizing such arrangements. The state
should let people find what's satisfying to them, let them form the
relationships that work for them, and in the absence of demonstrable
harms, support those arrangements in ways that makes the couple happy
and fully participating citizens. In this case, I think for large numbers of
gay people (but by no means all), permitting them to marry would
provide that satisfaction. I would put the burden on Lynn to explain
what harms he is worried about if people who were gay or lesbian
marry? Are those harms really likely to occur? And if those harms did
occur, do they really outweigh the advantages of helping people, good
citizens, taxpayers who are gay and lesbian, lead more satisfying lives?
Thank you.
PAULA ETTELBRICK: I have mostly just a series of observations
to make. No one, for the reasons David said, can really predict the
future. All of us have been wrong at some point, but we can certainly
look at the social forces that are in motion right now that can help us
understand, if not where we're going, where we should be going.
But first of all, I would like to say that I don't believe in any way
that marriage is necessarily obsolete or even that it should be eliminated.
I guess that was Professor Fineman's role on this panel, but she's not
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here. So it's not necessarily a counterpoint to marriage. The work that I
and many advocates like me have done for a long time, certainly
incorporates a critique of marriage, but also tries to focus on the
function of marriage, not just the form. If you were raised on feminism
at all, you can't get away from the gendered aspects of marriage, which
are very troubling. This was why the gay community did not initially
embrace marriage. Our relationships mostly didn't look like that. Some
did. Some were gendered in some odd way in the way that we define
function in terms of gender. But we didn't find ourselves and our
relationships reflected in what we saw within marital relationships by
and large. Not in terms of the function, the love, or the commitment,
but in terms of that gendered difference. I think what we were looking
for was a way to redefine, without the necessary gendered requirement, a
way of being families that focused on the function of being a good
partner, a good parent, and having the social resources and support to
fulfill those roles.
Second, I think that the discussion and focus on divorce statistics is
narrow and problematic. It misses a great deal of the positive
functioning of millions of families that are different from those that are
viewed as the correct or proper marital families. It misses the
functionality of American families in a significant way. When
cohabitating, unmarried couples get defined as less-committed and less-
able to carry on when defined in relation to married families, the
analysis misses some of the social good and social benefit that does exist.
I'm not trying to be a Pollyanna but I think we can really paint a much
happier, successful picture of family if we incorporated into our analysis
the many kinds of families that exist, that are excluded from the
research, and have traditionally been excluded from the research, and are
still excluded from the research. When we take away the labels and
stigma that we readily attach to non-marital families in our social and
scholarly discussions, and stop using them for fear-mongering about the
ills of America, we might actually begin to address the lives and needs of
most American families whose issues don't usually stem from the lack of
a marriage license.
I think that government does have a role to play in families. I
believe in families personally. I believe that families are a necessary part,
a social part, of a humane world. Without families and without a
structure to support families, I don't see how we have a humane world.
Families help ground us as individuals. I think that government (i.e.,
society) needs to find ways to support those families and the functioning
of those families and to find ways in which they can work without
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pushing them into boxes, without pushing them into a certain kind of
norm, without pushing them into adopting something that doesn't fit
with who they are or how they as individuals view the world, how they
as individuals are capable of developing their family structures and their
family support systems.
David already preempted my mentioning the great value I see to
the movement for covenant marriage. And that is, as Steve pointed out
in his comment, a clear acknowledgement of the ability to define family
along different strata within the law. To allow people to make a decision
about what kind of family form, commitment and function they are
able and willing to take on, and what works best for their lives at a
particular point in time.
The position of people who argue to exclude gay and lesbian
couples from marriage is odd to me. On the one hand, they want to
strengthen marriage and coerce all people into it, whether those people
value marriage or not. On the other hand they fight viciously anti-gay
battles to exclude people who really do value marriage and do look at
marriage as something significant, meaningful and important in both
society and in our lives. That seems to be an ironic way to go about
reaching their goals. Likewise, excluding lesbians and gay men people
from adopting children seems an odd way to support the lives of
children abandoned to the system. Better that they be raised by the state
than by a lesbian or gay man who, unlike the state, can actually love and
nurture them, I guess.
In the future, I think that, as was already stated in the very first
panel, marriage for lesbian and gay couples will be an eventuality,
perhaps even in my lifetime, somewhere in some state. I think that it
provides a role in knighting people into full citizenship. It always has
historically, and for better for worse, it will in the future as well. It is a
symbolic way in which we understand the class status of different
relationships in our society, and that has always been one of the roles
that it has played in sending that social message.
I'm very interested, obviously, in expanding our advocacy and ideas
and pushing our minds beyond just marriage. I don't believe it should
be the sole access point for all of the never-ending array of public and
private and other kinds of benefits. I think the government needs to
intervene soon and more forcefully in understanding the difference
between allowing people to marry, and the incidents, the thousands and
millions of incidents of marriage, and the ways in which the exclusion
from marriage hurts families. If we care about families, we have to
acknowledge that basic point.
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I look at some demographic changes, the aging of our society, the
longevity with which people are living, and I worry. I worry about what
care giving structures are going to be available for people who are either
excluded from familial definitions by law, choose not to engage in those,
choose not to have children, or can't have children. I look at my ninety-
eight-and-a-half-year-old grandmother who, fortunately, is cared for. I
look at my seventy-five-year old aunt who cares for my grandmother but
has no children nor a husband to care for her-though she fortunately
has devoted nieces and nephews. We don't have a social system that
provides affordable, quality care for ninety-eight-and-a-half-year-old
grandmothers that feels like home and feels like your daughter taking
care of you. We don't value that in our system. If we are going to try to
find some value in the system, we have to at least allow for an expanded
idea of what care giving means in our society. There's a very interesting
study that's going on right now on care giving by lesbians and gay men.
It is a phenomenon within families that a lot of lesbian and gay children
get called upon to care for their elderly parents. The social, cultural and
familial assumption is, since they have no children, they have no
obligations, and can drop everything to take care of their parents. They
do because they care about their families, they care about what those
structures are, and they care about performing the familial function that
all of us should be called upon, or are called upon, to do. But, who will
care for them? Not even their life-long partners are given such a
privilege in our system.
The potential elimination of Social Security, or the private
investment approach worries me. In the days of Enron-scale scandals, it's
a little scary to think that my investment skills are the sole determinant to
my ability to survive or not, as a sixty-five-, seventy-five-, eighty-five-, or
if I have my grandmothers genes, ninety-eight-and-a-half-year-old in
this society! So we need to find ways. We're looking at potential threats
to the ability of people, as they grow older in society, to be well cared
for as government continues to divest itself from that level of social
support. As we continue to argue over whether or not certain family
structures are right or not, we're missing the point about our future and
how each one of us, as individuals, needs to be taken care of when we're
older. Laws, such as the Family Medical Leave Act, have to acknowledge
the role that partners play in taking care of one another and have to
provide the legal impetus to support that.
Cohabitation. A seventy-two percent increase between 1990 and
2000 in the numbers of recorded cohabiting relationships. This doesn't
include the broad range of other kinds of family relationships, but
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simply includes two adults who declare themselves to be unmarried
partners on a census form, and includes unmarried partners across all
racial, economic, age, same-sex, and opposite-sex categories. These are
part of the structures that are reality in our society. We don't really
investigate a lot into why people make decisions not to marry. Very
little of the literature investigates the decision why without some sort of
judgmental approach to assuming that we know. That alone should
require us to take note of the fact that we need to understand that
marriage isn't a solution to all social needs.
Something I call post-marital cohabitation is another kind of
phenomenon. The culture in our society around marriage is so much
about procreation and child-rearing that we forget that marriage can
actually transcend that stage, as difficult as it is! We need to consider the
phenomenon where people have lived long, healthy and wonderful
marriages and then they're widowed. Or maybe they do get divorced at
some point, find another partner (I'm talking about opposite-sex
couples), live with them, share a life with them, but don't have the
social imperative to marry, because if you're sixty-five years old you're
not going to be procreating, and are not going to be raising children.
You're finally at that stage. In fact a lot of elder activists have been our
mainstay partners in the domestic partners struggle because a lot of
them live in relationships and have disincentives to remarry either
because of the way pension plans are defined or the way that divorce
agreements sometimes get worked out. So there are a range of people
who are living in relationships, and we don't know what to do with that
phenomenon and those structures.
Finally, a friend of mine always says family is a lifelong enterprise.
It doesn't exist at just one, single point in time. It doesn't exist just
when you marry. It doesn't exist just when you have children. It exists
when you're a child. It exists when you become an adult. It does exist
when you get married. And when you get old. It restructures itself in
some ways. It exists throughout child-rearing. It exists beyond child-
rearing. What we haven't done is really adequately define what family is
in our society and what we need to do to prevent the dire injustices to
our future and to our collective children that will occur if we continue
to ignore the changes, the demographics, the cultural forces that are
helping to shape families and helping families function well despite
some of the disincentives they face in our world.
Thank you.
LYNN W. WARDLE: Again, I want to reiterate how honored I
am to be able to sit on the platform with David and Paula, who are very
thoughtful and whom I respect tremendously for their contribution to
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the dialogue and Paula for her advocacy work in this area as well. David,
weren't you in Vermont for a year?
DAVID L. CHAMBERS: I live there now most of the time.
LYNN W. WARDLE: Well, I am grateful to be here with both of
you, and clearly we have a difference of opinion. I'm going to proceed
with more of my points but digress, as I go, to respond to a few other
notes that I made here.
First, certainly if relationships provide equivalent benefits to
society, they should receive equivalent legal status as marriage. But
where is the evidence that they provide such benefits, that they are
comparable in terms of social importance? What is the burden of proof?.
In my paper I spend much time reviewing non-marital cohabitation as
an example of the lack of contribution. Indeed, David recommends we
allow them unless they're harmful. Well, certainly there is a lot of
evidence of harm. I want to emphasize again that the primary concern
here is not harm to the individual, or their perception of what they
think is good or harmful or helpful, but to society and our social
concerns.
There is a tremendous movement to treat all intimate relationships
as legal in law and social order. Part of my paper reviews this so-called
close relationships theory and what's happening in it. Martha Fineman
is a well known advocate of that in the most extreme or polar form, but
her position isn't unique. Governor Cayetano of Hawaii, back when
there was a big dispute there, was quoted in the newspaper as saying
government "ought to quit the business of regulating marriage." The
ALl and its Principles of Law of Family Dissolution has endorsed
treating all cohabitating relationships as equivalent to marriage for the
purpose of dealing with the economic consequences when the parties
separate. Incredibly, they didn't tailor the benefits that they would give
to those relationships to the qualities or characteristics of the
relationship, to domestic partnerships. Rather, very woodenly and
mechanically they just said they would give them all the exact same
benefits that are ascribed to marriage.
DAVID L. CHAMBERS: After a certain length of time.
LYNN W. WARDLE: Actually they can contract going in and it
depends on how they define the length of time. There's an assumption,
if a child is born. But the point is clear that the economic expectations
and the economic characteristics of the relationship of cohabitation are
very different than the economic expectations and the economic
relations of marriage. Yet they just woodenly extended it.
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That's part of the problem we have when we get into the area of
benefits. One of Paula's requests is to just get the benefits. However,
inevitably it's not benefits tailored to this situation or this circumstance.
We want marital benefits, regardless of the difference or regardless of the
nature of our relationship and its differences. And there's a number of
Supreme Court cases that would seem to be sympathetic to this
relationship's movement.
There are three reasons why we shouldn't embrace the relationship
theory. David says (and I'm going to come to this), one of the purposes
is to facilitate people living the lives that they're comfortable with unless
those lifestyles are harmful. I would emphatically agree with that. But
we must distinguish three things. Law deals with three categories of
relationships. It prohibits some, tolerates others, and prefers a few. In
the last twenty years, we have seen a dramatic change in the law's
treatment of same-sex relationships from strict prohibition to
widespread tolerance. But the question of legalizing same-sex marriage
or same-sex domestic partnership with a marriage-like status and
benefits isn't a question of mere tolerance. It is a matter of substantial
preference, the highest preference that the law can give.
The question of harm to society: First, the burden of proof on
redefining the fundamental institution of marriage ought to lie with
those who are arguing for the redefinition. Second, part of the problem
with showing harm is that harm from the redefinition of marriage isn't
blood spurting out of a neck wound or a bone sticking through the arm.
Comments like, "Well the sky isn't falling in Vermont," simply aren't
helpful, because we're not talking about, "Gee, if we do it today, we're
going to see disaster tomorrow kind of harm." Rather we're seeing the
kind of harm that comes after a generation or two.
If you want to see harm, let's look at Sweden, whose government
adopted a very vigorous policy of neutrality toward relationships sixty
years ago. All relationships were to be treated equal. Marriage was not to
be preferred. Cohabitation, and as of about 1990 same-sex domestic
partnerships, were included in the group of relationship forms that were
to be treated equally. But it's consistent with their policy that all
relationships are the same. The consequence of that: more than half of
all children born in Sweden are born out of wedlock. Non-marital
cohabitation outnumbers marriage. Of people that do marry, more than
50% of the marriages end in divorce. And there is open and expressed
hostility to women who wish to stay home to raise their own children,
because they've adopted the commercial or market model. Everyone
needs to work, and we have daycare centers, nursery and school, and
you get into the marketplace. So there's substantial concern in Sweden
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now, but it's awfully hard to change. Once the genie is out of the bottle,
it's hard to put the genie back in. So before we decide to go down that
road, we ought to be careful and make a very careful decision, because
the road appears to be a one-way road. You can't come back once you
have gone down that road.
I'm concerned because marriage is the foundation of society, so the
transformative effect of radical redefinition of marriage to include
relationships that are of a very different nature and have different
characteristics, the transformative power of inclusion in marriage, will
have an effect upon society and that is something that needs to be
considered before we take that step.
I have no crystal ball to predict whether alternative relationships
will be given marital or quasi-marital status in some states, but it
wouldn't surprise me if that happens to a varying degree, mostly of a
moderate or compromised nature. It has already happened in Vermont,
and I think that it's going to happen in different degrees in other states.
Even though I think this is bad policy, I can live with it. I can live with
it because of Mr. Jefferson's primary principle: the consent of the
government. When the citizens of a given jurisdiction choose by the
democratic process to experiment with new social orders, the role of the
people should be respected. In a federal system, we can live with that
kind of diversity. It's not neat and tidy. There will be lots of collateral
questions and debates, especially concerning interjurisdictional effects,
but that's precisely how Jefferson's principle and our constitutional
system is supposed to work. So while I do expect that there will be some
change, I don't think that it will be massive.
Thank you very much for inviting me.
MELISSA L. BREGER, MODERATOR: Thank you to our
distinguished panel. I see plenty of questions from the audience.
QUESTION: I'm wondering how you feel about marriage
between members of different races? Also, are you in favor of equality-
based marriage?
LYNN W. WARDLE: Thanks and I think that we should hear
from the other panelists if they have any response or disagree with my
answer. The question essentially, if I can grossly over-summarize, is the
Loving argument for same-sex marriage. Equating same-sex relationships
with laws that prohibit same-sex couples from marrying with anti-
miscegenation laws that prohibit persons of different races from marrying.
The second question is don't you favor more equality-based on marriage.
Yes, I'm on the side of the angels, of course. First, I think the Loving
argument is simply one of the weakest arguments for same-sex marriage.
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The best answer was given by General Colin Powell. He said that race is
an inherent characteristic and not related to behavior. Our skin color is
an inherent characteristic unrelated to behavior. Sexual conduct is a very
behavioral activity. Comparison of the two is a convenient but invalid
argument.
QUESTION: So you are saying that Loving is not relevant to the
same-sex marriage discussion?
LYNN W. WARDLE: That's just exactly the response. There's a
difference between race and sexual orientation. Race is an inherent,
immutable characteristic, while sexual behavior is "behavior" and not an
inherent, immutable characteristic. We can control our behavior; we
cannot control our race. (There can be a debate about that). Another
difference is that race has nothing to do with the purpose of marriage.
Sexual behavior has everything to do with the purpose of marriage. We
fought a Civil War to establish the principle that discrimination on the
basis of race is not acceptable. It's a constitutional principle. We have no
similar constitutional consensus that sexual orientation discrimination is
an invalid basis for discrimination, particularly in marriage. But the most
important point is that race has nothing to do with marriage whereas
regulation of sexual behavior has everything to do with marriage. So I
think that the Loving argument simply fails on that basis. Am I in favor of
equality-based marriages? I am. And that reminds me of a quip. I debated
Evan Wolfson a few years ago. My wife came with me to the debate to
give me some moral support and afterwards Evan and I were continuing
the debate, and my wife-
DAVID L. CHAMBERS: Evan, if you don't know is at the
Lambda Legal Defense Fund and is one of the foremost advocates for
same-sex marriage.
LYNN W. WARDLE: And very persuasive, forceful advocate. But
my wife came up and said, I think both of you overstate the value of
marriage.
The point is we have an equality-based marriage. At least I try very
hard to hold up my end. But I don't think that changing the nature of
marriage to include same-sex couples would enhance the equality nature
at all. I think it would have in fact the opposite effect. I think marriage is
the oldest equal rights institution that our laws know, because it requires a
man and a woman for the most basic unitive society. It says two men
aren't enough. Two women aren't enough. For this relationship we need
a man and a woman: both voices, both perspectives, and both qualities are
needed in this relationship. So I think equality would suffer by the
legalization of same-sex marriage. By the way, I heard a quote, Bill
Eskridge told me that it comes from Paula, I think, and I give her credit,
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I use it in all the debates, and that is, "Marriage is a great institution if
you want to spend your life in an institution."
MELISSA L. BREGER, MODERATOR: Professor Ertman, did
you have a question?
MARTHA ERTMAN: Since you consider marriage to be an equal
rights institution, how do you explain its origins in inequality (e.g., the
property-rights Model)?
LYNN W. WARDLE: To the twenty first century mind it's hard
to explain it, but I think understanding the economic world and the life
that existed in the nineteenth or particularly the seventeenth century
and earlier or the eighteenth century. One way that you can achieve
equality isn't everybody does everything equally, rather it's an allocation
of responsibilities, a division of labor, if you will. I think that explains it.
But I'm not here to defend the common law denial of property rights to
married women by any justification or any means. I don't have a
justification for it. Although I think historically there are explanations
that make it a lot less invidious than it sounds taken out of the context
of the times to the twenty-first century mind.
QUESTION: Professor Wardle, what harms do you think would
result from allowing same-sex marriage?
LYNN W. WARDLE: I've had two questions in a row, so I'm
going to defer that to David Chambers, who's bright enough to be able
to argue both sides of the question brilliantly and then I'm going to
answer it. I think there is an answer. My first answer is that you've got
the burden of proof wrong, but then I'll try to answer your question.
Let David and Paula answer it first and then I'll come back.
DAVID L. CHAMBERS: Well, I think that Western civilization
will come to an end if-!
LYNN W. WARDLE: Okay, the sky is falling!
DAVID L. CHAMBERS: Actually, that is a question I put to you.
That is, I ended up my talk by asking you to try to be specific about the
harms that you would expect to accrue in this country over time if
same-sex couples were permitted to marry. What would they be? [Aside
to Paula Ettelbrick: Ask him the same question.]
PAULA ETTELBRICK: What would be the harms over time!
[Laughter]
LYNN W. WARDLE: When I came out here, someone asked me
who was going to be participating in the panel, and I told them David
Chambers and Paula Ettelbrick. And they said, "Well good, glad you're
not outnumbered!" I guess I have to ask you to define harm. If you're
asking to see the blood spurt, then it's hard to identify. But the kind of
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harm is the kind of harm that I alluded to when I referred to the
Swedish experience. First, one potential harm is a dramatic increase in
the instability of marriage. Second, a diminution of the exclusivity of
the marriage relationship. Let me read to you, if I can, because I have
just a summary allusion to this in my paper. "Important social interest
for marriage can be identified that alternative relationships, including
proposed same-sex marriage, do not serve as well as the received
tradition of marriage." So, each of these are areas in which there would
be loss, diminution and disadvantage in my opinion. I just had an
article published this last year devoted to one of them, but they are: one,
safe sexual relations; two, responsible procreation; three, optimal
childrearing; four, healthy human development; five, protecting those
who undertake the most vulnerable family roles for the benefit of
society, especially wives and mothers; six, securing the stability and the
integrity of the basic unit of society; seven, fostering civic virtue,
democracy, and social order; and eight, promoting and facilitating
interjurisdiction compatibility. And let me stop there.
QUESTION: [INAUDIBLE]
LYNN W. WARDLE: I'm not asking us to have a theological or
religious discussion here, but I do think that the union of a man and
woman is different than the union of two men or two women. I think
that the relationship of that dyad (male-female) in a committed
relationship is quite different than the relationship of two men and of
two women, because men and women are different. Don't blame me if
you think that it's a theological reason. I think we simply have to deal
with the fact that they are different. Part of the strength of marriage is
that we do have that difference. Somebody's written a book, I forget his
name, The Gift of Strangers, about how the importance of what we've
learned from the people who view the world different than we do, and
that may be part of the genius of the mandate of inter-gender marriage.
That's one of the other distinctions between the anti-miscegenation laws
struck down in Loving and laws prohibiting same-sex marriage that are
being questioned by advocates of gay marriage. One was exclusive. It
was segregationist. You cannot integrate a white man and a black
woman or a white woman and a black man. Laws requiring a man and a
woman are just the opposite. They are not segregationist. They require
integration. And having a family that is an integrated unit (both gender
integrated and generationally integrated) is a particular value to society.
It's not the only possibility, but it is of particular value. It makes a
particular and unique contribution to society in my opinion.
QUESTION: [INAUDIBLE]
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DAVID L. CHAMBERS: Your question has at least a couple of
dimensions. One is the question of the appropriateness of the state's use
of an institution like marriage to try to encourage a certain form of
behavior. I think it is appropriate for the state to offer various kinds of
structures to its citizens, such as marriage, the corporate entity, the
nonprofit corporation, and a partnership, as a way of encouraging
people toward a form that they think has some likely benefit to them
and to society as a whole. I think it's appropriate to do that, but I have
great doubts that in this context encouraging marriage will actually have
much utility in serving that function. That second aspect is empirical.
Will permitting same-sex marriage in fact encourage people to enter
into longer-term monogamous relationships than they otherwise would
have? At the minimum the court is out about that. There are just large
numbers of gay and lesbian relationships that have lasted a long time
without the benefit of marriage law or civil union law. And whether it
will be any different in a future in which such legally recognized
relationships are allowed, I'm not at all sure.
PAULA ETTELBRICK: I think one question always comes to my
mind in some of these discussions. What exactly is the social value or
social interest in longevity in a relationship? I haven't quite figured that
out. Monogamy seems to be uniquely a heterosexual experience required
most prominently of married women. It was a way in which men could
give themselves some assurance that the children their wives gave birth
to were theirs. Before we had DNA testing, monogamy was a means by
which they could be assured of their property transfers. Over time
monogamy has become more of a social and moral value. I'm not
discounting the personal harm that people might feel to their
relationship if a partner is non-monogamous, but I'm not sure it's the
government's responsibility to tell us when it's harmful or not. I'm
talking even in terms of the longevity of relationships. Take apart the
idea of raising children, because as a parent of two kids I understand
personally and intellectually the importance of the stability of a family
unit to children, the dependence children have on the adults around
them, and many other factors. Once you take that out, I'm not sure
what the social value of the state's interest in long relationships
necessarily is. I've talked about the importance of the care giving role,
but that isn't a role that even has to necessarily be done solely by an
intimate partner. For instance, children take care of elderly parents all
the time. Extended family members as well. There are probably some
extended family or friends who are better at caregiving than some
people's kids, for instance. Again there's this emphasis on lifelong
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relationships. That, to me, seems intensely personal. I can understand
the state's interest in encouraging certain kinds of commitments during
key points in my lifetime when they involve care giving for somebody
else. And if we had a social value for care giving at the later state of life,
perhaps that would become part of the state's interest as well.
QUESTION: The whole issue of lifelong marriage is not one that
we raise today and as some of you who are married probably know
better than anybody else in this room, I'm constantly asked the
question, "what made your marriage endure?" More the norm is serial
marriage at this moment in history, and is there any talk about lawyers,
legal thinkers today, of an alternative form of marriage that would
contract people to remain together for a certain duration of time,
because that seems to be the major issue today. That to me concerns the
state. After the children are raised it seems that the state has less interest
in whether people stay together. I'm just wondering is there anything
out there on this subject?
DAVID L. CHAMBERS: Judith Younger has written extensively
about a proposition to make divorce very difficult to obtain while
children are being raised, unless one of the spouses can demonstrate that
the children are likely to be seriously harmed if the parents are forced to
remain together. On the other hand, she would leave divorce very easy
to get before there are any children or after the children are grown. She
has gotten, so far as I know, no legislative support, whatsoever, but the
answer to your question is yes. There are some people out there making
this suggestion.
QUESTION: [INAUDIBLE]
LYNN W. WARDLE: I'd like to pick up on that. It's not just the
economic or social welfare argument, but there's something about
commitment. It's a frightening thing to make a commitment, and yet
that's one of the key basis for the ordering of our society. I remember
seeing one of the firefighters who after 9-11 was being interviewed and
they were praising the courage of all the firefighters who'd gone into the
Twin Towers and his comment was that that wasn't brave or
courageous. The only courageous thing a firefighter does is when he
takes his oath as a firefighter. That's the courageous act. Everything after
that is simply keeping his word. There's something to keeping your
word. There's something to being able to say, I'll be there. And that is a
good part of the institution of marriage and promotion of stable
relationships. It's a very good point, very serious point. You have to
weigh the advantages that could accrue from extending this status or a
status like marriage to these couples. They're certainly at this point
speculative, but we might get some data out of Vermont and certainly in
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the Netherlands. Is this causing more stability in the relationships? More
fidelity in the relationship? You're talking about the transformative
effect of the institution on the new relationships that are taken into it.
That's a legitimate point, since I'm saying we need to consider the
potential transformative effect of those relationships upon those already
in marriage. But monogamy-the very eloquent language from the
Baker opinion about this is just a question of common humanity has
always seemed to me to be begging the question, wonderful rhetoric,
but there are so many other humans that are denied the right to marry.
Out in my state of Utah there's a man who's now in jail, Tom Green,
because he married five women. If a man wants to marry a number of
women, a woman wants to marry a number of men or you want to have
a communal marriage you're denied that preference. Fathers who want
to marry their daughters. Brothers and sisters who love each other.
Every year you get those examples in the newspaper. But there are
reasons for these restrictions. I spoke at a group called Tapestry of
Polygamy. They're refugees of polygamy, women who have escaped,
and they tell stories that raise substantial concerns and make you realize
that maybe there are some serious reasons why we say these relationships
should not be given preferred status. Tom Green was prosecuted
because one of his wives was thirteen years old when he married her and
got her pregnant. In fact, most of his wives were thirteen, fourteen,
fifteen, or sixteen or seventeen years old. There are concerns that flow
from those relationships. Well, I think I've answered it.
PAULA ETTELBRICK: I just want to respond to one thing. I
don't think we have to wait until Vermont is somewhere down the road
before we begin to look at its impact on gay and lesbian relationships
and whether they are or aren't going to last. There'll be some interesting
data from Vermont, to be sure. But so much of what has impacted the
longevity of gay and lesbian relationships is the personal character of
some of the people in the relationships and the level to which society
has become more accepting of lesbians and gay men: less violent, less
discriminatory, less hostile. That directly affects people's abilities to
sustain their relationships. The extent to which one's family accepts
one's relationship is proven time and time again to be critical to how
well people feel that they can function in that relationship. It's no fun
nor is it necessarily healthy to function in a closeted relationship. It's
happened. People have done it-for decades sometimes. I'm just
suggesting the idea, that given the social utility many of us find in
supporting same-sex relationships, I was genuinely just wondering what
the response from people like Steve would be. What's the value there?
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LYNN W. WARDLE: Let me just make a comment. A good
analogy is probably the effect of divorce on children. In the 1970s all of
the people writing about the effect permissive divorce laws would have
on children were saying there would be no harm, kids are resilient, they
may struggle or be confused for a few months, maybe a year, but would
be unharmed. But the longitudinal studies show a very different picture.
So I'm not saying that we can't forecast and speculate, but when I do
that people say, you're just speculating. I'm saying that when we get
some data, we're likely to see things that we hadn't expected.
PAULA ETTELBRICK: If marriage is proven to be such a social
good and such a social benefit, it's hard to imagine that taking the risk
towards allowing marriage would be a bigger risk than denying it.
Otherwise, I think your arguments have crumbled. Is marriage so
vulnerable that a few gay people getting married is going to make it fall
into the wayside? Same-sex marriage is bound to destroy, on some level,
our understanding of what marriage is. The patriarchal nature of
marriage, the gendered nature of marriage would probably change a bit.
And that's probably scary to a lot of folks. However, you almost have to
acknowledge the social benefits that will flow from it. If marriage has
such a strong social benefit, then let's take the risk and allow it to
happen.
MELISSA L. BREGER, MODERATOR: I still see many hands
up for questions. We are scheduled for a reception now, so I am going
to stop here. Thank you so much to our distinguished panelists. I'd also
like to just take a moment to thank all of the groups that helped make
this Symposium possible, including all of the student groups. As a law
student here, my classmates actually founded the Michigan Journal of
Gender & Law, so it is wonderful to see eight years later that it is still
thriving.
Thank you to the students and everybody else who have made this
possible today. We now have a few closing remarks from Dean Evan
Caminker and then we have a reception outside.
Thank you.
DEAN EVAN H. CAMINKER: I want to thank the Journal very
much for asking me to provide just a couple of closing remarks. The
cardinal rule about such remarks is basically to be laudatory, to be
thoughtful, and to be brief. I can guarantee the third. I can start with
the first, which is to say that we all owe a great deal of thanks to the
Michigan Journal of Gender & Law for doing such an incredibly
wonderful job in planning the Symposium, bringing such distinguished
people together, structuring a wonderful conversation, and executing
really a wonderful day, save maybe the cold walk to and from lunch. But
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if you can all join me in a round of applause for them. And obviously, as
well, thank you to all of the people who participated as panelists, as
members of the audience asking provocative questions. It's really been a
great day of wonderful conversation.
Such a great day of wonderful conversation that it makes it very
difficult to make any sort of summarizing effort here at the end of the
day, so I probably will try and be minimalist here. Unfortunately Lynn
Wardle already stole my opening line, which was going to be that really
the central inquiry of today's discussion was already captured by
Groucho Marx many years ago when he said, "Marriage is a wonderful
institution, but who wants to live in an institution?" The answer I
think, that we have for today, is a lot of us want to live in the institution
of marriage. The difficulty is figuring out exactly what the institution
ought to look like. As was brought out by any number of panelists today
in any number of ways, there's a huge gulf today between our sort of
idealized, formalized, received wisdom of what a marriage and a family
looks like, which of course, as we know, is a lifelong, binary agreement
between two heterosexual persons to come together, live forever, have
2.2 kids, buy a minivan, and learn to recycle. That picture is reality,
right? Reality is very different. We can quibble about numbers but
everybody agrees that a high percentage of marriages end in divorce.
This sounds horrible unless you consider the alternative, which is that
they end in death. It's not clear either one, when you put it that way, is
desirable. But we also have stepfamilies and single parents. And in
hearing all the stories about that as we went through the day, there are
bits and pieces of those stories that are quite depressing. But there are
also bits and pieces of those stories that are quite life-affirming and
inspirational.
There's also a gulf that leads us to, of course, the gulf between
marriage as we idealize it today, again, the received wisdom, and
marriage or family as we think it should be. Obviously any number of
us, including particularly those on this last panel, have very different
ideas about what the idealized version of marriage should be. But it is
clear that there are any number of people in this room that have their
own interesting and provocative ideas about how it should differ from
the received wisdom and ways in which we should try and get there
from here. But that, of course, is the problem. It's wonderful to have
these kinds of conferences precisely because it reminds us of how these
problems are incredibly complex, but unfortunately also reminds us of
all of the great burdens and hurdles that we have to surmount, wherever
our goal is, to get from here to there.
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I did promise to be brief, so I won't suggest an idea that I was
going to talk about, but I'll just flag it for you. I found it interesting that
in all the conversations today, in thinking about legal reform, people
have focused primarily on the role of state legislative bodies, secondarily
on the role of state courts, but very little on the Supreme Court of the
United States and its control over the content of federal constitutional
doctrine. The Supreme Court, of course, also helps to shape norms and
rules surrounding the family and marriage, whether it's defining the
actual right to marry, as in Loving v. Virginia, or ancillary rights that come
along with marriage, such as rights to certain kinds of sexual intimacy,
which of course the court has expanded to heterosexual couples. I think
the derivation of that after the Griswold case is pretty clear because they
have in mind the vision of a traditional married couple and are extending
only so far as to unmarried, traditional-looking, heterosexual couples.
However, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to extend rights of
sexual intimacy to homosexuals as the Bowers decision reminds us
(though the Lawrence case is on the horizon).
Secondly, thinking about the recent Troxel v. Granville case, where
the Supreme Court focuses on the automatic rights in parents to control
and have custody over their natural-born children, those rights that are
automatically given by the U.S. Constitution, incident to a legally
defined marriage. And one of my concerns is that even after we talk
about legal reforms through state legislative bodies or state judicial
bodies, we have to confront the fact that the Supreme Court focuses in
defining these rights on tradition. It's their mode of operation. They
may be a little bit faster at changing their minds than the Catholic
Church but not a lot and not particularly on this issue. So one of the
fears I have is that even if reformers get to be somewhat successful, as in
Vermont, in defining new structures of what counts as potential
marriage or domestic partnership, as long as the Supreme Court
continues to suggest that there are some ancillary rights that attach only
to the traditional or real form of marriage, there is still obviously going
to be a second-class citizenship of marriage or family. Troxel's a good
example only because, as I'm sure everybody in this room knows, the
Supreme Court there invalidated a Washington State statute that gave
visitation rights to a grandparent over the objection of a natural parent.
But just last month that Alabama Supreme Court said Troxel doesn't
apply when the parent is an adoptive parent. Again, somehow the
panoply of federal constitutional rights that come along to natural
parents don't automatically apply to parents who adopt.
I'm a little nervous about this. Obviously, state law can evolve itself
to fill in the gap. State laws, of course, have to some extent filled in the
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gap after Bowers, either by repealing sodomy statutes or state courts
interpreting their state constitutions to provide a broader right of
privacy than the federal constitution. But I'm still worried about the
symbolic effect, and we all know the symbolic effect of Bowers
independent of where state law itself chooses to go.
So I guess what I would say at the end of the day to the Beth
Robinsons of the world, and God knows, we need more of them, that
it's important to recognize that the burdens lie not only in convincing
state legislatures and state judicial bodies, but also to encourage federal
judges to understand that maybe constitutional law about the family has
to evolve just as much as state legislative and judicial rules about the
family do as well.
So in a sense, as we all know, at the end of the day life is complex,
and today's conference has been really wonderful in bringing out and
relating a lot of these complexities. We're at the end, but we're also
really at the beginning, because my sense is that all the participants in
today's conversation are leaving us with many new questions that they
will then as scholars, as advocates, as lawyers, hopefully go out and try
and address for our panel, next year, whenever it's going to be. I want to
thank you all again very much for coming and attending this wonderful
conference. And before you're allowed to go get food, we have one final
announcement.
STEPHANIE BAKER: Hello. I just wanted to take a moment to
thank someone who's been integral in today's event, and that's Nicole
Haaning. She is our symposium coordinator and we just wanted to take
a minute to express our gratitude. I'm speaking on behalf of all the
members of the Michigan Journal of Gender & Law, so if Nicole could
come down for a moment, we just got a little something, because she
definitely stepped up to the plate and took over a very daunting task of
seeing this whole symposium through, and I think she did a wonderful
job! Thank you Nicole!
NICOLE HAANING: Thank you so much. I'd also like to thank
all the speakers who came, especially those of you who traveled from far
away to brave our terrible weather and whose thoughtful contributions
really made today's event a huge success. Thank you so much for
coming!
I'd also like to thank the members of the Journal of Gender & Law
who pitched in to help the day run smoothly. Everyone got here,
everything worked out perfectly, so thank you to all of you.
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I'd also like to thank Stephanie Helfrich who really came up with a
proposal, invited all the speakers and really, I think, laid the
groundwork for today's event.
I would like to thank Stephanie Baker for her work on publicizing
this event. She was very creative, very hardworking, and I think her
efforts paid off, because we had a great turnout today!
I'd like to thank the other members of the symposium committee;
Janine Harvey, Sam Tuttle, Charlotte Gillingham, and Sharon Dolente.
I hope I'm not forgetting anyone, I don't think so!
And finally I'd like to thank Maureen Bishop, our publication
manager. And I'd like her to come down here. She's hiding in the back.
Maureen! And really her expertise, her guidance, really made this day a
success. She knew all the details, really all I had to do was listen to her!
It turned out great, thanks! Please help yourselves, there's food and
drink outside.
Thanks! t
